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The Power of Congress "Without Limitation":
The Property Clause and Federal Regulation
of Private Property
Peter A. Appelt
INTRODUCTION
Suppose that a single landowner held approximately thirty
percent of all land in the United States. With such wealth, the
owner might persuade the government to create extraordinary
rules to benefit him or her. For example, the owner might demand exemption from the doctrine of adverse possession because of the expense associated with monitoring the boundaries. Further, if the owner held the vast majority of the total
land in one state, the state legislature and fellow citizens might
react to the demands for special treatment with disdain, if not
outright hostility. They might even resort to condemning the
lands to break up the owner's monopoly.'
There is such a landowner with special rules that benefit
it, namely the United States. The United States owns land in
every state, approximately thirty percent of all of the land in
the United States, and approximately eighty percent of the
land in the state of Nevada. 2 Courts have created special rules
t Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. B.A., J.D.,
Yale University. I have discussed this Article with many people during its
progress. I would like to thank in particular my colleagues Milner S. Ball, J.
Randy Beck, Dan Coenen, Walter Hellerstein, Charles R.T. O'Kelley, and Alan
Watson, and those at other schools including Eugene Gaetke. Special thanks
go to Christine Loren Albright. Work on this article was funded in part with
summer support from the University of Georgia School of Law.
1. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241-43 (1984).
2. See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC
LAND STATISTICS 2000, at 7-10 tbl.1-3 (2001) (showing that in fiscal year 1999
the United States owned 27.7% of the land in the states and 82.9% of the land
in Nevada). This figure excludes land that the United States holds in trust for
Indian tribes and individual Indians. Because of the unique rules that surround the federal government's relationship with Indian tribes and individual
Indians, these problems are for the most part excluded from the analysis pre-
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for the United States, relieving it, for example, from the doctrines of adverse possession and prescription.3 Moreover, the
courts have held that the United States may take actions on its
lands that an ordinary landowner could not. 4 The rules concerning eminent domain also favor the United States greatly.
While the federal government may use its own power of eminent domain to acquire land for any public purpose, 5 including
lands owned by a state, 6 its own lands remain free from the
state power of eminent domain.7 Historically, the Supreme
Court has described the United States's power over its property
as "without limitation," 8 although more recently the Court acknowledged that the "furthest reaches of [this power] have not
yet been definitively resolved." 9 This acknowledgement poses
an obvious question: What are the "furthest reaches" of the
power that the Court has otherwise described as "without limitation"?
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court make this inquiry
especially timely. Until recently, most scholars believed that
Congress possessed almost unlimited power under the Commerce Clause, 10 making it unnecessary to explore other constitutional foundations for federal legislation. Then came the Su-

sented in this Article. The federal government's relationship with Indian
tribes is analyzed mostly under the Indian Commerce Clause. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to regulate commerce
"with the Indian Tribes").
3. See, e.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947). In that
case, the Supreme Court stated,
The [Federal] Government, which holds its interests here as elsewhere in trust for all the people, is not to be deprived of those interests by the ordinary court rules designed particularly for private disputes over individually owned pieces of property; and officers who
have no authority at all to dispose of Government property cannot by
their conduct cause the Government to lose its valuable rights by
their acquiescence, laches, or failure to act.
Id.
4. See, e.g., Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 100-01 (1928) (upholding
the culling of a deer herd on federal property in violation of state game laws).
5. See United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 679
(1896); Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1875).
6. See United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 242 (1946).
7. See Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 384-87 (1939) (holding
that a state cannot condemn lands that the United States owns in trust for
Indians unless authorized to do so by the Secretary of the Interior).
8. United States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940).
9. KIeppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 3.
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preme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez.11 In that
case, the Court invalidated a statute criminalizing the possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school. 12 Lopez marked
the first time that the Court had held an act unconstitutional
as exceeding Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause
since the New Deal. Lopez and its progeny have raised Commerce Clause issues with respect to numerous federal statutes
and regulations, including those in the environmental and
land-use fields. 13 The District of Columbia and Fourth Circuits
recently considered whether applications of the Endangered
Species Act exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce
applicaClause. Both courts eventually upheld the challenged
14
dissents.
vigorous
over
only
but
statute,
the
tions of
Curiously, the courts and commentators have paid little attention to the federal government's power over its own property, a power that the Constitution grants to the federal government independent of its power to regulate interstate
commerce. The federal government's power over its own property resides primarily in the Property Clause, which provides
in full: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in
this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any

11.

514 U.S. 549 (1995).

12.

See id. at 551.

13. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
121 S. Ct. 675, 683-84 (2001) (striking down an administrative interpretation
of "navigable waters" in the Clean Water Act in part because the interpretation raised significant constitutional questions); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000) (invalidating the Violence Against Women
Act because it exceeded Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce).
14. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.
Ct. 1081 (2001); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C.
Cir. 1997). Professor John Copeland Nagle reviewed the D.C. Circuit's decision in the Michigan Law Review and created a thoughtful Commerce Clause
justification for the Endangered Species Act. See John Copeland Nagle, The
Commerce ClauseMeets the Delhi Sands Flower-LovingFly, 97 MICH. L. REV.

174, 191-214 (1998); see also Eric Brignac, Recent Development, The Commerce Clause Justificationof Federal EndangeredSpecies Protection: Gibbs v.
Babbitt, 79 N.C. L. REV. 873 (2001). Other commentators have examined the
validity of the Endangered Species Act under the treaty power. See, e.g.,
Gavin R. Villareal, Note, One Leg to Stand on: The Treaty Power and Congres-

sional Authority for the EndangeredSpecies Act After United States v. Lopez,
76 TEx. L. REV. 1125 (1998); Omar N. White, Comment, The EndangeredSpecies Act's PrecariousPerch: A Constitutional Analysis Under the Commerce
Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215 (2000).
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Claims of the United States or of any particular State."'15 Under this Clause, Congress has the legislative authority to govern its own property as well as the property of others that may
affect federal lands. 16 Indeed, the Court has described the
power broadly in almost every case discussing the Clause.
These cases conclude that the federal government possesses
both proprietary and sovereign powers over its property, can
regulate activities on privately owned lands that affect its
lands, and exercises the equivalent of the police power in this
area. 17 The courts of appeals have further extended the reach
of the Property Clause to cover private activities that occur on
18
state-owned lands.
15. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Although I will refer to this as the
"Property Clause," others refer to it as the "Territorial Clause." The Constitution also provides for federal authority over what is now the District of Columbia and other federal enclaves in the so-called "Enclave Clause." This clause
provides Congress the power
[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the
Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over
all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in
which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17. Although I will explore the implications of the
differences between these two clauses throughout this Article, there are two
primary differences between the Property Clause and the Enclave Clause.
First, for land to fall under the Enclave Clause, the affected state must consent. Much of the case law in this area deals with the question of whether the
affected state has made a cession sufficient to grant exclusive jurisdiction to
the United States or the effect of such a cession on private parties. See, e.g.,
Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263-70 (1963); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 141-49 (1937); Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S.
647, 652 (1930); Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439, 454-55 (1929). Second, the Enclave Clause by its terms gives Congress exclusive legislative authority. By contrast, states retain the ability to legislate over federal property
not covered by the Enclave Clause, subject, of course, to the Supremacy
Clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land...."). The Supreme Court stated this second
conclusion in its decision in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976),
but that conclusion is subject to controversy.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (1927); Camfield v.
United States, 167 U.S. 518, 528 (1897).
17. See, e.g., Camfield, 167 U.S. at 525-26.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 186 F.3d 1055, 1061-62 (8th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1018, and cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1033 (2000);
Minnesota ex rel. Alexander v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249-51 (8th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
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The breadth of power conferred by the Property Clause as
presently interpreted suggests that Congress could, if it
wished, become more aggressive in regulating federal property
despite otherwise applicable state law. This possibility raises
interesting questions. What if Congress decided to authorize
an activity on federal lands that would otherwise contravene
state law? For example, suppose that the federal government
licensed casino gambling on national forests lying within states
that prohibit gambling. Could the state object and bar this
use? Moreover, what about the ability of the federal government to protect federal property from activities that occur off
of, or extraterritorial to, federal lands? Suppose that the federal government enacted a statute much like the one invalidated in Lopez, except that it prohibited people from carrying
firearms within 1000 feet of a federal building. Or suppose
that the federal government regulated pollution wholly outside
the provisions of the Clean Air Act 19 because it found such pollution damaging to national parks. 20 Finally, suppose that the
United States wished to enhance the visitor experience to an
existing national park. What if, to further this goal, Congress
directed the National Park Service to preserve the visual corridor leading to the park; expressly banned fast food restaurants,
trinket shops, and other unsightly structures; and devised clear
aesthetic requirements for nearby buildings that were more restrictive than local zoning laws? With regard to each of these
actions-permitting casino gaming on federal lands, banning
firearms within 1000 feet of a federal building, regulating air
pollution sources directly, or establishing aesthetic zoning to
protect the visual corridor to a national park-one can imagine
that certain local or state governments would vigorously pro19. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994). The Clean Air Act has special
provisions concerning the air quality for federal lands, but these are not directly germane to the question raised here. For a more thorough examination,
see infra note 532.
20. As early as 1980, the National Park Service reported to Congress that
acid rain was a threat to the future health of the national parks. See OFFICE
OF SCI. & TECH., NAT'L PARK SERV., STATE OF THE PARKS 1980: A REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS 34 (1980). The problems of air pollution in the national
parks-including both acid rain and visibility problems-have been discussed
in the legal literature as well. See Robert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal Lands I: Air PollutionLaw, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 1 (1993); William J. Lockhart, External Threats to Our National Parks:An Argument for
Substantive Protection, 16 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 3, 40 (1997); Diane M. Dale,
Note, The Boundary Dilemma at ShenandoahNational Park, 16 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 607, 626-27 (1997).
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test. If faced with these challenges, a federal court might invalidate these acts under the Commerce Clause. An alternative argument based on the Property Clause, however, suggests
that courts should sustain these hypothetical acts.
Despite the potentially sweeping authority that the Property Clause vests in the federal government, scholars of constitutional law have largely ignored the Clause.2 1 For example,
many took notice when the Fourth Circuit struck down the Violence Against Women Act as exceeding congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause. 22 Before the Supreme Court's decision on appeal, law professor and legal commentator Jeffrey
Rosen questioned how much the Supreme Court's reanalysis of
its Commerce Clause jurisprudence would change the legal
landscape:
[Ihf the Supreme Court strikes down the Violence Against Women
Act on [Commerce Clause grounds], it will call into question scores of
other federal laws and embolden states-rights judges on lower courts
to declare war on Congress. The Endangered Species Act, for example, regulates violence against animals, many of whom don't engage
in interstate travel. Will it soon be unconstitutional 23for Congress to
prohibit shooting a puma for sport in a national park?

Now that the Supreme Court has affirmed the Fourth Circuit and invalidated the Violence Against Women Act,24 is the
situation as dire as Rosen predicted? Has the Court tipped the
scale of federal-state relations so far toward state control that
Congress now lacks the authority to "prohibit shooting a puma

21. The leading comprehensive treatises on constitutional law devote
scant attention to the Property Clause. See 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOwAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3.6, at 362 n.6, § 3.11, at 390-93
(3d ed. 1999); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-8, at

848-50 (3d ed. 2000) (lumping the Property Clause in with congressional
power over bankruptcies). The leading casebooks used for teaching constitutional law either devote little or no attention to the subject. Searching four
casebooks for a reference to Kleppe v. New Mexico in the table of cases picks up
See PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF
no citations.
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 1562 (3d ed. 1992); DANIEL A. FARBER ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xxxviii (2d ed. 1998);
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xxxiv
(14th ed. 2001); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1572 (4th

ed. 2001). One casebook that does reprint an excerpt of Kieppe is WILLIAM
COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 210-12 (11th ed. 2001).

22. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820,
826 (4th Cir. 1999), affd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S 598
(2000).

23. Jeffrey Rosen, Hyperactive, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 31, 2000, at 20.
24. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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for sport in a national park?" 25 In a word, no. Rosen's prediction ignored the fact that the Property Clause has always provided and continues to vest Congress with such authority.
This sort of oversight is particularly unfortunate because of
the immense physical and legal scope of the Property Clause.
Physically, the federal government owns vast landholdings. Although much of this land is concentrated in the western continental United States and Alaska, the federal government owns
some real property in all fifty states, and it has the power to
acquire property within any state for public purposes. 26 Legally, even if the Property Clause does not confer broad power
over extraterritorial activities, it nevertheless empowers the
federal government to take action on its own lands in direct
contravention of state law. At a time when the judiciary, the
academy, and the bar vigorously debate the proper jurisdictional relations between the United States and the states, the
federal government's property and related exercises of federal
authority in the states should cause great interest. Nevertheless, the Property Clause has escaped widespread attention,
especially among scholars of constitutional law.
The academic commentary that does exist concerning the
Property Clause has generally taken two approaches. One approach uncritically assumes that the federal government possesses broad power to regulate and protect federal lands, and it
contemplates federal regulation of private property within a
state and outside the boundary of federal property.27 This body
25. Rosen, supra note 23, at 20.
26. See United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 681
(1896) ("It is, of course, not necessary that the power of condemnation for [preserving sites of historical importance like the battlefield at Gettysburg] be expressly given by the Constitution."); see also Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S.
367, 374 (1875) (stating that the federal government's right of eminent domain
is a plenary power not to be "diminished by a State").
27. See Harry R. Bader, Not So Helpless:Application of the U.S. Constitution Property Clause to Protect FederalParklandsfrom External Threats, 39
NAT. RESOURCES J. 193, 201-05 (1999); Eugene R. Gaetke, The Boundary Waters CanoeArea Wilderness Act of 1978: RegulatingNonfederal Property Under
The Property Clause, 60 OR. L. REV. 157, 167-69 (1981) [hereinafter Gaetke,
Boundary Waters]; Joseph L. Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks and
the Regulation of Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REV. 239, 250-55 (1976); James
J. Vinch, The TelecommunicationsAct of 1996 and Viewshed Protectionfor the
National Scenic Trails, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 93, 126-30 (1999). Two

articles that expressly take on the question of the overall scope of the federal
property power are Eugene R. Gaetke, Congressional Discretion Under the
Property Clause, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 381 (1981) [hereinafter Gaetke, Congres-

sional Discretion], and Blake Shepard, Comment, The Scope of Congress' Con-
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of writing-which the Article will refer to as the broad viewtypically ignores the history and potential expanse of the
Clause. The second category of literature grapples with the
history and breadth of the Clause, but argues that courts
should construe the power narrowly. This body of workswhich the Article will refer to as the narrow view-claims that
the federal government's power over its own property is that of
a mere proprietor, and not that of a sovereign. 28 This school of
thought asserts that, at a minimum, the states should generally control activities on federal lands. It views extraterritorial
assertions of federal power skeptically at best. Unfortunately,
neither body of writing satisfactorily treats the arguments of
29
the other.
This Article will urge that scholars adopting the broad
view reached the correct result, but that the proper basis for
their result lies in the historical work analyzed improperly by
scholars adopting the narrow view. Contrary to the narrow
view, the founders intended the Property Clause as a broad
grant of power to the federal government. In recognition of this
intent, the Supreme Court has correctly and deliberately interstitutionalPower Under the Property Clause: RegulatingNon-FederalProperty
to Further the Purposes of National Parks and Wilderness Areas, 11 B.C.
ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 479 (1984).
28. See Albert W. Brodie, A Question of Enumerated Powers: Constitutional Issues SurroundingFederalOwnership of the Public Lands, 12 PAC. L.J.
693, 706-15 (1981); David E. Engdahl, State and FederalPower over Federal
Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 361-62 (1976); Ronald F. Frank & John H.
Eckhard, Power of Congress Under the PropertyClause to Give Extraterritorial
Effect to FederalLands Law: Will "RespectingProperty"Go the Way of "Affecting Commerce"?, 15 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 663, 678-84 (1982); Robert E.
Hardwicke et al., The Constitution and the ContinentalShelf, 26 TEX. L. REV.
398, 426-32 (1948); Carolyn M. Landever, Whose Home on the Range? Equal
Footing,the New Federalism and State Jurisdictionon Public Lands, 47 FLA.
L. REV. 557, 576-84 (1995); C. Perry Patterson, The Relation of the Federal
Government to the Territoriesand the States in Landholding, 28 TEX. L. REV.
43, 60-62 (1949); Louis Touton, Note, The PropertyPower, Federalism, and the
EqualFootingDoctrine, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 817, 821-25 (1980).
29. Two exceptions to this statement are Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the
"Classic" Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C. L. REV. 617 (1985) [hereinafter
Gaetke, Refuting the "Classic"Theory], and Dale D. Goble, The Myth of the
Classic Property Clause Doctrine, 63 DENV. U. L. REV. 495 (1986). Both articles are responses primarily to Engdahl, supra note 28. In another context,
Professor Charles Wilkinson advocated a broad reading of the Property
Clause, but also conceded that Professor Engdahl's argument about its scope
"may have been what the framers of the Constitution intended." Charles F.
Wilkinson, The Field of Public Land Law: Some Connecting Threads and Future Directions, 1 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1, 9 (1980). As the text below demonstrates, I disagree with Professor Wilkinson's assessment.
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preted the Clause broadly. The Property Clause, properly understood, recognizes the United States as both proprietor and
sovereign over its property.
This conclusion, however, does not fully endorse the analysis associated with the broad view. For the most part, the proponents of the broad view have failed to appreciate fully the
implications of their argument. If the Court has properly read
the Property Clause broadly, then one must consider its potential reach and limitations. Few have tried to determine the
that the Supreme Court has said is
outer limits of the power
30
"without limitation."
In attempting to define the outer limits and implications of
the Property Clause power, this Article will proceed in three
Parts. Part I reviews the history and development of the
Clause from its antecedents under the Articles of Confederation, to the debates over the ratification of the Constitution,
and through the development of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence interpreting its reach. Using aspects of presently underanalyzed history, this Part refutes the narrow view of the Property Clause that vests the United States only with the powers
of an ordinary proprietor. Rather, this Part concludes that the
framers intended for the United States to have both sovereign
and proprietary power over its property, and that the Court
has, with one exception, properly interpreted the Clause
broadly in accordance with these basic principles. Readers who
accept these propositions readily may wish to skip to Part II,
which considers the intrinsic and extrinsic limitations on the
federal government's authority under the Property Clause. It
concludes that the federal government's power over its own
property or activities thereon is most analogous to the spending
power. 3 1 As for federal regulation of extraterritorial activities
affecting federal lands, courts should review such actions by
drawing analogies to Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Part III
then applies this reformulated view of the Property Clause
power, briefly sketching its implications for federal land management and the relationship between the federal government
and the states.

30. See Gaetke, CongressionalDiscretion, supra note 27; Sax, supra note
27, at 253-55; Shepard, supra note 27, at 533-37.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 1 (granting Congress the power to raise
taxes and spend for the general welfare).
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I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PROPERTY CLAUSE
Any argument that contends that the federal government
has extensive regulatory jurisdiction within the states will necessarily raise some eyebrows. At the very minimum, however,
the Property Clause vests sovereign power in the federal government to control activities on and dispositions of its own
lands, and exercises of this authority preempt state control.
These conclusions stem from the Property Clause itself, which
grants to Congress the power "to dispose of' and to make "all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States,"32 and from the Supremacy Clause, which provides that the Constitution and laws
made pursuant to it are the "supreme Law of the Land."33 The
Property Clause's unconditional wording resembles that of
other broadly interpreted clauses, such as3 6the power over immigration,34 patents, 35 or foreign relations.
Should words alone not prove persuasive, the case law developed under the Property Clause should convince the skeptic
of the Clause's broad grant of power. In almost all of its
cases-and especially in a series of cases decided after the Civil
War-the Supreme Court described the power over federal
property granted in the Property Clause in sweeping terms.
Although the Court has acknowledged that the "full scope of
this paragraph has never been definitely settled," it has nevertheless held that "[p]rimarily, at least, it is a grant of power to
the United States of control over its property."37 This control
can take myriad forms. "The United States can prohibit absolutely or fix the terms on which its property may be used. As it
38
can withhold or reserve the land it can do so indefinitely."
Indeed, "[t]he power over the public land... entrusted to Con32. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
33. Id. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land.... ").
34. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting to Congress the power "[t]o establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization").
35. Id. cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
36. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
318 (1936).

37. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89 (1907).
38. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911).
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gress [by the Property Clause] is without limitations." 39 This
power exceeds those of an ordinary proprietor because it resembles the police power possessed by the states.40 Finally, the
Court has held that the federal government's authority over its
own property displaces state and local authority:
[Although] for many purposes a State has civil and criminal jurisdiction over lands within its limits belonging to the United States...
this jurisdiction does not extend to any matter that is not consistent
with full power in the United States to protect its lands, to control
their use4 1and to prescribe in what manner others may acquire rights
in them.

In this regard, the federal government "exercises the powers
both of a proprietor and of a legislature over the public domain."42 While controversy surrounds assertions of federal
power over extraterritorial private and state activities, it
should be generally accepted that the federal government has
broad authority over its own property and can displace conflicting exercises of state authority over activities occurring directly
on federal lands.
Nevertheless, holders of the narrow view of the Property
Clause assert that the federal government does not have this
broad authority, or at least that the federal government would
not have this power if not for improper court interpretations.
Those who read the Property Clause narrowly range from extremists to more subtle critics. The extremists take several
views. Some extremists argue that the United States can only
own property within a state if that property falls under the En-

39. United States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940).
40. As the Court stated in Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243
U.S. 389 (1917),
[T]he inclusion within a State of lands of the United States does not
take from Congress the power to control their occupancy and use, to
protect them from trespass and injury and to prescribe the conditions
upon which others may obtain rights in them, even though this may
involve the exercise in some measure of what commonly is known as
the police power.
Id. at 405; see also Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525 (1897) ("The
general Government doubtless has a power over its own property analogous to
the police power of the several States, and the extent to which it may go in the
exercise of such power is measured by the exigencies of the particular case.").
41. Utah Power & Light, 243 U.S. at 404; see also Camfield, 167 U.S. at
525-26 ("[We do not think the admission of a Territory as a State deprives
[the federal government] of the power of legislating for the protection of the
public lands, though it may thereby involve the exercise of what is ordinarily
known as the police power .. ").
42. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976).
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clave Clause, which provides Congress with the authority to
legislate for the District of Columbia and other federal enclaves. 4 3 Otherwise, the vast public domain that existed in
states other than the original thirteen-and which still exists
in many western states-should belong to the states and not
the United States.44 Other extremists assert that the United
States retains only the power to dispose of its property through
45
sales, but that it cannot retain the property for the long term.
More subtle advocates of the narrow view concede that the
United States owns the public domain and can retain it indefinitely, but argue that the federal government has, with some
exceptions,
only the powers of an ordinary proprietor over its
46
property.
43. See supra note 15 (providing the full text of the Enclave Clause).
44. See Patterson, supra note 28, at 61; see also Landever, supra note 28,
at 605-12 (arguing that the equal footing doctrine appears to require transfer
of all retained lands to states, but recognizing that such transfer is presently
unworkable). The extreme position that the federal government cannot own
any land within a state except for those lands described by the Enclave Clause
is frequently associated with the movements variously known as the Sagebrush Rebellion and the County Supremacy Movement. For an extended and
thorough argument against this view, see Paul Conable, Comment, Equal
Footing,County Supremacy, and the Western Public Lands, 26 ENVTL. L. 1263
(1996); see also Richard D. Clayton, Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who
Should Control the Public Lands?, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 505. Although the
County Supremacy Movement enjoyed much popularity for a time, it lacks any
legal basis. See United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the United States validly owns public lands within a state's boundaries and is not required to hold the land in trust for the establishment of future states).
45. See, e.g., Brodie, supra note 28, at 721-22.
46. See Engdahl, supra note 28, at 296-300. Engdahl presented perhaps
the most elaborate theory concerning federal and state control of federal lands.
According to Engdahl, one could summarize the "classic property clause doctrine" in two propositions:
[Als to federal property covered by [the Enclave Clause], the governmental jurisdiction of the United States was by constitutional prescription exclusive; as to federal property covered only by the [Property Clause], however, the states enjoyed general governmental
jurisdiction and the United States had only a limited power akin to
that of a proprietor.
Id. at 296. Engdahl acknowledged that the United States could own land
within the states, and that it could continue to own ungranted or otherwise
unceded lands. Id. at 295. To take account of certain cases that appear to go
against his two propositions, Engdahl subjected his general rules to four exceptions. First, Engdahl conceded that federal law governed private acquisition of interests in federal land. See id. at 296. Second, the federal government could exercise legislative jurisdiction over lands covered by the Property
Clause (as opposed to the Enclave Clause) if the lands were used to further an
enumerated power of Congress. Thus, if the federal government acquired land
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All of the narrow readers of the Property Clause rest their
claims on history, some case law, the structure of the Constitution, and considerations of federalism. Their history begins
with their understanding of the acquisition of lands that some
of the original thirteen states claimed in the West. 47 It then
turns to an account of cases from the nineteenth and early
twentieth century that appear to limit federal authority over
federal property. The authorities that they claim bolster their
interpretation include Pollard v. Hagan and other cases interpreting the equal footing doctrine, 48 Fort Leavenworth Railroad

to run a post office, it could exercise legislative jurisdiction over the post office
even though the state had not made the cession of jurisdiction necessary for
the Enclave Clause to apply because running a post office furthers an enumerated power. Id. at 297-99 (discussing Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367
(1875)). Engdahl traced this second exception to his general rule to the Necessary and Proper Clause and the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities,
and not to any independent power that the Property Clause may create. Id. at
299. Third, Engdahl argued that states could make limited cessions of legislative jurisdiction to the federal government that would not satisfy the Enclave
Clause but would confer jurisdiction to exercise authority under the Property
Clause. See id. at 304-06 (tracing the development of the doctrine that states
could cede legislative jurisdiction over lands that the federal government
would manage under the Property Clause). Fourth, the federal government
could make legislative rules to protect federal property from harm, but only
rules that a landowner could obtain through private litigation. See id. at 30608 (discussing Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897)).
47. See, e.g., Brodie, supra note 28, at 695-98; Engdahl, supra note 28, at
290-91; Patterson, supra note 28, at 43-57.
48. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). The equal footing doctrine is the rule
that provides that new states are admitted to the Union with the same attributes of sovereignty as the original thirteen states. The principal practical application of the doctrine is that it vests all submerged lands under inland
navigable waterways in the new state. See United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S.
1, 5 (1997); Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195-98
(1987). Title to lands beneath the ocean nevertheless remains in the United
States absent legislation, see United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947),
and the United States can reserve submerged lands or grant them to private
parties before statehood, and the submerged lands will consequently not pass
to the new state upon its admission. See Idaho v. United States, 121 S. Ct.
2135, 2142-43 (2001); United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. at 34-36 (upholding
executive reservation); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48 (1894) (holding that
"Congress has the power to make grants of lands below high water mark of
navigable waters in any Territory of the United States"). The Court has also
extended the equal footing doctrine beyond the submerged lands context. See
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 203-04
(1999) (discussing the equal footing doctrine in the context of state management of natural resources); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (holding unconstitutional the restriction in the state admission act that prohibited the
state from relocating the state capital).
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Co. v. Lowe, 49 Ward v.Race Horse,50 Kansas v. Colorado,51
Omaechevarriav. Idaho,52 and Colorado v. Toll. 53 Structurally,
some of these scholars argue that the placement of the Property
Clause in Article IV, rather than Article I, supports the narrow
view. While Article I enumerates Congress's central powers,
Article IV grants Congress authority concerning new states, indicating that the Property Clause power relates only to transferring land to new states, not to land retained by the United
States. 54 Their federalism claims center around their concern
that the vast landholdings of the United States will give it too
much power to control activities within a state. Parts II and III
will discuss these arguments more thoroughly.
For supporters of broad federal authority over federal
lands, the historical argument takes a different form, to the extent that it is made at all. Although this view also begins with
evidence from western land claims and constitutional convention debates, it primarily reinterprets the historical evidence
offered by the opponents of a broader interpretation. 55 The
proponents of the broad view then turn to the case law following the ratification of the Constitution, especially United States
v. Gratiot,56 and then to the post-Civil War cases quoted earlier,57 relying heavily on such cases as Camfield v. United
States58 and United States v. Alford.59 The defense of the broad
reading typically concludes with a defense of Kleppe v. New
Mexico. 60 Usually, however, proponents of the broad view ignore the historical arguments and, relying on the cases that
read the Clause broadly, argue for some application of the
Clause to a particular situation. 6 1
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

114 U.S. 525 (1885).
163 U.S. 504 (1896).
206 U.S. 46 (1907).
246 U.S. 343 (1918).
268 U.S. 228 (1925).
See Brodie, supra note 28, at 720-21; Landever, supra note 28, at 577-

78.
55. See, e.g, Gaetke, Refuting the "Classic"Theory, supra note 29, at 62338; Goble, supra note 29, at 511-32.
56. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840).
57. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
58. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
59. 274 U.S. 264 (1927).
60. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).

61. See, e.g., Bader, supra note 27 (arguing that the National Park Service
does not need additional legislative authority to protect national parks from
external threats because of the authority conferred by the Property Clause);
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The historical debate concerning the origins and interpretation of the Property Clause properly begins with the disputes
over the western territories claimed by some of the states. For
the most part, however, scholars on both sides lose the richness
of the debates that led to the drafting of the Articles of Confederation and the subsequent role that the western land claims
played in the drafting and ratification of the Constitution.
These arguments form an important basis for understanding
the early case law and any apparent confusion over whether
the Property Clause should be read narrowly or broadly. Sadly,
the modern Property Clause debate also largely ignores the one
case in which the Supreme Court definitively interpreted the
62
Property Clause narrowly, namely the Dred Scott decision.
That decision provides the Court's sole rejection of the broad
reading of the Property Clause, and the Court's subsequent
repudiation of the decision supports the broader view. In
tracing the development of modern Property Clause doctrine,
this Part augments the historical points made elsewhere to
show that courts properly interpret the Property Clause
broadly.
The historical material that follows will not demonstrate,
however, that the founders intended to make a broad grant of
power to the federal government to control extraterritorial activities that affect federal lands. The historical documents give
little or no evidence as to whether the founders envisioned this
application of the Property Clause. This assertion should come
as no surprise, for, as the Supreme Court has observed, "[tihe
Federal Government undertakes activities today that would
have been unimaginable to the Framers ... ."63 Nevertheless,
Gaetke, Boundary Waters, supra note 27 (arguing that Congress had authority
under the Property Clause to create protections for the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness); Sax, supra note 27, at 254-55 (arguing for the use of the
Property Clause power to increase protection for national parks from peripheral threats); Vinch, supra note 27, at 126-30 (arguing that Congress could,
under the Property Clause, authorize the National Park Service to regulate
telecommunication towers visible from national trails).
62. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
63. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992). So that I am not
accused of quoting this language out of context, the full quotation is:
The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have
been unimaginable to the Framers in two senses; first, because the
Framers would not have conceived that any government would conduct such activities; and second, because the Framers would not have
believed that the FederalGovernment, rather than the States, would
assume such responsibilities. Yet the powers conferred upon the Federal Government by the Constitution were phrased in language broad
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the historical setting of the Property Clause, the documentary
evidence that survives, and early interpretations of the Clause
all confirm that the founders envisioned this power broadly.
The following historical examination ultimately demonstrates
that a broad view of the Property Clause is not inconsistent
with the view of the founders.

A. THE DRAFTING AND EARLY BROAD INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
PROPERTY CLAUSE

The Property Clause emerged from the intense debate over
the fate of the western land grants of the original states. 64
Some states-Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, New York,
Virginia, and the Carolinas-had acquired extensive grants
from the British Crown that extended far into the West, even to
the Pacific Ocean or the South Seas. 65 The others-Delaware,
Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations-did not have such
grants. Before the Revolutionary War, the British Crown terminated the grants that crossed the continent at the Mississippi after Britain acquiesced to Spain's claim of ownership. 66
Through the Quebec Act of 1774,67 Parliament further restricted the claims of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,
and Virginia north of the Ohio River by transferring these
lands to the province of Quebec, thus depriving the American
colonies of what one scholar estimated to be over 175 million
acres. 68 Eventually, the Declaration of Independence cited this
transfer of land, as well as other limitations that the British
had placed upon alienability of land in the West, among its justifications for severing ties with Britain. 69
enough to allow for the expansion of the Federal Government's role.
Id. My contention is that the Property Clause was "phrased in language broad
enough to allow for the expansion of the Federal Government's role," at least
with regard to federal property. Id.
64. For general histories of the western land claims, see THOMAS PERKINS
ABERNETHY, WESTERN LANDS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1937); PAUL
W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 49-57 (1968); PETER
S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL
CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1775-1787 (1983).
65. See GATES, supra note 64, at 49.
66. Id.
67. British North American Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, ch. 83 (Eng.).
68. GATES, supra note 64, at 49.
69. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 22 (U.S. 1776) ("For abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province, establishing therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as to
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The Declaration of Independence staked out a united front,
but in fact the question of land claims and boundary disputes
fractured the states. These issues confronted the states and
the new union in at least three ways. First, the boundaries between the states were not clear. For example, Pennsylvania
faced two major boundary disputes: one with Connecticut over
the Wyoming Valley in northeastern Pennsylvania, and another with Virginia over the region near Pittsburgh.7 0 Second,
the states disputed the boundaries of their western claims. The
various charters granted to the states often described the same
land, leading states to make grants of the same physical property to conflicting grantees. Third, and most importantly for
purposes of this Article, the states without western land grants
greatly resented the claims of the landed states. The nonlanded states believed that the western lands should constitute
a common fund for discharging the debt that the United States
incurred to finance the Revolutionary War.7 1 Maryland took
the lead on this charge, refusing to ratify the original Articles
because they did not deal effectively with the western land
claims.7 2 Not surprisingly, the landed states laid claim to their
lands because of the terms of their grants.
Addressing these problems-and the related questions of
whether new states could be created and, if so, by what authority-became one of the central concerns of the government under the Articles of Confederation and the subsequent Constitution. After experimenting with state management of the
render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these Colonies."); id. para. 9 ("He has endeavored to prevent the
population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migration
hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.").
70. See ONUF, supra note 64, at 49-73.
71. See GATES, supra note 64, at 50-51; ONUF, supra note 64, at 14-15.
72. For a charming, but dated, history of Maryland's involvement with
this issue, see HERBERT B. ADAMS, MARYLAND'S INFLUENCE IN FOUNDING A

NATIONAL COMIONWEALTH (Baltimore, John Murphy 1877). Adams's account
is called into question by the work of Merrill Jensen. See MERRILL JENSEN,
THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIALCONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMiERICAN REVOLUTION 1774-1781, at 15060, 202-05 (1940) [hereinafter JENSEN, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION]; Merrill
Jensen, The Cession of the Old Northwest, 23 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 27, 27

(1936) [hereinafter Jensen, Cession] (attributing Maryland's interest not to
"patriotic abstraction and national vision" but to "hopes of the members of
speculative land companies"). For a modern response to Jensen, see Lemuel
Molovinsky, Maryland and the American West at Independence, 72 MD. HIST.
MAG. 353 (1977).
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western lands, the founders ultimately addressed these concerns by vesting broad authority over these lands in the federal
government. The early case law and commentary interpreting
the reach of the Property Clause reflected this move from state
management to broad federal authority.
1. The Western Land Claims Under the Articles of
Confederation and in the Debates over Ratifying the
Constitution
The Articles of Confederation did not adequately address
the three intertwined problems of interstate boundary disputes,
conflicting land grants, and the ultimate disposition of the
western lands. The omission was intentional. As originally
proposed in the Continental Congress, the Articles provided
that boundary disputes between the colonies would be settled
by agreement or somehow left for Congress to decide. 73 During
the subsequent amendment and adoption of the Articles of Confederation, the drafters stripped the national government of
73. The original draft of the Articles of Confederation as submitted to the
Continental Congress on July 12, 1776, contained three provisions concerning
the boundaries of the colonies and settling disputes between colonies. Article
XV discussed the jurisdiction that the colonies would exercise once the
boundaries were agreed to or otherwise ascertained. 5 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 550 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed.,
1906) [hereinafter JOURNALS] (resolutions and deliberations from 1776). Article XVIII granted Congress the power to settle boundary disputes between
colonies, to limit the boundary of any colony that claimed its territory extended to the South Sea, to assign territories for new colonies and to dispose
"of all such Lands for the general Benefit of all the United Colonies." 5 id. at
550-51. Article XX allowed Canada to join the confederation upon its assent to
the Articles, but allowed no other colony to be admitted to the confederation
unless nine colonies agreed. 5 id.at 554. These provisions, especially the proposed Article XVIII power of Congress to limit the boundaries of the colonies,
were the subject of intense debate. See John Adams, Notes of Debates in the
Continental Congress (1776), reprinted in 6 JOURNALS, supra, at 1076-83.
When the Continental Congress considered the second draft of the Articles, it
postponed consideration on all of these proposed provisions except the clause
allowing Canada to join the union. See 5 JOURNALS, supra, at 680-82, 688. In
the meantime, the article pertaining to the settlement of the boundaries of the
states and conflicting land claims was renumbered Article XIV, and it provided that Congress would have the power of "deciding all disputes and differences now subsisting, or that hereafter may arise between two or more States
concerning boundaries, jurisdictions, or any other cause whatever." 5 id. at
681-82. Contemporary letters of the members of the Continental Congress
also reveal that the western land claims and the boundary disputes proved a
huge area of contention. See, e.g., 5 id. at 616 n.1 (reprinting a portion of a letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams where John Adams raises questions for
debate).
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much of this proposed authority.7 4 Specifically, the Articles, as
sent to the states for ratification, limited Congress's powers to
settling interstate boundary disputes only upon petition by one
of the affected states; settling conflicting private land claims issued by two or more states (but not the extent of any of the
claims made by states to land in the West); and admitting a
new colony only if nine states agreed. More importantly, no
state would lose property to the United States. The proposed
Articles did not give Congress the power to acquire, own, or
manage land. By implication, the Articles left the western land
claims in the hands of the landed states.
The nonlanded states strenuously objected to the disposition of the western land claims in the Articles of Confederation
as sent to the states for ratification. Maryland moved to amend
the Articles to authorize the United States to appoint commissioners who would "ascertain and restrict the boundaries of
such of the confederated states which claim to extend to the
river Mississippi, or South Sea."75
Congress rejected the

74. Specifically, the Continental Congress eliminated the draft language
that would have granted Congress the exclusive power to determine the western boundary of the states claiming to the Mississippi or to the South Sea. 9
JOURNALS, supra note 73, at 807-08 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1907)
(resolutions and deliberations from 1777). Subsequently, the Continental
Congress amended the boundary-settling provisions of the draft to include an
elaborate, judicial-like procedure for settling interstate boundary disputes.
See 9 id. at 842-43. The draft also provided that "no State shall be deprived of
territory for the benefit of the United States." 9 id. at 843. Congress then appointed a committee to make necessary additions to the draft Articles. 9 id. at
885. The committee proposed that Congress have the power to settle conflicting private land grants issued by two or more states. 9 id. at 890. Congress
incorporated this proposal into the draft articles. 9 id. at 899-900. The provision allowing Canada into the Confederation upon its accession to the Articles
remained, as did the language stating that "no other colony shall be admitted
into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine states"; these provisions were renumbered Article 12. 9 id. at 924. These paragraphs became the
final resolution of these matters in the Articles as adopted by the Continental
Congress, although the article containing the procedure for settling boundary
disputes and conflicting land grants was renumbered Article 9. 9 id. at 91519. New York and Connecticut proposed amendments to the procedure for deciding interstate boundary disputes, but these were rejected. 9 id. at 925-28.
For a capsule history of the land claim provisions of the Articles, see Eric M.
Freedman, Why ConstitutionalLawyers and HistoriansShould Take a Fresh
Look at the Emergence of the Constitutionfrom the ConfederationPeriod:The
Case of the Drafting of the Articles of Confederation, 60 TENN. L. REV. 783,
822-25 (1993).
75. 11 JOURNALS, supra note 73, at 632 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed.,
1908) (resolutions and deliberations from 1778).
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amendment.7 6 Rhode Island unsuccessfully moved to amend
the Articles to provide that Crown lands would become property of the United States to be "disposed of and appropriated by
Congress for the benefit of the whole confederacy, reserving,
however, to the states, within whose limits such crown lands
may be, the entire and complete jurisdiction thereof."77 The
New Jersey delegation laid out that state's concerns about the
Articles, two of which have relevance here. First, the absence
of a means to settle boundary disputes between the states
prompted New Jersey to request the establishment of a resolution mechanism within five years after ratification. 78 Second,
New Jersey, like Rhode Island, requested the vesting of all
crown lands into the common property of the United States,
with jurisdiction over each parcel of land remaining in the respective state that ceded it. 79 All of the states, argued New
Jersey,
have fought and bled for it, in proportion to their respective abilities,
and therefore the reward ought not to be predilectionally distributed.
Shall such states as are shut out by situation from availing themselves of the least advantage from this quarter, be left to sink under
an enormous debt, whilst others are enabled, in a short period, to replace all their expenditures from the hard earnings of the whole confederacy?80

Despite this plea, the Continental Congress rejected New Jer81
sey's suggested amendment to the Articles.
Although most of the nonlanded states eventually ratified
the Articles, 82 Maryland steadfastly refused because of the
western lands issue.
Maryland's refusal continued even
though, as early as September 1778, Congress proposed that
the states with western land claims cede them to the United
States. 83 On January 6, 1779, Maryland submitted to Congress
its lengthy objection to the Articles, focusing entirely on the
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

11 id.
11 id.
11 id.
11 id.
11 id.

at 637.
at 639.
at 649.
at 649-50.
at 650.

81.

llid.

at 651.

82. Some of the nonlanded states noted in their ratification the unfairness
of how the Articles dealt with the western lands. See 12 id. at 1162 (Worthington Chauncy Ford ed., 1908) (noting New Jersey's objection to the Articles in the resolutions and deliberations from 1778); 13 id. at 187 (noting
Delaware's objection to the Articles in the resolutions and deliberations from
1778).

83. See 12 id. at 931.
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lack of provisions requiring the landed states to relinquish
their claims for the common good. 84 Like Rhode Island and
New Jersey, Maryland believed it unjust that some states could
pay off their debts by selling these lands while others had no
such resource available.85 Unlike the New Jersey and Rhode
Island suggestions, however, Maryland did not envision that
the landed states would retain jurisdiction over the ceded
lands. Instead, Maryland argued that allowing such states to
retain their lands raised the specter of the landed states setting
up new states as loyal lackeys to their parents.8 6 To defeat this
possibility, Maryland was convinced that
policy and justice require[d] that a country unsettled at the commencement of this war, claimed by the British crown, and ceded to it
by the treaty of Paris, if wrested from the common enemy by the blood
and treasure of the thirteen states, should be considered as a common
property, subject to be parcelled out by Congress into free, convenient
and independent governments, in such manner and
at such times as
87
the wisdom of that assembly shall hereafter direct.

Maryland maintained that it would not ratify the Articles until
Congress had the authority to govern the western lands free
from state interference. 88
Maryland's refusal to ratify the Articles of Confederation
coincided with two acts of landed states that demanded the attention of Congress. First, the Virginia General Assembly issued a remonstrance against the Continental Congress for considering the claims of the Vandalia Company, a private group
of land speculators that claimed huge tracts of land in Virginia's western territory.8 9 Second, New York enacted a statute
84. See 13 id. at 29 (resolutions and deliberations from 1779); see also 14
id. at 622 n.1.
85. See 14 id. at 621.
86. 14 id.
87. 14 id. at 621-22.
88. 14 id. at 622.
89.

See 10 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 557

(Richmond, George Cochran 1822); see also 15 JOURNALS, supra note 73, at
1063-65 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1909) (setting out a memorial of the
Vandalia land company and referring the claim to committee in the resolutions and deliberations from 1779). Virginia claimed in its remonstrance that
the United States could not adjudicate the Vandalia claim and that, if it did,
the precedent would "establish in congress a power which in process of time
must degenerate into an intolerable despotism." HENING, supra, at 557. Virginia also urged that "[tihe United States hold no territory but in right of some
one individual state in the Union." Id. at 558. Land companies like the Vandalia Company were quite common during this period and afforded the opportunity for investors to speculate on vacant lands in the west and elsewhere.
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ceding its western territory to the United States in order to "accelerate the federal alliance, by removing... [this] impediment
to its final accomplishment." 90
The Continental Congress responded to Maryland's objection to the Articles, the Virginia remonstrance, and the New
York cession by appointing a committee that issued a report
that Congress subsequently adopted. The report concluded
that revisiting the merits of the western land claims would be
pointless, and instead called upon
those states which can remove the embarrassment respecting the
western country, a liberal surrender of a portion of their territorial
claims, since they cannot be preserved entire without endangering
the stability of the general confederacy; to remind them how indispensibly necessary it is to establish the federal union on a fixed and
permanent91 basis, and on principles acceptable to all its respective
members.

92
Congress sent this imploring declaration to all of the states.
Virginia enacted a resolution ceding its lands to the United
States in January 1781, although its cession required the
United States to treat as void all land grants from Indians and
others-i.e., those grants on which land speculators pinned
their claims. 93 As a result of Virginia's conditioned cession,
New York added a similar proviso to its cession of land to the
United States. 94 With Virginia's cession, Maryland lost its
principal objection to the Articles of Confederation and ratified
them. 95 It took three more years for Congress to formally accept the Virginia cession, a delay that historian Merrill Jensen

90. Act of Feb. 19, 1780, ch. 38, reprinted in 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK 38 (New York, Thomas Greenleaf 1792). Importantly, in addition to authorizing its delegates to cede the soil, the New York legislature authorized its
delegates to cede legislative jurisdiction over the lands. Id. at 39. Although
the New York claim was not based on its charter and therefore was not the
strongest claim, see ONUF, supra note 64, at 103-04, this proposed cession of
jurisdiction answered Maryland's objection to the Articles.
91. 17 JOURNALS, supra note 73, at 806 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed.,
1910) (resolutions and deliberations from 1780).
92. 17 id. at 807.
93. 10 HENING, supra note 89, at 564-66; see also Jensen, Cession, supra
note 72, at 35.
94. See 19 JOURNALS, supra note 73, at 209-13 (Worthington Chauncey
Ford ed., 1912) (resolutions and deliberations from 1781).
95. See 19 id. at 138-39, 213-14. There is also evidence that pressure from
the French ambassador also prompted Maryland's accession to the Articles of
Confederation. See JENSEN, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 72, at
236-37; EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC 1763-89, at 112 (3d
ed. 1992).
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attributed to96the continued machinations of the land companies
in Congress.
Whether Maryland acted based on principle or a desire to
promote the interests of its prominent land speculators bears
no relevance to the issues discussed here. 97 Whatever Maryland's motive, the history reveals that the western lands, the
question of who should control them, and the eventual decision
to vest that authority in the United States rather than the individual states received significant attention from the Continental Congress. Despite the pending war, the leaders of the
new country carefully considered these questions because of
their immediate importance, regardless of whether that importance stemmed from principle or greed.
After the war ended, the western land issue continued to
occupy the attention of the Continental Congress. The lack of
express authorization in the Articles of Confederation to govern
these lands did not prevent Congress from legislating for the
western territories ceded by the landed states. Once it had finalized the receipt of Virginia's cession of territory, 98 Congress
enacted three acts now known as the Ordinance of 1784, the
Land Act of 1785, and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. The
first of these three statutes established a system to transform
the newly acquired territory into subunits with provisional
governments that would eventually become states. 99 This ordinance specifically provided that the provisional governments
would not interfere with the United States's disposing of the
territory or "with the ordinances and regulations which Congress may find necessary" to implement the sale of the western
lands.1°° The plan set forth in the Ordinance of 1784 proved
96. See Merrill Jensen, The Creation of the National Domain, 1781-1784,
26 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 323 (1939).
97. See MORGAN, supra note 95, at 110-12; Jensen, Cession, supra note 72,

at 27.
98. See 26 JOURNALS, supra note 73, at 112-17 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1928)
(resolutions and deliberations from 1784). New Jersey had taken up the cause
of the land speculators and attempted unsuccessfully to force Congress to adjudicate Virginia's right to the land. See 26 id. at 110-12. In the end, the New
Jersey delegation moved to amend the act accepting the cession, and, when
Congress rejected the amendment, New Jersey voted against accepting the
land cession from Virginia. 26 id. at 116-17.
99.

See 26 id. at 275-79.

100. 26 id. at 277. Robert Berkhofer has argued that the draft version of
the Ordinance of 1784 that appears in the modern edition of the Journalsof
the Continental Congress suffers from "particularly bad editing," with the result that both parts of the committee reports and the amendments to the act
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unworkable and never went into effect. 10 1 The Land Act of
1785 established a system for surveying and selling the newly
acquired territory. 102 This system of surveying land still survives today. Finally, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 replaced
the Ordinance of 1784 and created a system of government for
the land acquired from Virginia northwest of the Ohio River. 103
The Northwest Ordinance also anticipated that the federal government would continue to own land in the territory even after
portions became states and to make regulations as necessary
for its disposal. 1°4
Thus, during the period of the Articles of Confederation,
the question of the ownership of and governance over the western lands occupied a considerable amount of time of the Continental Congress. In that period, the country saw a complete
shift from an express rejection of the notion of federal ownership of the western territories to a complete embrace of it.
Moreover, the Continental Congress considered the distinction
between simple federal ownership of the land with the states
retaining political sovereignty (the New Jersey and Rhode Island proposal) and combined federal ownership and sovereignty
(the Maryland view). Although Congress adopted none of the
proposed amendments to the Articles, it considered early on
whether states would retain jurisdiction over ceded lands. The
era of the Articles of Confederation ended with the Continental
Congress legislating and creating a system of government for
the western territories despite the Articles' lack of express authority for these actions. These early acts to manage the lands
the federal government acquired also stipulated that the local
are combined "into one text so it all appears in a form it never had in actuality." Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., Jefferson, the Ordinance of 1784, and the Origins of the American TerritorialSystem, 29 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 231, 237
& n.17 (1972). Berkhofer's criticism does not apply to the version of the Ordinance quoted above, and his criticism is part of his larger argument concerning Thomas Jefferson's role in drafting the Ordinance of 1784. The question of
the Ordinance's authorship is not central to the argument presented here.
101. See Denis P. Duffey, Note, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 935-36 (1995).

102. See 28 JOURNALS, supra note 73, at 375-81 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed.,
1933) (resolutions and deliberations from 1785).
103. See 32 id. at 334-43 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936) (resolutions and deliberations from 1787).
104. See 32 id. at 341 ("The Legislatures of those districts, or new States,
shall never interfere with the primary disposal of the Soil by the United States
in Congress Assembled, nor with any regulations Congress may find necessary
for securing the title in such soil to the bona fide purchasers.").
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governments would not interfere with federal authority. Practice, if not law, established federal power over the western
lands.
During the Constitutional Convention, the topic of the
western lands continued to excite a great deal of interest. The
Virginia plan called for each state to retain its territory, except
by express consent of the affected state. 10 5 The convention subsequently rejected this proposal. 1 6 The New Jersey plan expressly envisioned a government in which all states would
"equally participate in the same Privileges and Rights, and in
all waste, uncultivated, and back Territory and Lands," by consolidating the land and dividing it "into thirteen or more integral Parts."10 7 Obviously, the convention rejected this plan as
well. The debate over the power of Congress to admit new
states also implicated the western land claims. 108 Moreover,
the fight over the fate of the western land claims infused itself
into other issues, ranging from the debates over the composition of Congress 0 9 to the question of whether candidates for
Congress would have to be free of debts to the United States. 110
Some delegates also had financial interests in the western
lands because of their speculation in these lands.11 1
105. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 22,28 (Max
Farrand ed., 1937) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION].
106. See 1 id. at 193-94, 202, 206. The debate concerned a clause that
would guarantee to each state a republican form of government and its territory. 1 id. at 202. The resulting clause (without the guarantee of territory)
eventually became the Guarantee Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form
of Government...."). This clause had its roots in the western land claims as
well. It was accepted at the time that the new states might become vassal
states to their parent states. The Guarantee Clause was designed in part to
prevent that possibility.
107. 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 105, at 613.
Although the convention rejected this proposal, representatives of smaller
states brought up the idea on occasion. See, e.g., 1 id. at 202 (reporting the
view of George Read of Delaware that the "idea of distinct States ... would be
a perpetual source of discord" and that the only cure would be "doing away
[with] States altogether and uniting them all into <one> great Society" (second
set of brackets in original)).
108. See 2 id. at 461-64.
109. See 1 id. at 405,463 (reporting the views of Read from Delaware); 1 id.
at 441 (reporting the views of Luther Martin of Maryland).
110. 2 id. at 126 (noting the objection of George Pinkney of South Carolina
that such a limitation would "exclude persons who had purchased confiscated
property or should purchase Western territory of the public, and might be
some obstacle to the sale of the latter").
111. CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 143 (1966).
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Despite this interest, the question of how to draft the language that would become the Property Clause did not generate
much debate, and the Clause itself would not prove controversial during ratification. In the records of the Constitutional
Convention, the first mention of the necessity of something like
the Property Clause appears on August 18, 1787. The Journal
indicates that the founders referred to the Committee of Detail
an additional power for the legislature, namely the power "[t]o
1 12
dispose of the unappropriated lands of the United States."
The Journal and Madison's notes indicate that the convention
delegates considered and adopted the present language of the
Property Clause on August 30, 1787. According to Madison's
notes, Gouverneur Morris moved the convention to adopt the
language that would become the Property Clause.1 3 Notably,
Morris's proposal contained much broader language than the
issue committed to the Committee of Detail, for it provided the
legislature with the power not simply to dispose of unappropriated lands, but with the power "to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the U. States." 114 Morris's proposal thus
provided the legislature with power to make needful rules and
regulations and also distinguished the territories from other
property belonging to the federal government. Of the states
present, only Maryland voted against adopting this language. 115 Subsequently, the Committee of Style altered the
Property Clause, but only to change the word "Legislature" to
"Congress." 116 Thus, the existing records from the Constitutional Convention provide little guidance on the framers' interpretation of this textual grant of power. To some extent, however, they indicate that the framers wanted Congress to have
broad authority over the territory and its other property and
not simply the power to dispose of federal property.
The controversies over interstate boundaries and the western lands subsequently became an argument that the authors
of the FederalistPapers used to support ratification of the Con112.

2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 105, at 321.

Madison's notes indicate that he proposed referring this item to the committee, but it is unclear whether Madison or Pinkney originally proposed this as
an item for the convention to consider. See 2 id. at 324 & n.3. The distinction
is of no importance.
113. 2 id. at 466.
114. 2id.
115. 2 id.
116.

See 2 id. at 578, 602.
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stitution. FederalistNo. 7 featured the disputes most prominently. 117 That paper formed a part of Alexander Hamilton's
overall argument for why the states should remain unified. In
that paper, Hamilton argued that the states, if disunited,
would wage war against each other over the territories. Disputes over territorial claims frequently led to war, observed
Hamilton, and the "vast tract of unsettled territory within the
boundaries of the United States" would undoubtedly lead to
wars among the states because of the "discordant and undecided claims between several of them." 118 The cessions of western territory already made to the United States would only exacerbate these disputes. The states that made the cessions
would demand the land back "as a reversion," while the remaining states would claim that the land should be divided
among all states. 119 Lest anyone discount this possibility,
Hamilton reminded his readers of the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania over the Wyoming Valley and the
general dispute over Vermont. 120 Moreover, Hamilton cited the
potential dispute over how to divide the war debt if the states
disunited. 121 Although Hamilton did not directly discuss the
western lands in this portion of his argument, the sale of those
lands by the United States provided a means through which
the nation as a whole could retire the war debt. Readers of The
Federalistwould doubtlessly make the connection between the
war debt and the western land claims.
The FederalistPapers also attacked the Articles of Confederation for establishing a weak and insufficient government for
the nation. Madison argued that a chief weakness of the Articles stemmed from the lack of a power analogous to that conferred by the Property Clause. Once some states had ceded
their territorial claims to the United States, "Congress... proceeded to form new States, to erect temporary governments, to
appoint officers for them, and to prescribe the conditions on
which such States shall be admitted into the Confederacy. All
this has been done; and done without the least color of constitu-

117. THE FEDERALIST No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton).
118. Id. at 60 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
119. Id. at 61.
120. Id. at 61-62. On these disputes, see ONUF, supra note 64, at 49-73,
103-45.
121. See THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 64 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision between the separate States or confederacies.").
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tional authority."122 Although Madison did not object to Congress's actions, he argued that endowing a government with insufficient power to accomplish123
such tasks would inevitably lead
to "dissolution or usurpation."
Despite the importance of the disposition of the western
land claims, the sole mention of the text of the Property Clause
appears in FederalistNo. 43. There, Madison argued that the
power granted in the Property Clause
is a power of-very great importance, and required by considerations
similar to those which show the propriety of the former [clause, dealing with the admission of new states]. The proviso annexed [providing that the clause did not prejudice any claim of any state] is proper
in itself, and was probably rendered absolutely necessary by jealousies and questions concerning the Western territory sufficiently known
to the public.124

This small statement provided Madison's only direct defense of
the Property Clause. Yet it fit into his overall description and
defense of the powers conferred on the United States in the
25
proposed Constitution. 1
Madison and his coauthors knew which subjects in the
proposed Constitution would prove controversial and spent
great amounts of time addressing these issues. 126 They recognized that the western land claims constituted a familiar and
contentious subject to The Federalist'starget audience. Yet,
the authors of The Federalist apparently predicted that the
power conferred by the Property Clause would not cause great
controversy in the debate over ratifying the Constitution, because they spent little time defending it.
As a matter of prediction, the authors of The Federalist
were right. In the debates concerning ratification, the antifederalists generally ignored the Property Clause and the power of
the federal government over the West. This does not mean that
the text of the Property Clause escaped attention. In Virginia,
122.

THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 239 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter

ed., 1961).
123. Id. at 240.
124. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 274 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
125.

See THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 256 (James Madison) (Clinton Ros-

siter ed., 1961) (categorizing the powers conferred on the United States); THE
FEDERALIST No. 43, at 271 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (reviewing the miscellaneous powers conferred on the United States). The Property Clause fell into the miscellaneous powers conferred on the United States.
126.

See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 24-28 (Alexander Hamilton) (defend-

ing the need for a standing army).
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a "Society of Western Gentlemen" published an amended version of the proposed Constitution with the Property Clause
eliminated. 127 To the extent that the antifederalists discussed
the western lands, they refuted the assertion that the national
government functioned poorly under the Articles of Confederation. They argued that the western lands provided a common
fund for the United States to repay its war debt, sales proceeded, and the national government was actually repaying its
debts. 128 This success rendered the new form of national government unnecessary. Unlike their attacks on the Necessary
and Proper Clause, however, the antifederalists did not generally criticize the breadth of power granted by the Property
129
Clause.
Thus, even though the constitutional debates extensively
considered the fate of the western lands and the role that they
would play in the development of the nation, the text of the
Property Clause and the power granted by it came into the
Constitution almost without comment. These events left a thin
historical record from which to interpret the Clause. Nevertheless, several important principles evidently held wide acceptance among the founding generation. First, the national government should use the territory and other property of the
United States to benefit all people, most notably by selling it to
retire the collective war debt. Second, the power to legislate
and govern for the territory and other federal property was a
necessary adjunct of ownership. Congress had to have power to
govern these lands and to use them as expected, and continued
state authority over these lands would interfere with accom-

127. See The Society of Western Gentlemen Revise the Constitution, reprinted in

9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE

CONSTITUTION 769, 778 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990)
This objection was not universal
[hereinafter DOCUIENTARY HISTORY].
among westerners. Another group of westerners in Virginia submitted their
objections to the Constitution but did not include the federal government's
power over the territories and other property of the United States. See Circular Letter to the Fayette County Court, reprinted in 8 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra, at 433-36.

128. See, e.g., "Agrippa" No. III [James Winthrop], MASS. GAZETTE, Nov.
30, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 74 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); "Agrippa" No. XII [James Winthrop], MASS. GAZETTE, Jan. 14,
1788, reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 96.

129. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper"Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretationof the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE
L.J. 267, 282 (1993) (recounting the debate over the breadth of the Necessary
and Proper Clause).
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plishing those ends. Further, state power over the lands ceded
to the United States would have allowed the ceding states to
have more power than the states without such land claims.
Collectively, the states could trust only the United States to
properly govern and serve as a neutral arbiter of the western
lands. Therefore, as first set forth in the constitutional convention, the United States was not merely a proprietor over its
property; it had the powers of a sovereign.
2. Early Case Law and Commentary
Early case law interpreting the reach of the Property
Clause focused more on Congress's power to govern the territories rather than the other property of the United States, and
each case interpreted the Clause broadly. In its first extended
discussion of the Clause, the Court considered congressional
authority to establish territorial governments and territorial
courts. 130 The Court held that Congress had the authority to
130. Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). This
case is also referred to as American Insurance Co. v. Canter after the real
party in interest. The Court briefly mentioned the Clause in two other cases:
Ser v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332 (1810), and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The first case involved a suit brought in the federally established territorial court for the Orleans Territory. In deciding that
the federal court for the Orleans Territory could hear diversity cases brought
by and against citizens of the territory, the Court opined, "[tihe power of governing and of legislating for a territory is the inevitable consequence of the
right to acquire and to hold territory." Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 336. Moreover, the presence of the Property Clause in the Constitution expressly conferred this power. Id. Arguably, these statements are dicta. The Court held
that the federal district court lacked diversity jurisdiction over the underlying
action because the plaintiffs, who were foreigners, nevertheless were suing on
a chose in action assigned to them by a citizen of the territory. A statute disallowed federal jurisdiction based on assigned choses in action unless the assignor could have brought the action originally in federal court. Id. ("It is the
opinion of the court, that the plaintiffs had no right to maintain this suit in
the district court, against a citizen of the Orleans territory, they being the assignees of persons who were also citizens of that territory."); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1359 (1994) (embodying the same principle). The second, more celebrated
case involved the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States. Maryland
argued that the Bank was not constitutionally created because the Constitution did not expressly vest in Congress the authority to create a corporation.
In the course of interpreting Congress's power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress power to
"make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper" for implementing Congress's other enumerated powers), the Court took note of the Property Clause.
It stated that
[t]he power to "make all needful rules and regulations respecting the
territory or other property belonging to the United States," is not
more comprehensive, than the power "to make all laws which shall be
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govern territories pending statehood either by virtue of the
Property Clause or some implied power.1 31 The Court also held
that Congress could vest admiralty jurisdiction in territorial
courts that did not meet the standards of Article III courtsi.e., the judges did not have life tenure-even though it could
not vest admiralty jurisdiction in non-Article III courts in
states already admitted to the Union. 132 The Constitution allowed Congress to create these "legislative Courts" because,
when it legislated for territories, Congress exercised "the com33
bined powers of the general, and of a state government.'
These broad statements clearly vested Congress with a great
deal of authority over the territories. More remarkably, these
statements assumed that Congress would have this broad
power by virtue of the United States having acquired the territory even if the Property Clause did not exist. 134 Laterindeed, on the eve of the notorious Dred Scott decision discussed at length below-the Court reaffirmed congressional
power over the territories and held that the Constitution conferred authority on the federal government to establish a tem135
porary government for the area.
The earliest case that interpreted the reach of the Property
Clause also read its terms broadly. That case, United States v.
Gratiot, involved the authority of the United States to lease
lands it had retained within the boundaries of a state. 136 Connecessary and proper for carrying into execution" the powers of the
government. Yet all admit the constitutionality of a territorial government, which is a corporate body.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 422. Again, the statement is dicta because
the reach of the Property Clause was not at issue in the case. Aklhil Amar approvingly explores this discussion in McCulloch in his recent article, Intratextualism. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REV. 747, 757-

58 (1999).
131. See Am. Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 542-43 (citing the Property Clause
but noting that "[t]he right to govern [a territory], may be the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory").
132. Id. at 546.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 542-43.
135. See Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 193 (1853). This case
involved the establishment of a temporary customs collection system for California after the United States captured it from Mexico. The Court held that
the Constitution provided for the establishment of such a government under
the circumstances. Id. at 193-94.
136. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840). For a historical account of the larger context in which Gratiot arose, see CARL J. MAYER & GEORGE A. RILEY, PUBLIC
DOmAIN, PRIVATE DOINION: A HISTORY OF PUBLIC MINERAL POLICY IN
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gress had earlier directed the President to reserve lead mines
in the Indiana territory and authorized the President to lease
the mines for a period not to exceed five years. 137 The Armyto which the President had delegated oversight of the program-also decided to license smelters with the exclusive right
to smelt ore drawn from the federally leased mines. Subsequently, Congress created Illinois out of this territory and admitted Illinois-where Gratiotarose-to the Union. In Gratiot,
the United States sought to collect from licensees who had not
paid any of the royalties due on the 2,400,000 pounds of pure
lead they had smelted out of the ore. 138 Two questions then
arose. The first was whether, under the Property Clause, Congress had the authority to dispose of its property through
leases, or whether it had to dispose of its property through
permanent grants only. 139 Presumably, if the United States
lacked authority to enter into leases, then the smelters would
owe no royalties to the United States. The second question was
whether a statute authorizing the President to enter into leases
gave him the authority to enter into the license for the smelter
at issue in the case.
In sweeping terms, the Court held that Congress had authority to dispose of federal property in any way it saw fit. The
term "territory" in the Property Clause meant land and described only one type of property over which the government
wielded power. 140 This power vested in Congress "without limitation," extended to all property belonging to the United States,
and provided the foundation upon which the territorial government rested. 14 1 The Court rejected the notion that the Property Clause authorized Congress to "dispose of' the property of
the United States only through sale because "[tihe disposal
must be left to the discretion of Congress." 142 Finally, the Court
denied the existence of any "apprehensions of any encroachments upon state rights, by the creation of a numerous tenantry within their borders." 143 Congress reserved the land where
AMERICA 20-39 (1985).

137. Act of March 3, 1807, ch. XLIX, § 5, 2 Stat. 448, 449. Congress enacted another act to reserve lead mines in the Orleans Territory. Act of March
3, 1807, ch. XXXVI, §§ 2, 4, 2 Stat. 440-41.
138.

See Gratiot,39 U.S. at 528.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 533-34 (describing the argument of counsel for Gratiot).
Id. at 537; see also infra text accompanying note 188.
Gratiot,39 U.S. at 537.
Id. at 538.
Id.
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the lead mines lay before Illinois became a state.'4 Illinois
could no more "complain of any disposition or regulation of the
lead mines previously made by Congress" than it could "claim a
right to the public lands within her limits."1 45 The Court thus
early recognized that the United States could retain public
lands located within the boundaries of newly admitted states
and that Congress retained the authority to establish rules and
regulations for such land. On the statutory question, the Court
held that the license involved in the case qualified as a lease,
and that it was valid.
Early commentary on the Property Clause reinforced the
understanding that the Clause conferred broad authority to
Congress. 146 Joseph Story, the leading early commentator on
144. Id.

145. Id.
146. Just as some of the earliest case law on the Property Clause arose in
the dispute over the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, see
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 422 (1819), some of the earliest commentary about the reach of the Property Clause also emerged from this
controversy. For example, in his opinion on the constitutionality of the bank,
Alexander Hamilton compared the power of Congress to establish a corporation to its power to govern the territories and other federally owned property.
Hamilton took as given that Congress had broad authority in the Property
Clause, and used that broad grant of authority to argue that the grants of
power in the Congress similarly authorized the formation of a bank corporation.
It is admitted, that, with regard to the Western territory, they
give a power to erect a corporation; that is, to constitute a government. And by what rule of construction can it be maintained, that the
same words, in a constitution of government, will not have the same
effect, when applied to one species of property, as to another, as far as
the subject is capable of it? Or, that a legislative power, to make all
needful rules and regulations; or to pass all laws necessary and
proper, concerning the public property, which is admitted to authorize
an incorporation in one case, will not authorize it in another? Will
justify the institution of a government over the Western territory, and
will not justify the incorporation of a bank for the more useful management of the money of the nation?
Opinion of Alexander Hamilton, On the Constitutionalityof a National Bank
(February 23, 1791), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE AND DOcUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 109 (Augustus M. Kelley 1967) (M. St.

Clair Clarke & D.A. Hall comps., 1832).
The reach of the Property Clause also arose in the controversy over
the Louisiana Purchase. Some doubted whether the United States had
the constitutional authority to acquire territory outside of the boundaries
of the United States that existed at the ratification of the Constitution.
Eventually, Congress ratified the treaty with France and expanded the
boundaries of the United States. In the context of this debate, Gouverneur Morris expressed his opinion that the United States not only
could acquire new territory, but that such acquisitions were inevitable.
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the Constitution, relied on American Insurance Co. v. Canter to
argue that the Property Clause embodied a power that the federal government would possess even without the Clause because the right to govern territory and property derived from
acquisition through purchase or conquest. 147 Story explicitly
connected the territorial part of the Property Clause with the
"other property belonging to the United States," urging that
Congress's broad authority over the territories "be applied to
the due regulation of all other personal and real property rightfully belonging to the United States."1 48 According to Story, the
power thus conferred "over the public territory is clearly exclusive and universal; and their legislation is subject to no control;
but is absolute, and unlimited, unless so far as it is affected by
stipulations in the cessions, or by the ordinance of 1787, under
which any part of it has been settled."149 Story recognized that
while states could regulate the other property of the United
States-unless the state ceded jurisdiction under the Enclave
Clause-this state authority remained "subject to 150
the rightful
exercise of the powers of the national government."
Story also rejected the notion that extensive federal landholdings would eventually lead to "such immense revenue to
the national government, as to make it independent of, and
formidable to, the people." 15 1 Story treated this assertion with
scorn. 152 Instead, Story believed that the public lands held out
I always thought that, when we should acquire Canada and Louisiana it would be proper to govern them as provinces, and allow them
no voice in our councils. In wording the third section of the fourth article, I went as far as circumstances would permit to establish the exclusion. Candor obliges me to add my belief, that, had it been more
pointedly expressed, a strong opposition would have been made.
3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 105, at 404. Morris
therefore not only believed that the United States could acquire new territory,
but that it would have the power that an empire has over colonies, and that
the new territories could not be admitted as states. Id. When read in full,
however, it is clear that Morris did not believe that his views represented
those of the convention as a whole. Id.
147. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 1318, at 193-94 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1833).
148. 3 id. § 1319, at 196.
149. 3 id. § 1322, at 198.
150. 3 id.
151. 3 id. § 1320, at 196.
152. Story stated the following with regard to such a proposition:
What a strange representation is this of a republican government,
created by, and responsible to, the people in all its departments!
What possible analogy can there be between the possession of large
revenues in the hands of a monarch, and large revenues in the pos-
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the opportunity to pay off the national debt and provide more
revenue for education and internal improvements without burdening the people with taxation. 153 Thus, rather than seeing
the United States's extensive landholdings as a threat, Story
envisioned them as a great national treasure that would advance multiple aims of the fledgling country.
To be sure, some cases during this period limited federal
ownership of certain types of property, notably lands lying beneath navigable inland waterways. Advocates of the narrow
view of the Property Clause often cite Pollard v. Hagan154 as
the leading pre-Civil War case. That case questioned whether
the United States or a state had superior title to submerged
lands under inland navigable waterways. In an earlier case,
the Court had held that title to submerged lands in the original
thirteen states passed from the British crown to the states and
not to the United States. 155 The Pollard case questioned
whether Alabama similarly acquired submerged lands upon its
admission to the Union, or whether title remained in the
United States. The Court held,
When Alabama was admitted into the union, on an equal footing with
the original states, she succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which Georgia possessed at the date
of the cession, except so far as this right was diminished by the public
lands remaining in the possession and under the control of the United
States .... 156

Pollard thus marks the Court's first opinion in a line of cases
that would develop the equal footing doctrine. 157 The case,
session of a government, whose administration is confided to the chosen agents of the people for a short period, and may be dismissed almost at pleasure? If the doctrine be true, which is here inculcated, a
republican government is little more than a dream, however its administration may be organized; and the people are not worthy of being trusted with large public revenues, since they cannot provide
against corruption, and abuses of them. Poverty alone (it seems)
gives a security for fidelity; and the liberties of the people are safe
only, when they are pressed into vigilance by the power of taxation.
3 id. § 1321, at 197.
153. 3 id. § 1321, at 197-98.
154. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
155. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 406-18 (1842).
156. Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) at 223.
157. Arguably, the equal footing doctrine had its roots in Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836). That case involved the
question of ownership of submerged lands in the Louisiana Purchase but appeared to turn on the state of title to the lands under Spanish rule rather than
an equal footing rule that operated solely by force of American law. Id. at 73137 (discussing how the Spanish crown held lands). Pollard v. Hagan,by con-
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however, determined only which lands the federal government
owned and did not interpose any limitations on the federal government's authority over its property. Indeed, the Court recognized that the United States could continue to own the other
1 58
public domain lands in Alabama.
Thus, up until 1857, one could safely conclude that Congress had plenary authority over the territory and other property of the United States, including the power to enact legislation for this property that would displace state law. This
conclusion finds support in the history of the adoption of the
Articles of Confederation and the activities of the federal government under them; the thin record of the constitutional convention; the arguments surrounding the ratification of the Constitution; and the early case law. Moreover, commentators
such as Story saw the Clause as evidence that the Constitution
contemplated the United States's possession of vast landholdings as a national resource. Although the Court limited the
reach of federal title claims to certain lands, those limitations
applied only to submerged lands lying under inland navigable
waterways, not the vast western territory as a whole. The
Court did not diminish the authority that the federal government had over the lands generally accepted as federal property.
The Court's next encounter with the Property Clause would
skew this jurisprudence and contribute to changing the course
of the nation's history.
B. DRED SCOTT AND THE NARROWING OF THE PROPERTY
CLAUSE

The Court's sole narrow interpretation of the Property
Clause appears in the deservedly infamous Dred Scott decision. 159 That case warrants extended discussion for two reatrast, involved lands that Georgia ceded to the United States, and so only
American law was at issue. For further discussion of the equal footing doctrine, see supra note 48.
158. Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) at 223. To be sure, the Court concluded that
the power of Congress under the Property Clause "conferred no power to grant
to the plaintiffs the land in controversy in this case." Id. at 230. That conclusion is hardly surprising because the Court had held that the United States
did not own the property; one generally cannot grant what one does not own.
This dicta does not undermine the federal government's power under the
Property Clause. See Gaetke, Refuting the "Classic"Theory, supra note 29, at
641-45.
159. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). The defendant's real
name was "Sanford," but it was misspelled in the official reports. See DON E.
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScoTr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW
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sons. First, none of the literature on the Property Clause discusses the Dred Scott decision at any length. That oversight
comes as no surprise. The proponents of the narrow view of the
Property Clause would not hinge their argument on such a
hated decision, 160 and the proponents of a broad view could
therefore avoid the one case that squarely adopts the narrow
view. Second, contemporary legal literature criticizing the decision-and there is a wealth of such literature161-fails to address the Court's interpretation of Congress's authority under
the Property Clause. Thus, the legal academic literature deserves a modern examination and critique of the Court's opinion as it relates to the Property Clause.
The opinions in Dred Scott primarily concerned the question of the territorial power created in the Clause and not the
issue of control over federal property. The period leading up to
the Dred Scott decision involved great controversy over
whether Congress could ban slavery in the territories. In 1820,
Congress enacted the Missouri Compromise, a provision of the
act authorizing the people of Missouri to form a state. 162 The
Compromise admitted Missouri as a slave state, but it "forever
prohibited" slavery or involuntary servitude, except as the pun-

AND POLITICS 2 & n. (1978).
160. Some modern articles do reference the Supreme Court's decision in
Dred Scott. See Brodie, supra note 28, at 718 n.121, 720 n.126; Landever, supranote 28, at 579-83.
161. It would border on the impossible to catalogue all of the literature
critical of Dred Scott. Professor Mark Graber provides a marvelous catalog of
the criticism:
Commentators across the political spectrum describe Dred Scott as
"the worst constitutional decision of the nineteenth century," "the
worst atrocity in the Supreme Court's history," "the most disastrous
opinion the Supreme Court has ever issued," "the most odious action
ever taken by a branch of the federal government," a "ghastly error,"
a "tragic failure to follow the terms of the Constitution," "a gross
abuse of trust," "a lie before God," and "judicial review at its worst."
Mark A. Graber, DesperatelyDucking Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary
Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMiENT. 271, 271-72 (1997) (footnotes
omitted). One of the more interesting takes on the case is Alan Watson's argument that the Supreme Court's decision concerning Scott's status could not
have arisen were it not for Joseph Story's earlier misreading of a Dutch
scholar's work on conflict of laws. See ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH STORY AND THE
COMITY OF ERRORS: A CASE STUDY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS (1992). For a defense that Dred Scott may have been correctly decided or at least that it
reached a plausible result from the perspective of any school of modern constitutional thought, see Graber, supra.
162. Act of March 6, 1820, ch. XXII, § 8, 3 Stat. 545, 548.
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ishment for a crime, in all of the territory lying "north of thirtysix degrees and thirty minutes north latitude."163 At the time
of this compromise, the constitutional question of whether Congress could create this restriction remained dormant. It did not
become the topic of intense political debate until the 1840s and
1850s.
During the Mexican-American War, David Wilmot, a Democrat from Pennsylvania, inserted a provision into an appropriation bill that would prohibit slavery in any territory acquired from Mexico. 16 4 Although the Wilmot Proviso ultimately
failed, it raised the question of the extent of congressional authority over slavery in the territories. During the 1840s and
1850s, the debate over congressional power to exclude slavery
from the territories would become a surrogate for the debate
over slavery itself. This debate culminated in the dispute over
the organization of the Kansas and Nebraska territorial governments and the outbreak of civil war in Kansas.
As it unfolded, the constitutional debate divided into
roughly four positions. Some, like John C. Calhoun, argued
that Congress lacked any authority to ban slavery in the territories and that, in fact, Congress had a duty to protect slaveholders in their property. 165 Others, like Stephen Douglas, advocated popular sovereignty in the territories, under which
each territory would decide for itself whether to be slave or
free. 166 A third group saw compromise in the idea of simply ex16 7
tending the Missouri Compromise line across the continent.
This position had more basis in expediency and compromise
than in constitutional principle. Finally, some adhered to a position directly in opposition to Calhoun's and contended that
Congress could and must ban slavery in the territories.168 The
Republican Party platform for 1856 embodied this view and declared
[tihat the Constitution confers upon Congress sovereign power over
the Territories of the United States for their government; and that in
the exercise of this power, it is both the right and the imperative duty
of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin relics of barba163. Id.
164. FEBRENBACHER, supra note 159, at 129; STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE
DRED SCOTT DECISION: LAW OR POLITICS? at xi (1967).
165. See FEHRENEACHER, supra note 159, at 135-47 (describing the various

positions held on slavery in the territories).
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
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169
rism-Polygamy, and Slavery.

Although polygamy had few defenders in Congress, slavery had
many, and the Republicans would not enact this legislation until after the Civil War began.
This intense and heated political context gave rise to the
legal issues in Dred Scott. The basic question underlying the
Dred Scott decision asked under what circumstances a slave
could obtain his or her freedom. Courts had struggled with this
question against a variety of fact patterns, such as where the
slave escaped into free territory; where the master had taken
the slave voluntarily into free territory for a short period but
returned with the slave to slave territory; or where the master
had lent the slave to another who took the slave into free territory. 170 Free states had an obligation to return fugitive slaves,
but what about the cases in which the slave entered free territory at the direction of the master? Dred Scott involved one
version of these sorts of claims. Scott was at one time owned by
Dr. John Emerson and sued his putative master for his manumission. During Emerson's service in the United States Army,
he and Scott had traveled from Missouri to Rock Island in Illinois, then to the territory north of Missouri in what is now the
state of Minnesota, and finally back to Missouri. 17 1 Scott's wife
172
similarly traveled from Missouri to free soil and back.
Claiming that his time in free territory freed him under Missouri law, Scott unsuccessfully sued Emerson's widow for his
freedom. 173 Scott subsequently sued John Sanford-the brother
169. Republican National Convention and Platform of 1856, reprinted in
Hans L. Trefousse, The Republican Party 1854-1864, in 2 HISTORY OF U.S.
POLITICAL PARTIES 1141 app. at 1204 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. ed., 1973)

[hereinafter Republican Platform].
170. See, e.g., Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82, 94 (1850) (holding
that slaves escaping from slave territory were not rendered free); Jackson v.
Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38 (1837) (deciding the effect of temporary relocation of the
master and slave); Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh) 467 (1820) (discussing the effect on the slave's status of the master changing domicile from slave
to free territory); Commonwealth v. Ayes, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836) (discussing the effect on the slave's status where the master voluntarily brought
the slave into a free state for a short time).
171. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 397-98 (1857); see also
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 159, at 243-45 (detailing Scott's travels in and out
of slave territory). The Court did not mention that Scott also was in Louisiana
and may have returned to Illinois a second time. See id. at 245-46.
172. For a thorough biography of Harriet Scott and how her case differed
from Dred Scott's case, see Lea VanderVelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs.
Dred Scott, 106 YALE L.J. 1033 (1997).

173. Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576 (1852). This was the decision that, ac-
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of Mrs. Emerson who had either acquired or controlled the
Scotts as the executor of Emerson's estate' 74 - in federal court.
Sanford was a citizen of New York, and, to establish that the
federal courts had diversity jurisdiction over the case, Scott
175
pleaded that he was a citizen of Missouri.
Given the state of slavery law at the time, the Court's decision could have taken any number of turns. The Court could
have held that Scott's time on free soil rendered him free. It
also could have held that Scott's time on free soil did not render
him free because Emerson, his master, did not willingly go to
free territory but went only on orders of the army. 76 Instead,
the Court focused on the jurisdictional question. In what is
now viewed as the main and more odious part of its opinion, the
Supreme Court held that because Scott was black he was not a
citizen of any state. Therefore, he could not invoke the diversity
1 77
jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Having ruled that the federal courts could not entertain
Scott's lawsuit, the Court could have ended its decision there.
The Court nevertheless decided to rule on the merits of Scott's
claim that his presence on free soil-and, in particular, free soil
that was not part of any state-entitled him to his freedom.
Scott's presence on territorial land brought the Missouri Compromise squarely into the Court's focus (albeit unnecessarily as
shown below). Because Scott had accompanied his owner at the
owner's direction into territory of the United States above the
line described in the Missouri Compromise, Scott argued that
his presence there granted him his freedom. He also urged
that his time in Illinois rendered him free.
In an era when the Court frequently rendered brief opinions and dissents often took the form of a notation, 17 8 Dred
cording to Alan Watson, resulted from Joseph Story's misreading of the Dutch
scholar. See WATSON, supra note 161, at 61-67. As explained in the text, if

this decision had gone the other way, the federal Dred Scott case could never
have happened.
174. On Sanford's exact legal relationship with Scott, see FEHRENBACHER,
supra note 159, at 270-71; VINCENT C. HOPKINS, DRED SCOTT'S CASE 23-24
(1951).
175. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 400.

176. See Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. at 585 (suggesting that Scott could not
be free because the Army had ordered Emerson "to the posts where his slave
was detained in servitude").
177.

Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 403-29.

178. See, e.g., United States v. Sutherland, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 363 (1857).
Sutherland is a case of no particular significance except that it is in the same
volume of the United States Reports as Dred Scott. Sutherland runs just over
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Scott stands out. The decision occupies 240 pages in the official
reports, and each justice wrote his own opinion. The Court divided along several lines, some procedural and some substantive. The following discussion presents a summary and criticism of those opinions that discuss the territorial and federal
property issue.
The official report's designation of Chief Justice Taney's
decision as the opinion of the Court correctly described his
opinion with respect to the interpretation of the territorial and
property power. 79 To evaluate Scott's claims, Chief Justice
Taney decided to begin with the question of whether Scott's
presence in the territory of the United States made Scott free
(as opposed to the more general question of whether Scott's
presence on any free soil would render him free). Because of
the order in which he placed the questions, Taney had to address whether Congress had the authority to ban slavery in the
territories and therefore to enact the Missouri Compromise.
The Missouri Compromise was not Congress's first attempt
to ban slavery in the territories. Congress had previously
banned slavery in the Northwest Ordinance, which Congress
reaffirmed after the ratification of the Constitution. 180 To distinguish the Northwest Ordinance from the Missouri Compromise, therefore, Taney reviewed the history of the dispute over
the western land claims. According to Taney, when Virginia
ceded the Northwest Territory to the United States, the United
States did not in fact exist. 18 1 Rather, "what was then called
the United States, were thirteen separate, sovereign, independent States," and the meetings of Congress under the Articles of Confederation were "little more than a congress of ambassadors" from these independent states. 182 This congress of
three pages, and closes with the notation that Justice Daniel dissented. Id. at
366.
179. Given the length of the opinions and the fractious nature of them,
many have debated whether and to what extent Dred Scott has an actual holding. See FERRENBACHER, supra note 159, at 322-26. For reasons explained in
the following text, I contend that a majority adopts Taney's interpretation of
the territorial and property power. I will analyze the opinions in the order
they appear in the United States Reports. Professor Fehrenbacher provided
evidence that "[tihe order in which the opinions were published in Howard's
Reports did not follow the order of their oral delivery on March 6 and 7, but
rather was carefully specified by Taney." Id. at 390. The order of the opinions
does not alter my analysis.
180. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. VIII, 1 Stat. 50.
181. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 434.
182. Id. Of course, the federal government had much power under the Ar-
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ambassadors could certainly accept the grant to all from Virginia and the other states and agree to govern them under the
terms of the Northwest Ordinance. 183 That prior agreement
could not, however, bind the new government formed under the
Constitution, nor could it bind the states in the future. Taney's
argument ignored the subsequent reaffirmation of the Northwest Ordinance by the Congress formed under the Constitution. Moreover, as shown above, the record of the Constitutional Convention showed that the founders intended the
United States to have broad authority over its property.
Against the fanciful historical background he created,
Taney concluded that the term "territory" in the Property
Clause referred only to the territory that Virginia and other
states had ceded to the United States under the Articles of Confederation. 184 This reading would exclude any of the territory
ceded by North Carolina and Georgia, and it would exclude any
other after-acquired territory such as the Louisiana Purchase
(where Scott's owner had taken him), or Florida (where American Insurance Co. v. Canter18 5 arose), or California (where
Cross v. Harrison8 6 arose). Taney reached this conclusion
based on his reading of the plain language of the Clause. The
Clause "does not speak of any territory, nor of Territories,but
uses language which, according to its legitimate meaning,
points to a particular thing.... [Namely, it points to] a territory then in existence, and then known or claimed as the territory of the United States."1 87 The constitutional term "territory" then could refer only to the area ceded by Virginia and
New York and covered by the Northwest Ordinance. On this
point, Taney ignored the Court's earlier holding in United
States v. Gratiot, in which the Court held that the term terri-

ticles. As Professor Fehrenbacher pointedly observed,
Apparently, Taney did not regard the power to declare war, or the
power to make peace, or the power to enter into treaties, or the power
to fix the value of coins, or the power to regulate all relations with the
Indians, or the power to establish post offices, or the power to grant
letters of marque and reprisal, or the power to settle all disputes between two or more states, as constituting an "attribute of sovereignty."
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 159, at 371.
183. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 434.
184. See id. at 436.
185. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
186. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164 (1853).
187. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 436.
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tory "is equivalent to the word lands."18 8 Similarly, according
to Taney, the property referred to in the Property Clause included only personal property, "that is, the ships, arms, and
munitions of war, which then belonged in common to the State
sovereignties."' 8 9 Once again, Taney's reading did not comport
with Gratiot,where the Court held that Congress's power over
"other property belonging to the United States... is vested in
Congress without limitation." 190
Taney not only read narrowly the reach of what constituted
"territory" or "property," but he also suggested that Congress
had little authority over these objects. 19 1 Regarding the power
to make needful rules and regulations for these objects, Taney
concluded that "every one ... must admit that they are not the
words usually employed by statesmen in giving supreme power
of legislation." 192 This argument also carried little weight. The
founders had used the terms "rule" and "regulate" (or "regulation") with respect to the rules of each house of Congress, 193 for
regulating interstate commerce and commerce with Indian
tribes, 194 for making rules of naturalization and bankruptcy, 195
for regulating the value of money, 196 for making rules regarding
captures on land and water, 197 and for making rules for the
government and the armed forces. 198 Under Taney's reading,
these clauses vested minimal power in Congress and did not
grant "general powers of legislation" 199 over these subjects.
Thus, the Court could ignore any history of the federal government banning slavery in the Northwest Ordinance as irrelevant to whether Congress could ban slavery in land acquired
after the ratification of the Constitution. The constitutional
text, according to Taney, applied only in the Northwest Terri188. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537 (1840).
189. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 437.
190. Gratiot,39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 537.
191. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 437. This reading is also in tension with the Court's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819), in which the Court relied on the Property Clause to reach its broad
reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id. at 422.
192. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 436-37.
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
194. Id. § 8, cl. 3.

195. Id. cl. 4.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. cl. 5.
Id. cl. 11.
Id. cl. 14.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 440.
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tory and did not constitute a broad grant of power to the United
States.
To reach this conclusion, Taney had to somehow distinguish American Insurance Co. v. Canter, in which the Court
held that the United States governed Florida-land not included in the original grants of territory-by virtue of the Property Clause. 2°° Moreover, if Taney wished to limit Congress's
authority under the Property Clause to governing only those
territories ceded by the states during the Articles of Confederation, he needed to find another source of authority to allow
Congress to legislate for the newly acquired territories. To
solve this problem, Taney interpreted the holding of Canter as
mere dicta, and decided that the true holding was that Congress had an inherent or implied authority to govern the territories by virtue of its authority to acquire property. 201 Taney
based this conclusion on language in Canter noting that "[the
right to govern, may be the inevitable consequence of the right
to acquire territory."20 2 In Dred Scott, Taney adopted this possibility as the holding of the decision. Taney held that federal
authority to legislate for the later-acquired territories stemmed
not from the text of the Constitution, but from some inherent
20 3
power of Congress to acquire (and thus govern) new territory.
The original Canter decision also held that in governing
the territories Congress exercised "the combined powers of the
general, and of a state government."2°4 Taney limited this passage from Canter to the question of what kinds of courts Congress could establish in a territory.20 5 In contrast, Taney described the question before the Court in Dred Scott as whether
"Congress had a right to prohibit a citizen of the United States
from taking any property [i.e. a slave] which he lawfully held
20 6
into a Territory of the United States."
Thus, Taney eviscerated the one provision of the Constitution that provided a textual basis for the establishment and
regulation of territorial governments and narrowly construed
the one case that had squarely held that provision to apply to
200.
(1828).
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 442-44.
Am. Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 543 (emphasis added).
See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 443.
Am. Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 546.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 445-46.
Id. at 446.
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the newly acquired territories. 2 7 Liberated from text and
precedent, Taney could easily delimit the federal government's
implied power over the newly acquired territories. First, Congress did not have the power "to acquire a Territory to be held
and governed permanently in that character."208 Second, "citizens of the United States who migrate to a Territory belonging
to the people of the United States, cannot be ruled as mere
colonists, dependent upon the will of the General Government,
and to be governed by any laws it may think proper to im207. Taney further misconstrued Canter and Madison's writings in The
FederalistPapers. As for the former, Taney based his reading of Canter-i.e.,
that federal authority over the territories was an implied, not express,
power-on the circuit court opinion of Justice Johnson, who later participated
in the case when it reached the Supreme Court. In that opinion Johnson argued that the Constitution addressed only the original territory, and did not
expressly provide for "the acquisition or government of territories" beyond the
original limits of the United States. Am. Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 517 n.*.
Later on, however, Johnson stated, "I see nothing in which the power acquired
over the ceded territories, can vary from the power acquired under the law of
nations, by any other government, over acquired or ceded territory." Id. Thus,
Johnson apparently believed that the federal government potentially had more
power over the later-acquired territories than over the ceded territories. As
for the latter, Taney referred in Dred Scott to FederalistNo. 38, which he
characterized as arguing that the establishment of a government for the ceded
territory was "an exercise of power not warranted by the Articles of Confederation, and dangerous to the liberties of the people." Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19
How.) at 447. In fact, Madison's argument in FederalistNo. 38 is that Congress had taken actions to establish governments in the territory "without the
least color of constitutional authority." THE FEDERALIST NO. 38, at 239
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Madison approved of the result,
but used the fact that Congress had acted without constitutional authorization
as "alarming proof of the danger resulting from a government which does not
possess regular powers commensurate to its objects[.]" Id. at 240. Madison
urged the adoption of the Constitution because it expressly provided such
power and would not tempt the federal government into assuming implied
powers. In Dred Scott, Taney accomplished the exact end that Madison did
not want because Taney shifted the federal government's authority to govern
the newly acquired territories from the text of the Constitution to some power
implied in Congress's power to admit new states to the union. As Professor
Fehrenbacher observed, "Taney, in emasculating the territory clause and in
insisting that the power to govern the West could be justified only by double
implication, was contradicting almost everything that Madison had said on the
subject in the Convention and in The Federalist." FEHRENBACHER, supra note
159, at 376.
208. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 446. Although this statement is not
directly at odds with United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840), it
certainly strains against the conclusion in that case. In Gratiot, the Court
squarely held that the United States could reserve public lands and continue
to own them even after the territory in which they lay became a state, id. at
538, and it held that Congress could continue to make rules for such reserved
lands "without limitation." Id. at 537.
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pose."2 09 Thus, the Constitution followed the flag, and all of the
constitutional limitations on federal power applied with equal
force in the territories. Congress could not use its authority
over a territory to establish a church, to abridge speech or freedom of the press, to deny the right to a jury trial, to quarter
soldiers during peacetime, or to take private property for public
use without just compensation. 2 10 Banning slavery took private
property without just compensation and without due process of
law. Moreover, if Congress itself could not ban slavery, it could
not authorize a territorial government to exercise such authority.211 Because the Court treated slaves as property protected
by the Constitution, the only power that the Constitution conferred on Congress was "the power coupled with the duty of
212
guarding and protecting the [slave] owner in his rights."
Purely from an analysis of the legal reasoning, Taney's
opinion in Dred Scott is disturbing. To reach his conclusion,
Taney belittled the text of the Constitution and ignored or misconstrued several key cases interpreting congressional power
over the territories. In addition, Taney demeaned congressional power over federal property within states admitted to
the Union, even though the case did not directly raise this issue.
Equally disturbing is the fact that the Court's decision
holding the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional was doubly
unnecessary. In addition to reaching the merits of Scott's
claims after denying jurisdiction, the Court also unnecessarily
determined specifically whether Scott's presence on territory
subject to the Missouri Compromise won him his freedom.
Taney's opinion asked first whether Scott's presence on territory of the United States made him free, and, if not, whether
his presence in the admitted, free state of Illinois made him
free.2 13 Temporally, however, Scott entered Illinois before entering the Wisconsin Territory, and no logical rule of precedence would indicate that Taney should take either question
first. According to the Court, Scott's presence in Illinois did not
grant him his freedom under the applicable choice of law rules.
209. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 447.
210. Id. at 450.
211. Id. at 451. This statement undermined the position of those who advocated popular sovereignty in the territories.
212. Id. at 452. This statement would galvanize the Southern position that
the Constitution forced Congress to recognize slavery in the territories.
213. Id. at 431-32.
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The Court's earlier decision in Strader v. Graham, according to
Taney, dictated that the determination of a person's status as
free or slave depended on the state law of the person's domicile
at the time of the determination. 2 14 Although Strader involved
escaped slaves and not slaves that the master had deliberately
taken into free states, Taney had no compunction against extending the holding in Strader to Scott's status. 215 Since Missouri law (as changed especially for Scott) denied Scott his
freedom, the Court must come to the same conclusion.2 16 Under this reasoning, Scott could not obtain his freedom whether
he traveled to a free state or a territory in which Congress had
abolished slavery. Thus, the Court did not need to determine
the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise.
Three justices fully joined Taney's opinion on this subject
with little independent analysis. 2 17 Three justices concurred
with Taney and offered their own approaches to the power that
Congress had over the territories. Although their analyses differed slightly from Taney's interpretation, they adopted
Taney's basic conclusion that the Missouri Compromise violated the Constitution. 218 Thus, at least six justices signed on
214. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82, 93-94 (1850).
215. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 452.
216. Id. at 453-54. Fehrenbacher criticizes the application of Strader to
Dred Scott, noting that Taney added part of the reasoning only after he had
announced his original decision. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 159, at 268-69,
386-88. My point is only that the Court did not need to hold the Missouri
Compromise unconstitutional to reach the decision that presence on free soil
did not render Scott free.
217. I include here Justices Wayne, Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 454
(Wayne, J., concurring), Nelson, id. at 457-69 (Nelson, J., concurring), and
Grier, id. at 469 (Grier, J., concurring).
218. Justice Daniel stressed that the power of Congress over the territories
required Congress to act as a trustee over the territories, and that banning
slavery would have violated that trust with regard to southern slaveholders.
Id. at 489-92 (Daniel, J., concurring). Justice Campbell acknowledged the
"plenary power in Congress to dispose of the public domain, or to organize a
Government over it," but he concluded that this plenary power "does not imply
a corresponding authority to determine the internal polity, or to adjust the
domestic relations, or the persons who may lawfully inhabit the territory in
which it is situated." Id. at 501 (Campbell, J., concurring). Campbell reviewed the history of the rules for these lands under the British government,
and derived a contrary "American doctrine" which provided that the people of
a territory and not the national government possessed the authority to legislate for the territory. Id. at 511. The power of Congress under this theory was
only that necessary to sell the lands, for the Constitution contained no "annunciation that a consolidated power had been inaugurated, whose subject
comprehended an empire, and which had no restriction but the discretion of
Congress." Id. at 505; see also id. at 514 ("[T]he power to make rules and regu-
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to Taney's view in some form.
Among the members of the majority, only the concurring
opinion of Justice Catron pointed to the obvious flaw in the
theories of Taney and the concurring justices. Catron readily
accepted that "Congress is vested with power to govern the
Territories of the United States by force of' the Property
Clause.2 19 He reviewed the history of the cession of the western
2 20
land claims by the original states to reinforce this conclusion.
Based on this history, Catron could not accept the idea that the
federal government lacked the authority to govern the territories for the most personal reasons:
It is due to myself to say, that it is asking much of a judge, who has
for nearly twenty years been exercising jurisdiction, from the western
Missouri line to the Rocky Mountains, and, on this understanding of
the Constitution, inflicting the extreme penalty of death for crimes
committed where the direct legislation of Congress was the only rule,
to agree 2that
he had been all the while acting in mistake, and as an
21
usurper.

Catron had exercised the authority that Taney denied existed
in the express terms of the Constitution, namely the federal
government's authority to establish regulations for the territory
and other property of the United States. Moreover, Catron had
exercised this authority in the most extreme possible way.
Nevertheless, Catron, a southerner, found a way to agree
that the Missouri Compromise violated the Constitution. He
believed that the terms of the land cessions determined
whether the land should be slave or free. Reviewing the history
of these cessions, Catron concluded that the United States
could prohibit slavery from the territory ceded by Virginia only
because Virginia agreed to the prohibition, but that Spain and
France had not made similar agreements with regard to the
Louisiana Purchase. 222 Catron also accepted Taney's theory
that the Constitution did not allow the federal government to
lations, from the nature of the subject, is restricted to such administrative and
conservatory acts as are needful for the preservation of the public domain, and
its preparation for sale or disposition."). To interpret the clause as vesting
such power in Congress would be to read the words "as George III would have
understood them," id. at 511, and would appeal to the senses of the "Norman
lawyers of William the Conqueror," but not to "an American patriot." Id. at
513. Campbell issued this opinion undeterred by United States v. Gratiot or
Story's commentaries.
219. Id. at 519-20 (Catron, J., concurring).
220.

Id. at 521-23.

221. Id. at 522-23.
222. Id. at 524-26.
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prohibit citizens from bringing all manner of property, including slaves, with them if they settled in the territories.223 In the
end, seven justices voted to hold the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, and six believed that it lay entirely beyond the
competence of Congress to enact such legislation for the territo224
ries.
Justices McLean and Curtis dissented. On the question of
Congress's power over the territories, McLean argued that
Taney's opinion contradicted the Court's earlier decision in
American Insurance Co. v. Canter and that the words "territory
and other property" meant that "[in both of these senses it belonged to the United States-as land, for the purpose of sale; as
territory, for the purpose of government." 225 McLean thus accepted Maryland's view of federal ownership of the western territories as proposed for the Articles of Confederation. The Constitution made the federal government both proprietor of and
sovereign over the western lands. Linking the Property Clause
to its original purpose, McLean also urged that Congress must
have the power to ban slavery in a territory if for no other reason than to protect the value of the lands for their ultimate disposal:
If Congress should deem slaves or free colored persons injurious to
the population of a free Territory, as conducing to lessen the value of
the public lands, or on any other ground connected with the public interest, they have the power to prohibit them from becoming settlers in
it.... The repugnancy to slavery would probably prevent fifty or a
hundred freemen from settling in a slave Territory, where 226
one slaveholder would be prevented from settling in a free Territory.

To the extent that Congress had the authority to repel foreign
invasion of the territories and to create a criminal code for
227
them, it could ban slavery.

223. Id. at 527-28.
224. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 159, at 404 (providing a useful chart
of the reasoning in the majority opinions). Unfortunately, the chart omits
from consideration the opinion of Justice Nelson, even though Justice Nelson
hinted that he agreed with Taney's reasoning:
It is perhaps not unfit to notice, in this connection, that many of the
most eminent statesmen and jurists of the country entertain the opinion that this provision of the act of Congress, even within the territory
to which it relates, was not authorized by any power under the Constitution.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 464 (Nelson, J., concurring).
225. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 540, 541 (McLean, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 543.
227. Id.
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Nevertheless, McLean entertained the possibility that
Taney correctly interpreted the Constitution:
What do the lessons of wisdom and experience teach, under such circumstances, if the new light, which has so suddenly and unexpectedly
burst upon us, be true? Acquiescence; acquiescence under a settled
construction of the Constitution for sixty years, though it may be erroneous; which has secured to the country
an advancement of pros228
perity beyond the power of computation.

In making this plea, McLean himself acquiesced to Taney's
reasoning in part. McLean's only response to Taney's due process justification for holding the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional was that Congress did not "forfeit property, or take it
2229
It only prohibited slavery ....
for public purposes.
McLean's answer referred to an understanding commonly held
at the time of Dred Scott: Although the law regarded slaves as
property, slavery existed only because of positive municipal law
that states could choose to abolish.230 Taney's opinion changed
the understanding of congressional power over the territories
and whether Congress had municipal authority over them.
Justice Curtis's dissent dealt more thoroughly with Taney's
opinion. Curtis began with two historical points on the cessions
of the public domain. First, because the Constitutional Convention met as Congress was enacting the Northwest Ordinance, the founders must have intended to authorize Congress
to administer the lands that the landed states had ceded and
would cede to the United States. 231 Second, North Carolina and
228. Id. at 546. Carolyn Landever quotes this language from Justice
McLean's dissent to suggest that states might have to accept continued federal
authority over federal lands within their borders, as if McLean agreed with
the proposition that the states should receive such lands under the equal footing doctrine. See Landever, supra note 28, at 607. There is no evidence that
McLean believed anything of the kind or that he actually believed that the
construction of the Constitution he urged was erroneous. Rather, McLean offered this reading as a last line of defense against Taney's reasoning.
229. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 547.
230. See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 611 (1842) ("The
state of slavery is deemed to be a mere municipal regulation, founded upon
and limited to the range of the territorial laws."); Commonwealth v. Aves, 35
Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, 215 (1836) ("[Sllavery is a relation founded in force, not
in right, existing, where it does exist, by force of positive law, and not recognized as founded in natural right...."); Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep.
499, 510 (KB. 1772) ('CThe state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political.., it's so odious,
that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law.").
231. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 606-08 (Curtis, J., dissenting). Justice Curtis stated,
Keeping these facts in view, it may confidently be asserted that there
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Georgia had not ceded their western lands until after the adoption of the Constitution, but the members of the convention
fully expected those states to cede their lands.232 Therefore, the
founders must have intended the Constitution to provide authority to the federal government to govern lands acquired after the adoption of the Constitution. 233 Curtis found this authority in the Property Clause. 234 The early acts of the first
Congress and Congress's subsequent actions confirmed Curtis's
2 35
reading that Congress could ban slavery in the territories.
The Dred Scott decision immediately elicited strong reaction from both antagonists and defenders. Antagonistic contemporary commentaries came out swiftly after the decision
and focused on the territorial aspect of the decision.236 This focus of criticism was not surprising from a strategic perspective.
Although the Court's decision that Scott was not a Missouri
citizen caused great stir, most northern states did not treat
blacks as citizens, opening critics of Dred Scott to the charge of
hypocrisy by southerners and Democrats. 237 The question of
is very strong reason to believe, before we examine the Constitution
itself, that the necessity for a competent grant of power to hold, dispose of, and govern territory, ceded and expected to be ceded, could
not have escaped the attention of those who framed or adopted the
Constitution ....
Id. at 608.
232. Id. at 610.
233. Id. at 611.
234. Id. at 612-14. To the extent that the Constitution forbade Congress
from enacting legislation, such as the prohibition on ex post facto clauses, Curtis recognized that the Property Clause did not extend to that situation. Id. at
614. Curtis also believed that the question of whether a regulation is "needful" rested in the exclusive province of Congress. See id. at 614-15.
235. See id. at 616-19. Curtis summarizes,
[If the practical construction of the Constitution contemporaneously
with its going into effect, by men intimately acquainted with its history from their personal participation in framing and adopting it, and
continued by them through a long series of acts of the gravest importance, be entitled to weight in the judicial mind on a question of construction, it would seem to be difficult to resist the force of the acts
above adverted to.
Id. at 619.
236. See, e.g., FEHRENBACHER, supra note 159, at 429-31.
237. See id. The northern publication Harper'sWeekly Journalof Civilization ran an editorial reflecting this fact:
Nor does it appear that the question of the citizenship of our free
black population is a question likely to take any practical shape capable of profoundly agitating the public mind. We are indeed a consistent and reasonable people! We have among us a small representation of a tropical race of human beings, marked off from us by the
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Congress's power over the territories thus presented a more attractive target to attack, especially given the paucity of the
Court's reasoning.
Thomas Hart Benton, senator from Missouri and John C.
Calhoun's frequent opponent, issued a notable critique of Dred
Scott on the eve of his death. 238 In Benton's view, Taney correctly concluded that the Constitution did not give Congress
legislative power over the territories. Where Taney erred, according to Benton, was in concluding that the Constitution applied to the territories at all. The senator's somewhat tortured
argument on this point probably stems from the fact that Benton had argued United States v. Gratioton behalf of the private
landowners, and he believed that Congress lacked power over
the territories ,other than to dispose of them through sales.
appeared in everything from
Other critiques of Dred24 Scott
0
pamphlets 239 to treatises.
The Dred Scott decision also complicated the politics of the
Democratic Party and ultimately led to its defeat in the presiunmistakable line of color, if by nothing else, and over whom we daily
arrogate to ourselves of the Caucasian stock a complete and absolute
superiority. We will not marry with them, we will not eat with them,
as a general rule we do not let them vote, we will let them hold no office. We do not allow them to kneel beside us to worship the Great
Father of all; not even when we approach the end of our weary journey will we allow our miserable dust to repose side by side with theirs
in the common receptacle of humanity. And yet, when half a dozen
old lawyers at Washington, after racking their heads for two years
over a question that has bothered the Robe for half a century, announce as their decision that free blacks are not citizens of the United
States, and as such not permitted to sue in certain courts of limited
and special jurisdiction, we fume, and fret, and bubble, and squeak,
as if some dreadful injustice and oppression were committed. It really
does not seem to us that this part of the Dred Scott decision is likely
to produce any very serious practical results.
The Dred Scott Case, 1 HARPER'S WKLY. J. OF CILIZATION 193, 193 (1857),
reprintedin KUTLER, supra note 164, at 49.
238. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL EXAMINATION OF THAT PART OF THE DECISION
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE DRED SCOT CASE,
WHICH DECLARES THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE
ACT, AND THE SELF-EXTENSION OF THE CONSTITUTION TO TERRITORIES,
CARRYING SLAVERY WITH IT (photo. reprint 1969) (1857).
239. See, e.g., GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, THE JUST SUPREMACY OF
CONGRESS OVER THE TERRITORIES (Boston, A. Williams & Co. 1859). Curtis

served as one of Scott's attorneys. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 399.
240.

See, e.g., 1 JOHN CODMAN HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE

IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 493-501, 506-523 (photo. reprint 1968) (1858). Professor Fehrenbacher accurately observed that "Hurd's treatise did not so much
attack the Dred Scott decision as pass over it like a glacier, with devastating
effect." FEHRENBACHER, supra note 159, at 427.
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dential election in 1860. Northern Democrats like Stephen
Douglas hoped to soothe anti-slavery activists with the promise
of popular sovereignty in the territories. The Dred Scott decision threw a monkey wrench into this promise. If Congress
lacked the authority to ban slavery in the territories, how could
Congress vest a territorial government with such authority? In
a lengthy article that appeared in Harper'smagazine, Douglas
laid out his view that a territorial government could do so because it reflected the direct will of the people. 241 Douglas's article immediately generated nasty attacks in pamphlet form, one
from President Buchanan's attorney general, Jeremiah Black,
and another from Reverdy Johnson, a southern Democrat who
had served as President Taylor's attorney general and as Sanford's counsel before the Supreme Court in Dred Scott.242 Emboldened by the implications of the Dred Scott decision, southerners and their northern allies began to suggest that if the
Constitution prohibited Congress from banning slavery in the
territories, then it also mandated that Congress must positively
institute slavery in the territories. 243 Indeed, if Taney correctly
concluded that a congressional ban on slavery in the territories
constituted a deprivation of private property without due process of law, free state bans on slavery violated state constitutions containing similar due process provisions. 244 According to
this argument, slavery was a legal institution everywhere in
the United States.
Meanwhile, leaders of the Republican Party treated the decision on the territorial question as mere dicta. After all, the
Court's denial of diversity jurisdiction over Scott's case rendered the rest of the opinion superfluous. The decision in Dred
Scott also thoroughly undermined the Republican Party platform calling for the extirpation of the "twin relics of barba241. Stephen A. Douglas, The Dividing Line Between Federal and Local
Authority, 19 HARPER'S NEW MONTHLY MAG. 519, 537 (1859).
242. The pamphlet OBSERVATIONS ON SENATOR DOUGLAS'S VIEwS OF
POPULAR

SOVEREIGNTY,

AS

EXPRESSED

IN HARPERS'

MAGAZINE,

FOR

1859 (Washington, Thomas McGill 1859) is attributed to Attorney General Jeremiah Black, and the pamphlet REMARKS ON POPULAR
SEPTEMBER,

SOVEREIGNTY, AS MAINTAINED AND DENIED RESPECTIVELY BY JUDGE
DOUGLAS, AND ATTORNEY-GENERAL BLACK (Baltimore, Murphy & Co. 1859) is

attributed to Reverdy Johnson. Douglas then wrote his own pamphlet responding to these attacks, entitled POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN THE
TERRITORIES (Washington 1859).
243. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 159, at 431-37 (describing reaction to

the decision in state legislatures).
244. See id.
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rism-Polygamy, and Slavery."245 Abraham Lincoln called for
simply ignoring the decision. A legal solution to the problems
that the Court created in Dred Scott probably lay out of reach.
The nation collapsed into civil war. In 1862, the Republicans made good on their promise to eliminate polygamy and
slavery in the territories. 246 Congress also enacted many of the
statutes that would govern the shape of the public lands for the
next one hundred years. 247 Politically, however, the issue of
congressional authority over the territories and other property
of the United States disappeared as the much more immediate
and wrenching issues of secession, union, and reconstruction
garnered the nation's attention.
Dred Scott thus provides the only clear authority narrowly
interpreting the Property Clause. Neither logic nor prior
precedent supported it. The most plausible reading of the opinions holding the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional is that
politics and sectionalism motivated the justices involved. Nevertheless, the Dred Scott decision warrants an extended reading. Because the decision represents the Supreme Court's only
definitively narrow reading of the Property Clause, advocates of
the narrow view must defend its reasoning. Thus far, they
have not, perhaps because of the general embarrassment that
the case causes any commentator on the American legal system. It is not entirely unfair, however, to charge that any advocate of a narrow reading of the Property Clause must argue
that the Court decided the Missouri Compromise portion of
Dred Scott correctly. 24 8 The paucity of Taney's reasoning, however, shows that even this relatively early attempt to construe
the Property Clause narrowly does not withstand scrutiny. The
legal authority that existed at the time-the records of the federal government's behavior under the Articles of Confederation,
245. Republican Platform, supra note 169, at 1204.
246. Act of June 19, 1862, ch. CXI, 12 Stat. 432 (banning slavery in the territories); Act of July 1, 1862, ch. CXXVI, 12 Stat. 501 (banning polygamy in
the territories).
247. See, e.g., General Mining Act of 1872, Act of May 10 1872, ch. CLII, 17
Stat. 91 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-40 (1994)); Act of July 26,
1866, ch. CCLXII, 14 Stat. 251 (recognizing rights-of-way across public lands);
Homestead Act, Act of May 20, 1862, ch. LXXV, 12 Stat. 392. Professor
Charles Wilkinson has traced the origins of the still-existing Mining Act of
1872 from the acts of 1866 and 1870. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING
THE NEXT MERIDIAN 40-43 (1992).

248. Curiously, Professor Engdahl-who argued that the classic view of the
Property Clause is a narrow one and who thoroughly catalogued the casesdoes not discuss or even cite Dred Scott. See Engdahl, supra note 28.
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the records of the Constitutional Convention, early case law,
249
and early commentary--did not support Taney's conclusion.
Indeed, the Court's own behavior regarding the decision reveals
its weaknesses. Soon after the embarrassment of Dred Scott
the Court would return to the broad construction of the Property Clause that had prevailed in other cases.
C. THE JURISPRUDENCE FOLLOWING DRED SCOTT AND THE
RAPID REEMERGENCE OF THE BROAD AUTHORITY IN THE

PROPERTY CLAUSE
After Dred Scott, the Court rarely invoked the decision as
authority for its Property Clause jurisprudence. Two key considerations can explain this lack of citation. First, to the extent
that people blamed the outcome in Dred Scott for the Civil War,
any citation to the decision obviously would lack authoritative
or persuasive power. Second, because the Dred Scott decision
dramatically deviated from the Court's earlier Property Clause
jurisprudence, the Court could easily ignore it. Thus, the
Court's use of Dred Scott-or, more precisely, its refusal to confront the decision-reveals itself in both the territorial context
and in the context of other federal property. The territorial
249. Professor Graber's attempt to defend the reasoning in Dred Scott from
a historical perspective is unavailing. See Graber, supra note 161, at 302-10.
For the most part, Graber focuses on defending Taney's ruling that banning
slavery in the territories would constitute a deprivation of property without
due process of law. See id. Only at the end of his account does Graber attempt to defend the portion of the opinion in which Taney argues that Congress lacked authority to ban slavery in the territories not because of the application of an external prohibition (the due process clause) but because the
Property Clause did not vest sufficient authority in Congress over the territories. See id. at 308-10. Graber asserts that, at the time that the Court decided
Dred Scott, sufficient debate existed over the proper interpretation of the term
"needful" and the analogous term "necessary" in the Necessary and Proper
Clause to justify Taney's reading. Id. at 308-09. "The late twentieth-century
legal mind," asserts Graber, "regards elected officials as having the power to
regulate property in any way that might plausibly be regarded as a rational
means to a legitimate government end," id. at 308, implying that legal minds
at the time of Dred Scott did not so regard the power of elected officials.
Graber's argument overlooks such decisions as United States v. Gratiot, and
the broad language in such decisions as American Insurance Co. v. Canter and
Cross v. Harrisonin which the Court ratified broad power of Congress over
federal property and the territories. Whether Graber is correct that, at the
time of the Dred Scott decision, one could plausibly argue that a legislated ban
on slavery constituted a deprivation of property without due process is irrelevant to the question of whether Congress otherwise had the legislative jurisdiction to enact such legislation for the territories and other property belonging to the United States.
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cases show the Court's retreat from its stance in Dred Scott and
shed light on the Court's overall treatment of the power
granted in the Property Clause. Nevertheless, these cases will
receive less attention below than the cases involving other federal property.
1. The Territorial Cases
One of the first cases upholding congressional legislation
for the territories after Dred Scott involved the ban on polygamy that the Republicans had moved through Congress during
the Civil War. 250 The composition of the Court had changed
completely from the time of Dred Scott, and the Court's holding
in the later case reflected this change. In the challenge to the
polygamy statute, the Court unanimously held that "the statute immediately under consideration is within the legislative
power of Congress," without mention of Dred Scott.25 1 In just
one stroke, the Court had reversed the holding of Dred Scott
without even acknowledging the fact.
The Court still had to deal with the source of Congress's
power over the territories. After all, Dred Scott held that the
Property Clause granted Congress power only over the territory
ceded by the states before the adoption of the Constitution.
Rather than expressly overrule Dred Scott on this point, however, the Court relied on the inherent authority theory of congressional power and eventually paired it again with the text of
the Constitution. At first, the Court timidly found authority in
the Property Clause. One case, with amazing sangfroid, stated
that "[t]here have been some differences of opinion as to the
particular clause of the Constitution from which the power [to
govern the territories] is derived, but that it exists has always
been conceded. '252 In upholding Congress's decision to repeal
250. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
251. Id. at 166. Justice Field concurred in the majority opinion except for
one point unrelated to the territorial power issue. See id. at 168 (Field, J.,
concurring).
252. Nat'l Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 132 (1879); see also
Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44-45 (1885) (upholding a statute banning
bigamy and polygamy in the territories, failing to identify the source of power,
and unusually, citing Dred Scott); Natl Bank, 101 U.S. at 132 ("It is certainly
now too late to doubt the power of Congress to govern the Territories."). The
Court has also stated,
[Tihis power of Congress to organize territorial governments, and
make laws for their inhabitants, arises not so much from the clause in
the Constitution in regard to disposing of and making rules and regulations concerning the Territory and other property of the United
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the articles of incorporation for the Mormon Church in the
Utah Territory, the Court held that the power of Congress over
the territories "is general and plenary, arising from and incidental to" the power of the federal government to acquire the
territories and from the power conferred in the Property
Clause. 253 Thus, however derived, Congress had plenary authority over the territories once again.
Moreover, contrary to Taney's opinion in Dred Scott, the
Court did not limit Congress's inherent authority over the territories. Throughout the last decade of the nineteenth century
and the first decade of the twentieth, the Court not only returned to the original spirit of American Insurance Co. v. Canter and held that Congress possessed plenary power over the
territories, but it also authorized governmental structures and
practices not contemplated by the Constitution. In one of the
more important controversies, the Court determined whether
the territories were incorporated into the United States and to
what extent the Constitution would apply to them. In a group
of cases known as the Insular Cases, the Court held that not all
constitutional protections applied to inhabitants of territories
without express legislative action. 254 Although these cases assumed that Congress had broad power over the territories, they
did not expressly overrule Dred Scott on this point. Indeed, in
one of the Insular Cases, the Court simply noted about Dred
Scott that "[i]t is sufficient to say that the country did not acStates, as from the ownership of the country in which the Territories
are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the
National Government, and can be found nowhere else.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886).
253. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 42 (1890).
254. The Insular Cases include Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)
(holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury is inapplicable in
Puerto Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914) (holding that the
Fifth Amendment right to an indictment by a grand jury is inapplicable in the
Philippines); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (holding that the right
to a trial by jury is inapplicable in the Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190
U.S. 197 (1903) (holding that the rights to an indictment by grand jury and to
a trial by jury are inapplicable in Hawaii); and Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244 (1901) (holding that Congress can place a duty on goods shipped from
Puerto Rico to other parts of United States despite the Ports Preference
Clause). Professor Levinson has recently called for instructors of constitutional law to add consideration of the Insular Cases to their classes. See Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should Be Expanded to Include The Insular
Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241

(2000).
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quiesce in the opinion, and that the civil war, which shortly
thereafter followed, produced such changes in judicial, as well
as public sentiment, as to seriously impair the authority of this
case."2 55 These cases would likely have satisfied Thomas Hart
Benton, because they held that the Constitution did not apply
to the territories by its own force. Although this conclusion understandably finds few supporters among the modern commentators,256 it nevertheless demonstrates the Court's comfort with
broad federal power at least when the interests of a state are
not involved.
2. The Federal Property Cases
Just as the post-Civil War Court recognized broad congressional authority over the territories and eventually relinked
that authority with the constitutional text, it also recognized
broad congressional authority over the real property of the federal government as if Dred Scott had never happened. One of
the first of these decisions is Gibson v. Chouteau, a case involving the disposition of federal property.257 Two parties claimed
the same tract of land located in Missouri's public domain, one
through a patent from the United States and the other through
the operation of the state statute of limitations and the doctrine
of equitable conversion. The Court held for the party claiming
the property through the federal patent. This result flowed
from the Property Clause:
With respect to the public domain, the Constitution vests in Congress
the power of disposition and of making all needful rules and regulations. That power is subject to no limitations. Congress has the absolute right to prescribe the times, the conditions, and the mode of
transferring this property, or any part of it, and to designate the persons to whom the transfer shall be made. No State le*slation can interfere with this right or embarrass its exercise ....

Thus, without any reference to Dred Scott, the Court restored
broad congressional authority over the disposition of federal
property, including property lying outside of the original land
ceded to the United States prior to the ratification of the Constitution.
255. Downes, 182 U.S. at 274.
256. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of
Formalism, 78 CAL. L. REV. 853 (1990); Robert A. Katz, Comment, The Jurisprudence of Legitimacy: Applying the Constitution to U.S. Territories, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 779 (1992).

257. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92 (1872).
258. Id. at 99.
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Other cases of this era similarly held in sweeping terms
that the Property Clause vested vast power in Congress to
make rules for the nation's property and to dispose of, to enhance the value of, and to protect federal property as Congress
saw fit.259 In upholding early administrative regulations that
governed grazing on public lands, the Court held in Light v.
United States that "It]he United States can prohibit absolutely
or fix the terms on which its property may be used. As it can
withhold or reserve the land it can do so indefinitely. 2 60 The
federal government possessed this authority by virtue of its
dual roles as proprietor and sovereign. 26 1 As a sovereign, the
federal government could create crimes for violating the terms
of use imposed on public property. 262 Federal law designed to
protect federal lands, control their use, and prescribe the
means through which people acquired rights to them displaced
263
all contrary state law.

259. See, e.g., Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 104 (1918) (upholding an act exempting homesteads from serving as security for debts undertaken prior to the
issuance of the patent for the homestead).
260. 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911). For some background on Fred Light, the
rancher who challenged these regulations, see WILKINSON, supra note 247, at
92.
261. Light, 220 U.S. at 537 ("These are rights incident to proprietorship, to
say nothing of the power of the United States as a sovereign over the property
belonging to it.").
262. See McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 359 (1922). Ordinary
proprietors cannot create criminal law.
263. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 404 (1917).
There, the Court stated,
True, for many purposes a State has civil and criminal jurisdiction
over lands within its limits belonging to the United States, but this
jurisdiction does not extend to any matter that is not consistent with
full power in the United States to protect its lands, to control their
use and to prescribe in what manner others may acquire rights in
them.
Id. Broadly construing this power, the Court continued:
[Tihe inclusion within a State of lands of the United States does not
take from Congress the power to control their occupancy and use, to
protect them from trespass and injury and to prescribe the conditions
upon which others may obtain rights in them, even though this may
involve the exercise in some measure of what commonly is known as
the police power.
Id. at 405. State laws on this subject were irrelevant "save as they may have
been adopted or made applicable by Congress." Id.
Justice Van Devanter wrote Utah Power & Light. In a later decision, the
Supreme Court noted that Justice Van Devanter "as Assistant Attorney General for the Interior Department from 1897 to 1903[ did more than any other
person to give character and distinction to the administration of the public
lands .... " Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336-37 (1963).
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Moreover, the federal government's authority over its
property did not extend solely to the public domain, the national parks, and the forest reserves. In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Tennessee Valley Authority acquiring transmission lines to
market hydroelectric energy produced at one of its dams. 264
The Court reasoned that the Property Clause authorized the
government to lease out its lands for mineral development in
addition to selling them outright. 265 Surely, if the government
could lease its lands for mineral development, "it could mine
and obtain profit from its own sales."266 By analogy, because
the United States owned the "water power and electric energy
generated at the dam,"267 the United States could sell the elec268
tricity itself as its property.
During the post-Civil War era, the Court also affirmed that
the federal government could use its power to grant federal
lands for accomplishing arguably nonfederal ends. For example, the Court upheld the federal government's conditional
grant that allowed San Francisco to generate electricity at the
Hetch-Hetchy valley in Yosemite National Park, but only if a
municipal entity, and not a private utility, sold the electrical
power. 269 Because the Court found that the Property Clause
power was "without limitations," it upheld the grant as constitutional. 270 Under this limitless authority, "Congress may constitutionally limit the disposition of the public domain to a
manner consistent with its views of public policy," including a
policy "designed to avoid monopoly and to bring about a wide-

This observation undermines Professor Engdahl's assertion that the justices
deciding Utah Power & Light "were seriously deficient in their understanding
of the property clause precedents." Engdahl, supra note 28, at 311; see also id.
at 314 n.142 (questioning Van Devanter's reasoning in Utah Power & Light).

264. 297 U.S. 288 (1936). Ashwander is known more for Justice Brandeis's
concurring opinion and its view that courts should avoid reaching constitutional questions if possible. See id. at 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Although three justices joined Brandeis, id. at 356, Brandeis also made it clear
that he agreed with Chief Justice Hughes's opinion on the merits of the constitutional question. See id. at 341 ("1 do not disagree with the conclusion on the
constitutional question announced by the Chief Justice...
265.

See id. at 331-32.

266. Id. at 333.
267. Id.
268.

See id. at 333-35.

269. United States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 18-19 (1940).
270. Id. at 29.
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spread distribution of benefits."27 1 This holding followed from
Ashwander, where the Court rejected the notion that Congress
could only sell electricity generated at federally owned dams to
further an enumerated power. Instead, the decision to sell lay
to determine of how much
"in the discretion of the Congress...
2 72
of the property it shall dispose.
During this period, the Court also upheld federal actions
taking place on federal land that directly contravened state
statutes. For example, in Hunt v. United States, the Court held
that the Forest Service could authorize its agents to shoot deer
that were overbrowsing a national forest, even though the
hunting violated state game laws. 273 Similarly, the Court held
that federal agents could take actions that directly violated
state law even when the state had originally ceded jurisdiction
to the United States under the Enclave Clause and the federal
ceded the exclusive jurisdiction back
government2 7subsequently
4
to the state.
271. Id. at 30.
272. Ashwanderv. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 336 (1935).
273. 278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928) ("The direction given by the Secretary of Agriculture was within the authority conferred upon him by act of Congress. And
the power of the United States to thus protect its lands and property does not
admit of doubt."). One twist to the Hunt decision is that the district court held
that the United States could not license private hunters to cull the herds on
behalf of the Forest Service, id., and that the Supreme Court, under the circumstances of the case, required that the Secretary of Agriculture promulgate
regulations requiring the Forest Service to specially tag the carcasses of all
deer taken. Id. at 101. Nevertheless, these interesting twists are of no special
importance, because the Court's opinion makes clear that these provisos are
unique to the case. See id. at 100-01. No commentator has attempted to use
these comments to undermine the overall reasoning of Hunt or has argued
that they are necessary to the decision.
274. See Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899) (approving of federal officials
serving oleomargarine at a military hospital without warnings required by
state law). Professor Engdahl interprets Ohio v. Thomas as reinforcing his
theory that under the classic doctrine "although the state enjoyed general governmental jurisdiction [over federal property], if federal property were used to
effectuate one of the enumerated federal governmental powers, that enumerated governmental power would invoke the supremacy clause so as to override
state law." Engdahl, supra note 28, at 304. In Engdahl's view, the specific
enumerated power involved in Ohio v. Thomas is the power of Congress over
the military. Nevertheless, Ohio v. Thomas evidences a broader understanding that actions taken pursuant to the Property Clause on federal lands can
override otherwise applicable state law even if the federal government is not
exercising what Engdahl would call an enumerated power. First, the Court
spoke generally in Ohio v. Thomas and did not limit its language to the exercise powers enumerated in Article I.
Federal officers who are discharging their duties in a State and who
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The Court also determined to what extent Congress could
delegate this power to the executive. The Court upheld criminal prosecutions for violations of grazing regulations issued
under the Forest Reserve Act because the statute contemplated
such regulations generally, even though it did not specifically
provide for them. 275 The Court also upheld the President's
withdrawal of public lands from otherwise applicable laws authorizing the disposal of such lands simply because of the longstanding practice. 276 These holdings arguably extended the
Court's jurisprudence in the delegation of legislative power to
the executive. Similarly, the Court upheld mining laws that
subjected mining on federal lands to state law as well as federal
law, a holding that arguably went beyond the Court's delega277
tion jurisprudence in other areas.
are engaged... in superintending the internal government and management of a Federal institution... are not subject to the jurisdiction
of the State in regard to those very matters of administration which
are thus approved by the Federal authority.
Thomas, 173 U.S. at 283. Second, the decision in Hunt v. United Stateswhich upheld the decision of the United States to cull a deer herd that was
overbrowsing a national forest-is incomprehensible under Engdahl's theory.
It is coherent only under a theory that recognizes that the Property Clause is
itself an enumerated power, not an authority that Congress must use to further some other enumerated power if it seeks to preempt contrary state legislation. According to Engdahl, that decision involved the exercise of no enumerated power. Engdahl, supra note 28, at 314 n.140 ("Making provision for
public recreation or for future timber needs is not an objective within the scope
of any enumerated federal power."). In Engdahl's view, if the federal government is not exercising a power enumerated in Article I, the federal government is limited to the powers of a mere proprietor and is "subject to the governmental jurisdiction of the state wherein the particular land lay, without
the possibility of federal preemption." Id. at 310. Generally, a private landowner cannot kill animals in violation of state game laws even if the wildlife
has injured the landowner's property. Engdahl dismissed Hunt in two ways.
First, he conceded that the "United States enjoyed as a proprietor... certainly
a somewhat greater right of self-help than that which a private proprietor
could claim." Id. at 317. Second, cases like Hunt spelled the beginning of the
end of what Engdahl conceived was the "classic" Property Clause doctrine. See
id. at 318 n.157 (arguing that although "classic principles still prevailed in the
Supreme Court, [this] by no means indicates that they were universally understood and consistently applied by all lawyers, government officers, and inferior courts"). Engdahl's argument concerning Hunt is baroque. A cleaner
and more coherent view is that the control of federal property is an enumerated power, and that the federal officials in Hunt acted with the same authority as those in the earlier Ohio v. Thomas case.
275. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
276. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
277. Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119 (1905). The Court's reasoning does evince a sense that the Property Clause power may not be a power
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For the purposes of this Article, however, Camfield v.
United States provides the most notable Property Clause case
that the Court decided in this period.278 That case deserves
close attention for two reasons. First, Camfield involved a
question of the federal government's power to regulate private
activities on private lands located within a state (as opposed to
a territory). Second, the Court's approach provides some insight into possible limits on the Property Clause power.
Camfield involved an attempt by private parties to fence in
approximately 20,000 acres of public lands that lay within the
state of Colorado.27 9 Congress had enacted a statute making
the enclosure of public lands in any state or territory unlawful,
unless the party erecting the fence had a claim or color of title
to the land. 280 The individuals in Camfield apparently had no
such claim, but they devised an ingenious means to fence in
approximately seventy-two square miles of land, with about
half of that owned by the federal government. Their scheme
rested on a common pattern of land ownership in the West.
The individuals owned the odd-numbered sections within the
two townships in question, and the United States owned all of
the even-numbered sections. 28 1 To avoid erecting a fence on
public lands, the individuals erected fences only on oddnumbered sections. 282 Although this pattern enclosed the evennumbered sections of land as well,28 3 the private individuals
as extensive as other powers granted in the Constitution.
While the disposition of these lands is provided for by Congressional
legislation, such legislation savors somewhat of mere rules prescribed
by an owner of property for its disposal. It is not of a legislative char-

acter in the highest sense of the term, and as an owner may delegate
to his principal agent the right to employ subordinates, giving to them
a limited discretion, so it would seem that Congress might rightfully
entrust to the local legislature the determination of minor matters respecting the disposal of these lands.
Id. at 126. Despite the fact that the Court says that statutes enacted under
the Property Clause are perhaps "not of a legislative character in the highest
sense of the term," the holding of the case is only that Congress could incorporate state law in its disposition of public lands, not that the Property Clause
power is a lesser congressional power. Id.
278. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
279. Id. at 519.
280. Act of Feb. 25, 1885, ch. 149, § 1, 23 Stat. 321 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §
1061 (1994)).
281. Camfield, 167 U.S. at 519.
282. Id.
283. The Court's opinion includes a helpful diagram that shows how the
defendants erected their fences. Id. at 520.
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argued that they had fenced in only their own lands. Therefore, their actions lay beyond the reach of the legislative authority of the federal government because the actions took
284
place solely on privately owned lands.
In rejecting the defendant's view, the Court held that the
federal government had both proprietary and sovereign powers
over its lands. Indeed, the Court intertwined its discussion of
these two aspects of federal ownership. To address the proprietary aspect of federal ownership, the Court first questioned
whether the fences would qualify as a nuisance. 285 If so, the
United States, like any private landowner, could seek to enjoin
the fences even if they were not erected directly on federal
land. 286 In the case of an established nuisance, "no legislation
was necessary to vindicate the rights of the Government as a
landed proprietor."287 This holding was consistent with the
Court's earlier decision giving the United States all the remedies available
to an ordinary proprietor for instances of tres8
pass.

28

In relation to the sovereign aspect of federal ownership, the
Court analogized to the state police power. States could, under
their police power, legislate against the erection of injurious
fences even if they did not qualify as a nuisance. 289 This legislation had a basis in the state police power because it advanced
and sufficiently safeguarded the public interest and did not
merely vindicate private values. 290 If the fences involved in
Camfield did not qualify as a nuisance, this would prevent the
federal government from enjoining them in its capacity as proprietor. 91 Nevertheless, the federal government could legislate
against such fences because they interfered with the congres284. Id. at 522.
285. Id. at 522-23.
286. Id. at 524 ("While the lands in question are all within the State of
Colorado, the Government has, with respect to its own lands, the rights of an
ordinary proprietor, to maintain its possession and to prosecute trespassers.").
287. Id.
288. See Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229, 231-32 (1851).
289. Camfield, 167 U.S. at 522-24; see also Rideout v. Knox, 19 N.E. 390
(Mass. 1889) (Holmes, J.), cited in Camfield, 167 U.S. at 523.
290. Camfield, 167 U.S. at 524.
291. The defendants erected the fences wholly on private lands and without
spite. See Gaetke, Boundary Waters, supra note 27, at 172. Therefore, an ordinary proprietor probably could not have obtained an injunction against these
fences under the common law then prevalent. Indeed, no evidence suggested
that these fences were anything other than ordinary agricultural fences typically built on the range in the intermountain West at the time.
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sional policy for these lands.292 This legislation withstood scrutiny even though it "may involve an entry upon the lands of a
293
private individual."
In reaching this conclusion, the Court declared that the
"general Government doubtless has a power over its own property analogous to the police power of the several States, and the
extent to which it may go in the exercise of such power is
measured by the exigencies of the particular case."2 9 4 It made
no difference to the Court that the federal lands lay within a
state. Even though Congress did not have general power over
property within a state as it would over property within a territory, this distinction dissolved when dealing with federal prop292. Camfield, 167 U.S. at 525. Professor Gaetke persuasively argues that
the rule in Camfleld extends beyond protecting the public lands from common
law nuisances. Gaetke, Boundary Waters, supra note 27, at 169-74. Analyzing
Camfield closely, he concludes that "if Camfield is to be cited merely for the
proposition that Congress may prohibit the maintenance of nuisances on property adjoining the public lands, it must be recognized that 'nuisance' includes
a use of private property that frustrates a congressional policy for the use of
federal property." Id. at 172. Nevertheless, Professor Gaetke relies too heavily on the Court's conclusion that "the fence is clearly a nuisance." Camfield,
167 U.S. at 525. Professor Gaetke draws on this language to argue that courts
should determine the extent of the federal government's authority to control
extraterritorial activities in a manner similar to the way in which they determine whether the activity is a nuisance. Gaetke, Congressional Discretion,
supra note 27, at 397 & n.87. In particular, Professor Gaetke relies on language in the opinion suggesting that the Court would have found the defendants' conduct lawful if they had fenced in each individual privately owned
section. Id. at 397 n.87 (citing Camfield, 167 U.S. at 527-28). This argument
is flawed. The opinion in Camfield makes clear that this language is dicta.
Camfield, 167 U.S. at 528 ("It may be added, however, that this is scarcely a
practical question.. . ."). In addition, it is unclear from the Court's opinion
whether nuisance set an outward boundary of federal government regulation
of extraterritorial activity. The Court stated that "[slo long as the individual
proprietor confines his enclosure to his own land, the Government has no right
to complain, since he is entitled to the complete and exclusive enjoyment of it,
regardless of any detriment to his neighbor...." Id. Although the Court may
have been commenting on the outer boundaries of congressional authority under the Property Clause, an equally plausible reading is that the Court was
simply interpreting the terms of the statute, which only forbade fencing in
public lands. The presence of individual fences on private lands "was a contingency which the Government was bound to contemplate in granting away
the odd-numbered sections." Id. The Camfield decision thus does not set an
outer boundary of federal regulation of extraterritorial activities. Even though
Gaetke understands the Court's use of the term "nuisance" in Camfield to extend beyond mere common law nuisance, see Gaetke, Boundary Waters, supra
note 27, at 172, he nevertheless uses nuisance as a basic model in determining
the extent of federal authority.
293. Camfleld, 167 U.S. at 525.
294. Id.
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erty.295 Recognizing the federal government as a sovereign over
public lands in addition to being a proprietor avoided the risk of
"plac[ing] the public domain of the United States completely at
the mercy of state legislation. 2 96 Thus, without any hesitation,
the Court announced that the federal government had police
power over activities that harm federal property even when the
regulated activities occurred wholly on privately owned lands
within states admitted to the Union. 297 This recognition will
later prove important in evaluating the extent to which principles of federalism restrict the federal government's authority
over public lands.
The Court's second notable case concerning the authority of
the United States to regulate private activities on nonfederal
298
lands that threaten public lands is United States v. Alford.
In that case, Alford built a fire on nonfederal lands, did not ex299
tinguish the fire, and ended up setting fire to federal lands.
The United States indicted Alford for violating a statute that
subjected to criminal punishment any person who builds a fire
in or near any federal lands without totally extinguishing the
fire. 3°° The district court dismissed the indictment, and the
Supreme Court reversed in a characteristically terse opinion by
Justice Holmes. The Court held the statute constitutional, reasoning that "Congress may prohibit the doing of acts upon privately owned lands that imperil the publicly owned forests."30 1
The activity regulated only had to take place "near" publicly
30 2
owned lands.
295. Id. at 525-26. As the Court held,
While we do not undertake to say that Congress has the unlimited
power to legislate against nuisances within a State, which it would
have within a Territory, we do not think the admission of a Territory
as a State deprives it of the power of legislating for the protection of
the public lands, though it may thereby involve the exercise of what is
ordinarily known as the police power, so long as such power is directed solely to its own protection.

Id.
296. Id. at 526.
297. Id. at 525-26.

298. 274 U.S. 264 (1927).
299. Id. at 266.
300. Id. at 266-67 (quoting Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 6, 36 Stat. 855,
857).
301. Id. at 267.
302. Id. Professor Gaetke has pointed out that the rule of Camfield, properly read, comprises the rule of Alford. Gaetke, Boundary Waters, supra note
27, at 170 n.69. Alford is nevertheless important to buttress the proposition
that the federal government can regulate activities off federal lands.
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This litany of cases stands out in an era during which, at
least until the New Deal, the Court acted with disdain or outright hostility to the exercise of federal power within the states.
The Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence at this time made
fine distinctions between "local" activities such as manufacturing that Congress could not regulate and interstate commerce
that Congress could regulate. 30 3 The Court also held that the
civil rights amendments could not be enforced with broad federal enactments. 30 4 The federal government certainly did not
have anything resembling the police power within states admitted to the union. 30 5 Yet, in the context of the Property
Clause, the Court held that the federal government had broad
power over the administration of its lands, one akin to the general police power.
One must assess the cases from this era relied on by the
proponents of the narrow view against this background. These
proponents often attempt to turn the dicta from these cases
into holdings. These cases usually involved a dispute between
an individual and a state with the individuals claiming freedom
from state regulation because of their presence on federal land.
From early times, however, the Court and commentators recognized state authority to enact legislation for federal property
in the absence of a federal statute. 30 6 These decisions, therefore, do not accurately represent the Court's view on the federal
government's authority over its property. The more central inquiry to determine the extent of Congress's power under the
Property Clause asks whether the federal government can enact legislation for its property that trumps otherwise applicable
state law.
The most important case of this era on which the advocates
303. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating a
provision of the act setting minimum wage and maximum hours requirements
in the coal mining industry); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating a statute prohibiting interstate shipment of goods made with child
labor as an unconstitutional regulation of manufacturing), overruledin part by
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908) (invalidating an act that criminalized discharging an employee
based on membership in a labor organization), overruled in part by Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,
156 U.S. 1 (1895) (construing an antitrust act narrowly to exempt manufacturing activities).
304. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
305. See, e.g., In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 505-06 (1905), overruled in part by
United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
306. See, e.g., 3 STORY, supra note 147, § 1322, at 198.
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of the narrow view rely is Fort Leavenworth Railroad Co. v.
Lowe, 307 which provides the best textual support for the view
that the United States has only the rights of an ordinary proprietor over its lands. In Fort Leavenworth Railroad, the federal government owned a military base in Kansas and did not
obtain a cession of jurisdiction to the base under the Enclave
Clause when Congress admitted Kansas to the Union. 30 8 A
railroad company claimed that Kansas could not tax any of its
property that lay within the federal reservation. 30 9 If Kansas
had ceded jurisdiction and the United States had accepted the
cession, the case would be easily decided under standard Enclave Clause jurisprudence: The United States would have the
exclusive power to make laws for the area, and Kansas tax law
would not apply. 310 Because Kansas had not made such a complete cession, however, the railroad's claim to an exemption
from state taxation rested on its presence within a federal reservation. 3 11 To the extent that Kansas had made a cession of
jurisdiction to the United States, the cession expressly retained
3 12
authority to tax railroads within the military reservation.
Thus, for the railroad to win, it had to show that such a retention of the authority to tax somehow violated the Constitution. 313 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding
that states retained jurisdiction over private parties on federal
reservations unless the state had ceded all jurisdiction to the
314
federal government.
The holding of Fort Leavenworth Railroad does not itself
interfere with a broad reading of the Property Clause. It simply held that where a state expressly reserves the authority to
307.

114 U.S. 525 (1885). Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845),

the principal authority from before the Civil War on which the opponents of a
broad reading of the Property Clause rely, is discussed supra notes 154-58 and
accompanying text.
308. FortLeavenworth, 114 U.S. at 526-27.
309. Id. at 526.
310. Id. at 533-38.
311. Id. at 526-27.
312.

See id. at 528.

313. See id. Even this argument was weak. If Kansas could not make a
partial cession of jurisdiction under the Constitution, "the jurisdiction of the
State would then remain as it previously existed," and the state could tax the
railroad. Id. at 540. Thus, the railroad was in the unenviable position of arguing that the only cession of jurisdiction that a state can make is one that
complies with the Enclave Clause, and that the Court should construe the partial cession as a complete one.
314. Id. at 542.
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tax people within a federal reservation, the tax subsequently
imposed is valid. 315 This holding said nothing about conflicting
federal and state legislation applying to the same federal property. Those critics who read the Property Clause narrowly
therefore do not turn their argument on the holding of Fort
Leavenworth Railroad.
Instead, these critics seize on the Court's repetition of the
statement in Fort Leavenworth Railroad that the federal government has "only the rights of an ordinary proprietor" with
316
regard to land that it regulates under the Property Clause.
A full reading of the opinion, however, demonstrates that the
Court used this phrase solely to emphasize the existence of
state authority over private parties on federal lands where no
controlling federal statute displaced state authority. The Court
did not conclude that the federal government lacked legislative
authority over its own property. In the better reading of its
opinion, the Court recognized the unique sovereign attributes
of the federal government as a landowner, despite the "ordinary
proprietor" language. Three pieces of evidence support this
view. First, immediately after equating federal government
land ownership with that "of private individuals," the Court described the right of eminent domain that the United States has
over land within the states. 317 Ordinary proprietors lack this
power. 3 18 Second, in emphasizing that states retain their legislative jurisdiction over federal lands subject to the Property
Clause, the Court incompletely quoted Story's Commentaries,
leaving out the language indicating that this state power was

315. Id.
316. Id. at 527; see also id. ("So far as the land constituting the Reservation
was not used for military purposes, the possession of the United States was
only that of an individual proprietor."); id. at 531 (stating that where lands are
not acquired under the Enclave Clause, possession by the United States "is
simply that of an ordinary proprietor"); id. (stating that federal property "is
subject to the legislative authority and control of the States equally with the
property of private individuals"). For how this language fits into a narrow
reading of the Property Clause, see Brodie, supra note 28, at 710-11; Engdahl,
supra note 28, at 298-99.
317. Fort Leavenworth, 114 U.S. at 531.
318. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited its earlier cases, which
held that the right of eminent domain was an inherent attribute of sovereignty. See id. at 532 ( citing United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883)
("The power to take private property for public uses, generally termed the
right of eminent domain, belongs to every independent government.")); id. at
531 (citing Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-73 (1875)).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

subject to overriding federal legislation. 319 The Court probably
omitted this language because it did not have to address this
matter in the case at hand.
Finally, and most importantly, the Court recognized a new
form of cession of jurisdiction not set forth in the Constitution.
This cession of jurisdiction would not suffice to bring the area
in question under the Enclave Clause, but would operate as a
cession of exclusive jurisdiction under the Property Clause. 320
319. See id. at 538. For the complete quotation including the proviso about
the federal government retaining its authority, see supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
320. It was not clear from the case whether the affected state must make
such a cession expressly; Kansas did in the Fort Leavenworth case, but the
Court's language recognizing this new form of cession leaves the question
open. The Court stated the following conclusion:
Where, therefore, lands are acquired [by any means other than the
provisions of the Enclave Clause, the United States] will hold the
lands subject to this qualification: that if upon them forts, arsenals, or
other public buildings are erected for the uses of the general government, such buildings, with their appurtenances, as instrumentalities
for the execution of its powers, will be free from any such interference
and jurisdiction of the State as would destroy or impair their effective
use for the purposes designed.... But, when not used as such instrumentalities, the legislative power of the State over the places acquired will be as full and complete as over any other places within her
limits.
FortLeavenworth, 114 U.S. at 539; see also id. at 542 ("It is necessarily temporary, to be exercised only so long as the places continue to be used for the public purposes for which the property was acquired or reserved from sale. When
they cease to be thus used, the jurisdiction reverts to the State."). Professor
Engdahl has read Fort Leavenworth to stand for the proposition that exercise
of federal legislative power over federal property subject to the Property
Clause is "constitutionally permissible only as to property that was being utilized to effectuate some constitutionally enumerated federal power, and only
insofar as the possession of such jurisdiction might be said to facilitate such
use," this type of cession being only "an application of the necessary and
proper clause." Engdahl, supra note 28, at 306. Professor Engdahl's reading,
however, has at least two flaws. First, Engdahl's reading fails to account fully
for how the Court could recognize the partial cession of legislative jurisdiction.
If the federal government had the power of an ordinary proprietor under the
Property Clause, then Engdahl does not identify another provision of the Constitution under which the United States could accept the cession of legislative
jurisdiction. Engdahl would likely argue that the Necessary and Proper
Clause would provide such authority because Congress can legislate for, say, a
military installation to further its powers over the military. If that were the
case, however, a cession of jurisdiction from the state would be unnecessary.
Second, Engdahl's reading fails to account for the Court's language immunizing from state control not just "forts, arsenals, or other public buildings," but
also "all instrumentalities created by the general government," Fort Leavenworth, 114 U.S. at 539, including "places [that] continue to be used for the
public purposes for which the property was acquired or reserved from sale."
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If the Court had adhered to the narrow view, then the Kansas
cession in Fort Leavenworth Railroad could not have conferred
any authority to the United States because it did not satisfy the
terms of the Enclave Clause. 32 1 Yet the Court made clear that
the federal government possessed legislative authority that
would oust state authority at least where the exercise of state
jurisdiction would "destroy or impair" the "effective use" of the
federal lands for their designated purposes.322
The larger body of tax immunity cases also supports the
proposition that the federal government has sovereign authority over its property, not merely the powers of an ordinary proprietor. Ordinary proprietors cannot confer tax immunity on
people who perform work on their property. 323 Thus, if an ordinary proprietor contracts with a timber harvesting company
and the state in which the land lies has a severance tax for
timber, someone must pay the tax. If, however, the federal
government conducts the same activity on its own property, it
is immune from that tax. 324 Under some circumstances, even
private activities that take place on federal land are so linked
to the federal government that they escape state taxing authority. The exact contours of the doctrine that immunizes certain
private activities that occur on federal property escape easy
definition. 325 Nevertheless, the Court has held that Congress
Id. at 542 (emphasis added). The italicized language would include national
forests and national parks, which Engdahl has claimed does not further any
enumerated power. See Engdahl, supra note 28, at 314 n.140.
321. Of course, as previously noted, this holding would not have assisted
the railroad. FortLeavenworth, 114 U.S. at 540. Nevertheless, the Court gave
the partial cession of Kansas full effect in the case immediately following Fort
Leavenworth in the reports. See Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 547 (1885) (holding that a tort suit in Fort Leavenworth is controlled by tort law in effect at the time Kansas ceded jurisdiction,
not later-enacted Kansas tort law, because of cession ofjurisdiction).
322. FortLeavenworth, 114 U.S. at 539.
323. Although private parties can agree to an allocation of tax liabilities
among themselves, such agreements do not bind the taxing authority. See,
e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930) (disregarding a contract that
attempted to reallocate salary to avoid federal income tax).
324. The leading case for this proposition is McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 328 (1819), and the principle is firmly established in Van
Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 155-58 (1886).
325. For example, activities that take place within lands governed under
the Enclave Clause generally escape state taxation, unless the state has reserved the power to tax within the enclave. See, e.g., United States v. Tax
Comm'n, 412 U.S. 363, 371 (1973) (holding the state liquor tax inapplicable to
sales within military reservation); Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 255-62
(1963) (holding that a state cannot apply its price-fixing regulations to pur-
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can extend the federal government's immunity to private activities if it acts through express legislation. 326 This rule, if applied to construction projects for forts and magazines, might
327
just extend the reach of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The Supreme Court, however, has strongly suggested that
Congress can extend federal immunity from state taxation to
activities not covered by any enumerated power other than the
328
Property Clause.
Advocates of the narrow view also heavily rely on Ward v.
Race Horse, which held that state game laws governed hunting
by Indians on federal land subject to the Property Clause, even
though these laws conflicted with an existing treaty.329 The
treaty provided that the Indians would "have the right to hunt
on the unoccupied lands of the United States, so long as game
may be found thereon, and so long as peace subsists among the
chases of milk for military consumption when the regulations are in conflict
with federal law); Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 530-39
(1938) (upholding some state taxes on activities within Yosemite National
Park, a federal enclave, but not others depending on wording of state cession
of jurisdiction); Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 186, 206-09 (1937)
(upholding application of occupation tax within enclave where state reserved
power to tax in cession); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 148-50
(1937) (upholding gross receipts tax on work performed for the federal government where cession ofjurisdiction reserved power to tax); Surplus Trading
Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 656-57 (1930) (holding that a state may not tax personal property within enclave). Activities that take place within lands governed under the Property Clause are generally subject to state taxation. See,
e.g., Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1946) (holding that activites in federal forest reserve lands are subject to state tax if cession of jurisdiction has
not occurred). Two cases decided the same day explain the differences in state
regulation over federal enclaves and other federal property. Compare Pac.
Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Dep't of Agric., 318 U.S. 285, 295-96 (1943) (holding state
minimum price for milk inapplicable within federal enclave), with Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261, 275 (1943) (upholding state
minimum price for milk sold within military reservation not subject to Enclave
Clause).
326. See United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 474 (1958) (suggesting that Congress could confer immunity on private parties beyond immunity
constitutionally conferred on federal government); Penn Dairies, 318 U.S. at
269 (assuming that Congress could confer tax immunity on sales to federal
government); see also Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 8 (1941) (distinguishing constitutional immunity from taxation from congressional power to
immunize federal contractors from state taxation). Professor Engdahl argued
that the ability of Congress to confer immunity from state taxation flows from
the power of Congress to act through the Necessary and Proper Clause. Engdahl, supra note 28, at 374.
327. Engdahl, supra note 28, at 299-300.
328. See cases cited supra note 326.
329. 163 U.S. 504, 514-16 (1896).
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whites and Indians on the borders of the hunting districts."330
The Court held that the treaty did not give the Indians hunting
rights on all public lands in Wyoming but "only lands of that
character embraced within what the treaty denominates as
hunting districts." 331 This language, the Court held, conferred
only a temporary right that the admission of Wyoming to the
Union repealed. 332 In reaching that conclusion, the Court held
that to read the treaty to apply to all federally owned lands in
the state would violate principles of equal footing by depriving
the state of the power to regulate hunting generally. 333 Race
Horse therefore only involved the interpretation of a particular
treaty and the effect of an act of admission on that treaty; it did
not involve the extent to which the United States could have
granted Indians hunting rights on federal lands that would
334
conflict with otherwise applicable state law.

The other cases frequently cited in narrow readings of the
Property Clause weakly support this view. At most these cases
stand for the proposition that state laws of general application
apply to federal lands. The cases do not hold that the federal
government lacks broad authority to legislate for its lands, including displacement of otherwise applicable state law. In
Kansas v. Colorado,335 for example, the Court held that the
United States could not intervene in an interstate dispute over
the allocation of water in a non-navigable river. The federal
government sought to participate based on its interest in the
reclamation of arid lands. In denying intervention, the Court
held that the Property Clause "does not grant to Congress any
legislative control over the States, and must, so far as they are
concerned, be limited to authority over the property belonging
to the United States within their limits." 336 Read in full con-

text, this statement does not limit the reach of the Property
330. Id. at 507.
331. Id. at 508.
332. Id. at 514.
333. See id. at 511-12, 514-15.
334. Professor Engdahl argues that Race Horse "cannot be dismissed as
merely involving judicial construction of the terms of the Indian treaty and the
subsequent act admitting the state into the Union," because the Court had
rested its decision on equal footing grounds. Engdahl, supra note 28, at 357
n.332. The Supreme Court has recently expressly repudiated this portion of
the Race Horse decision. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,
526 U.S. 172, 203-04 (1999).
335. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
336. Id. at 89.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

Clause. The Court instead held that the Constitution did not
grant the United States unbridled authority to regulate reclamation of federal lands simply because the problem implicated
a national concern. 337 This holding embraced the principles of
the Tenth Amendment and blocked the possible assertion that
Congress could force a particular type of water law-either riparianism or prior appropriation-on a state. 338 Nevertheless
in reaching this conclusion the Court recognized the United
States's power over its own land. The Court also emphasized
precedent that interthat its decision did not erode earlier
339
preted the Property Clause broadly.
The Court in Omaechevarria v. Idaho upheld a state law
banning sheep ranching on any rangelands (including federal
lands) where cattle had been grazed, but it did so only because
a federal law did not exist at the time to govern ranching on the
public lands.340 Colorado v. Toll involved the question whether
a state retained jurisdiction over highways through a national
park, where a park superintendent allegedly asserted the authority to determine who could use the highway. 34 1 The Court
expressly held that the statute creating the park did not "attempt to give exclusive jurisdiction to the United States, but on
the contrary the rights of the State over the roads are left unaffected in terms."342 All of these cases stand only for the proposition that, unless the federal government acts, state law still
governs actions on federal lands subject to the Property Clause.
They do not address situations in which the federal government
acts contrary to state law or in which the federal government
has relied on its sovereign power over its lands in adopting
laws.
Thus, even in the period after Dred Scott, the Court continuously read the Property Clause broadly. The cases advanced by the advocates of the narrow view do not necessarily
337. See id. at 92 ("[Ilt may well be that no power is adequate for their reclamation other than that of the National Government. But if no such power
has been granted, none can be exercised.").
338. See id. ("We do not mean that [federal] legislation can override state
laws in respect to the general subject of reclamation."); see also id. at 90 (citing
the Tenth Amendment).
339. See id. at 89.
340. 246 U.S. 343, 346 (1918) ("The police power of the State extends over
the federal public domain, at least when there is no legislation by Congress on
the subject.").
341. 268 U.S. 228 (1925).
342. Id. at 231.
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apply to the situation at hand and run contrary to the Court's
repeated affirmation of the dual relationships that the federal
government has with its lands, that of proprietor and that of
sovereign. This period of the Property Clause's history continued to support rather than supplant the traditional broad
43
view.3
D. THE CURRENT APPROACH TO THE PROPERTY CLAUSE
The most recent exposition of the Property Clause from the
Supreme Court came in Kieppe v. New Mexico. 34 That case involved a constitutional challenge to the Wild Free-Roaming
Horses and Burros Act, 345 which protects these animals both on
and off the public range. The dispute in Kleppe involved wild
burros spotted near a water source on federal lands. Someone
with a permit to graze cattle on those lands complained. 346 The
federal government would not remove the burros, so the
rancher complained to the New Mexico Livestock Board-a
state agency of New Mexico-and that agency rounded up the
burros and sold them at auction. 347 When the federal government protested this action, the state sued the federal government and argued that the act was unconstitutional. The district court so held, but the Supreme Court reversed in sweeping
348
terms.
To be sure, Kieppe applied to the federal government's
regulation of activities that took place entirely on federal lands.
The rancher used public lands by permission of the United
States and the state seized the burros on federally owned
lands. Much like its earlier cases, however, the Court spoke in
sweeping terms in upholding the constitutionality of the act as
a valid exercise of the federal government's power under the
Property Clause. To find a valid exercise of that power, the
Court said that it needed to determine only whether the act
constituted "a 'needful' regulation 'respecting' the public

343. This conclusion refutes Engdahl's position. See supra note 46 (describing Engdahl's position). Rather than representing a period in which an upstart reading supplanted a now-lost classic reading, this period reflected the
continued classic, i.e., broad, reading of the Property Clause.
344. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
345. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994).
346. Ieppe, 426 U.S. at 533.
347. Id. at 533-34.
348. Id. at 542-47.
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lands."349 The Court then limited its role in making this determination because such a determination should be "entrusted
350
primarily to the judgment of Congress."
The Court also rejected the contention that the presence of
the Enclave Clause somehow limited the federal government's
authority under the Property Clause. 35 1 The Court recognized
that the federal government could acquire exclusive authority
352
and jurisdiction over lands ceded under the Enclave Clause.
The Court also recognized that "[albsent consent or cession a
State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal lands within
its territory ....353 Nevertheless, the Court continued, "Congress equally surely retains the power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the Property Clause. And
when Congress so acts, the federal legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause."354 In
comprehensive language, the Court summed up the relationship between the federal government and the states in the
management of public lands falling outside of the Enclave
Clause. The states could enforce their criminal and civil laws
on the public lands, but Congress could oust state law through
355
express legislation.
Moreover, the Court rejected the argument from the principles of federalism that federal regulation of conduct on federal
lands constituted an unwarranted intrusion into an area tradi356
tionally reserved to the states, such as the control of wildlife.
Although the opponents to the broad view criticize Kleppe as a
rogue misinterpretation of older case law,357 the decision reads
as if written by Joseph Story himself. Story argued that states
had authority to regulate activities on federal property "subject

349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

Id. at 536.
Id.
See id. at 541-43.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 543.
Id. (citations omitted).

355.

See id.

356. See id. at 545. The argument that states traditionally regulated the
taking of wildlife rested on Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). Geer held
that a state prohibition of interstate transportation of wildlife otherwise legally taken in the state did not violate the Commerce Clause. See id. at 52932. Three years after it decided Kleppe, the Supreme Court overruled this aspect of Geer in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).

357. See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 28, at 349-58; Landever, supra note 28,
at 597-600; Touton, supra note 28, at 823-25.
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to the exercise of the power of the national government."358 The
Court in Kieppe made an almost identical statement.
In fairness to those who advocate the narrow view, Kieppe
involved the regulation of nonfederal activity on public lands,
and the Court did not address the regulation of activities on
nonfederal land. 359 Nevertheless, the courts of appeals have
consistently reaffirmed the broad power that the federal government has over its own property. 360 They uniformly conclude
that the federal government has broad power to control extraterritorial private activities that might adversely affect federal
property. Thus, the courts have upheld federal regulations that
restrict businesses lying outside of a national park because
they affected neighboring federal lands. 36 1 The courts have upheld federal regulation of waters owned by the State of Minnesota that lie within the federally owned Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness as a valid exercise of power under the
358. 3 STORY, supra note 147, § 1322, at 198.
359. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 546 ("We need not, and do not, decide whether
the Property Clause would sustain the Act in all of its conceivable applications.").
360. See, e.g., Diamond Bar Cattle Co. v. United States, 168 F.3d 1209,
1214 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that despite a state statute purporting to grant
possessory grazing interests on national forest land, such interests were not
enforceable against the United States); Branson School Dist. RE-82 v. Romer,
161 F.3d 619, 635-36 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding the authority of the federal
government to place land in trust for schools), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1068
(1999); United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314, 1319 (9th Cir. 1997) (distinguishing, for the purposes of the equal footing doctrine, a state's political sovereignty from its economic and physical characteristics); Duncan Energy Co. v.
United States Forest Serv., 50 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding a state
mining law inapplicable to mining within a national forest), on appeal after
remand, 109 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1997); Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1553
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that Congress may examine suitability of federal land
for nuclear waste depository, despite contrary state law); United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638, 641-42 (9th Cir. 1988) (relying on Kieppe to affirm the federal government's authority to regulate access and mining within Alaska's national parks); United States v. Gliatta, 580 F.2d 156, 158-60 (5th Cir. 1978)
(upholding traffic regulations for a post office area despite the federal government's failure to secure state legislative cession).
361. See United States v. Armstrong, 186 F.3d 1055, 1061-62 (8th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1018, and cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1033 (2000); Free
Enter. Canoe Renters Ass'n v. Watt, 711 F.2d 852, 855-56 (8th Cir. 1983)
("[Tihe United States acted within its constitutional authority in [regulating]
business activities of the members of the Association as they affect the [park],
even though the members themselves may never enter federally owned property, but strictly keep to state or county roads and rights-of-way within the
[park]."); United States v. Richard, 636 F.2d 236, 240 (8th Cir. 1980)
("[F]ederal regulation may exceed federal boundaries when necessary for the
protection of human life or wildlife or government forest land or objectives.").
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Property Clause. 362 The courts have even upheld federal regulation of recreational activities occurring on state-owned lands
that affected the surrounding federal lands.3 63 Finally, the
courts have held that extensive federal regulation of federal
lands can preempt local regulation of the same land.364 These
cases, and others, indicate a broad acceptance of federal regulation at least of private activities that occur off of federal
lands. 365

362. See Minnesota ex rel. Alexander v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249 (8th
Cir. 1981) ("Under this authority to protect public land, Congress' power must
extend to regulation of conduct on or off the public land that would threaten
the designated purpose of federal lands."). The court also upheld the regulation against a Tenth Amendment challenge, reasoning that the regulation did
not govern the activities of a state but only of private persons. See id. at 125153.
363. See, e.g., United States v. Arbo, 691 F.2d 862, 865 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding the power of federal officers to inspect a mine partially on allegedly
state property); United States v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) ("It is well established that [the Property Clause] grants to the United
States power to regulate conduct on non-federal land when reasonably necessary to protect adjacent federal property or navigable waters."); United States
v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1977) ("[W]e view the congressional
power over federal lands to include the authority to regulate activities on nonfederal public waters in order to protect wildlife and visitors on the lands.").
364. See, e.g., Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080, 1086 (9th
Cir. 1979), affd mem., 445 U.S. 947 (1980).
365. Two other recent cases implicate a broad reading of the Property
Clause. First, an equally divided Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the
federal government could regulate private activities that occurred on the surface of a lake even when littoral owners asserted that the lake surface constituted their private property. See Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269
(6th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The concurring and dissenting opinions agreed that
the federal government had constitutional authority to promulgate this regulation, but disagreed on whether the federal agency-in that case, the Forest
Service-had statutory authority to implement it. See id. at 1269-72 (Moore,
J., concurring) (arguing that the Forest Service had such statutory authority);
id. at 1277 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the federal government has
constitutional power to regulate private activities). Second, the Fourth Circuit
upheld a Fish and Wildlife Service regulation prohibiting the taking of red
wolves on private property as a legitimate regulation under the Commerce
Clause. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000). Judge Luttig dissented, on the grounds that the regulation was neither sufficiently broad in
character nor economic in nature and thus beyond the federal government's
power to regulate interstate commerce. See id. at 506 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
Nevertheless, Judge Luttig argued that the activity was one "that Congress
could plainly regulate ... under its power over federal lands." Id. at 509. It is
unclear from this single comment the extent to which Judge Luttig believed
the Property Clause power extends.
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II. LIMITATIONS ON THE FEDERAL PROPERTY POWER
Even a power described as plenary and limitless must have
bounds. Just as Congress could not use its tax and spending
power-which the Court has read broadly 366 -to establish a
church, the federal government could not use its Property
Clause power to do the same. The Court has described congressional authority over Indian tribes, the military, and immigration as plenary, 367 but the Court has recognized that the exercise of each of these powers is subject to other limitations in
the Constitution, such as the Due Process Clause. 368 This section focuses on the limitations applicable to the federal government's exercise of its Property Clause power. Before turning to the extrinsic limitations, however, this Article will first
explore the intrinsic limits to the exercise of Property Clause
power, with particular regard to the regulation of activities
that occur extraterritorial to but nevertheless affect federal
lands.
A. INTRINSIC LIMITATIONS
The Property Clause gives the federal government power to
make "all needful Rules and Regulations respecting... Property belonging to the United States."369 This language appears
to have four limitations that a court might rely on to restrict
366. On the spending power, see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
The spending power stems from the clause of the Constitution that authorizes
Congress to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. As interpreted by the Court, this power
allows Congress to achieve aims beyond those enumerated in Article I by conditioning grants of federal money on compliance with the terms of the grant.
See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. at 203 (involving the establishment of
a national minimum drinking age). Arguably, the Twenty-First Amendment
gives to the states the authority to regulate liquor and thus establish the
minimum age to consume it. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. Instead of simply
establishing such an age, Congress limited the receipt of federal highway
funds to those states that enacted the desired minimum drinking age. See
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. at 205 (describing the grant limitation). The
Court held that Congress's chosen means of achieving a minimum drinking
age was an appropriate use of its spending authority. See id. at 208-11.
367. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343
(1998) (Indians); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 201 (1993)
(immigration); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983) (military).
368. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 176 (1994) (military);
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 494-96 (1991) (immigration); Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-84 (1977) (Indians).
369. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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assertions of federal power. First, the enactment must be a
rule or regulation. Second, the rule or regulation must involve
property belonging to the United States. Third, the rule or
regulation must be needful. Fourth, and finally-and most important in determining the constitutionality of a rule or regulation of extraterritorial application-the rule or regulation must
be one "respecting" federal property.
Before analyzing these four possible limitations, the Article
will discuss three of the hypothetical laws identified in the Introduction that will help illustrate the analysis. First, suppose
that Congress decides that it wants to relieve the tax burden on
all citizens and that it will enter the casino gaming business to
raise revenue. Congress decides to open casinos in five national forests under a hypothetical statute called the Forest
Gaming Act, and coincidentally the states wherein those forests
lie forbid all forms of gambling. 370 Second, suppose that Congress enacts a law like the Gun-Free School Zones Act held unconstitutional in United States v. Lopez, 371 but that applies only
to people who carry a firearm or explosives within 1000 feet of
a federal building. 372 For ease of reference, this hypothetical
statute will be called the Gun-Free Federal Building Zones Act.
Suppose finally that Congress enacts a broad statute regulating
the emission of sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) and oxides of nitrogen
(NO.) because these emissions are precursors to acid rain,
which harms national parks. 373 Instead of relying on the provisions of the federal Clean Air Act 374 -which has its own special
provisions regarding air quality in the national parks 37 5Congress seeks to regulate sources of specified pollution both
within and outside of the state in which federal lands lie. It
370. This possibility is raised as a concern in Touton, supra note 28, at 825.
371. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
372. It is presently unlawful to knowingly carry a firearm into a federal
building. 18 U.S.C. § 930 (1994). The act hypothesized here would extend
that zone 1000 feet from a federal building, and would, like § 930, require that
the defendant know that he or she was within 1000 feet of a federal building,
just as the statute invalidated in Lopez required that the defendant know that
he or she was within 1000 feet of a school. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).
373. It is documented that acid rain resulting from these pollutants has
damaged trees in eastern national parks. See, e.g., SUSAN BUFFONE &
CAROLYN FuLco, ACID RAIN INVADES OUR NATIONAL PARKS 3-5 (1987). For a
popular account of this phenomenon, see BILL BRYSON, A WALK IN THE WOODS
93, 138 (1998).

374. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
375. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7491-7492 (1994) (creating visibility protections for certain federal lands).

2001]

PROPERTY CLAUSE

also imposes a level of regulation that would exceed the level
produced through a nuisance-abatement action. For ease of
reference, this hypothetical statute will be called the National
Parks Clean Air Act.
These hypothetical examples should provide clear archetypes of potential regulations. The Forest Gaming Act provides
a clear instance of the federal government managing its own
lands in direct conflict with state law. Moreover, instead of
seeking more stringent regulation than the state, the federal
government purposefully attempts to become a haven from
state regulation. The Gun-Free Federal Building Zones Act
provides an example of a federal decision to regulate activity off
of federal property that reaches far beyond common law nuisance principles. In addition, it presents an example of federal
regulation that Congress probably could not enact pursuant 376
to
its Commerce Clause powers under United States v. Lopez.
Finally, the National Parks Clean Air Act involves direct federal regulation of activities that occur far from federal lands.
These activities have traditionally led to nuisance suits directed at air polluters. While these examples will aid and explicate the arguments, less hypothetical and more difficult examples will appear in Part III.
To evaluate claims that these three hypothetical acts exceed Congress's Property Clause authority, a reviewing court
would have to parse the language of the Clause to find its internal limitations. Two of these potential limitations can be
easily dismissed. First, congressional acts obviously constitute
rules or regulations. In the examples just imagined, each of the
laws-the Forest Gaming Act, the Gun-Free Federal Building
Zones Act or the National Parks Clean Air Act-would therefore qualify as a rule or regulation. Second, the rules and regulations must relate to property belonging to the United States,
and not some other person or entity. Again, this requirement
minimally restricts Congress's power to regulate so long as an
identified legislative objective concerning federal property exists. 37 7 In the case of the three hypothetical statutes, the for376. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
377. For that reason, the attempts by some critics to argue that cases such
as Pollard v. Hagan,44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), and Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U.S. 46 (1907), limit the federal government's authority under the Property
Clause are incorrect. See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 28, at 293-96, 303-04;
Landever, supra note 28, at 573-75. Those cases only point out the federal
government does not own submerged lands or lands within the states generally; they say little or nothing about the power the federal government has
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ests, federal buildings, and national parks obviously qualify as
federal property.
Third, a court may also consider whether the rule or regulation is a "needful" exercise of federal power undertaken pursuant to the Property Clause. Upon careful reflection, however,
this requirement also provides little content to a reviewing
court. In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held
that, in determining whether a federal action is "necessary" for
purposes of the Necessary and Proper Clause, it would defer to
the judgment of Congress. 378 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court pointed to the term "needful" in the Property Clause as
allowing Congress great discretion over what laws to pass pursuant to that Clause. 379 Thus, if it adheres to this readingand no one has contended that the Court should abandon it-a
court reviewing the hypothetical acts should defer to the judgment of Congress. The court will thus consider the regulation
needful provided that Congress could envision a sufficient
means-end relationship between the legislation and the end
380
envisioned.
over lands that everyone concedes the federal government owns.
378. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.").
379. See id. at 422.
380. The Court developed the means-end relationship to determine the extent of congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. This relationship would apply in the Property Clause context as well. Although all of
the legislation hypothesized in this Article has an appropriate means-end fit,
not all imaginable legislation would. For example, legislation that would prohibit the possession of a deck of cards or a pair of dice near federal lands on
which Congress authorized gambling would not be "needful" simply because
Congress wanted to prevent any gambling off federal lands and preserve its
profits from gambling. The object regulated would be too attenuated from the
interest that Congress sought to vindicate.
Arguably, a court could be more lenient with review of enactments pursuant to the Property Clause, because it has no limitation that the regulation be
proper, as does the Necessary and Proper Clause; regulations enacted under
the Property Clause must only be needful, and not proper. Nevertheless, the
Constitution provides that the Necessary and Proper Clause applies not only
to the powers listed in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, but also to "all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
This language controls all grants of power to the federal government in the
Constitution, not just those in Article I. Thus, whatever limitations stem from
the word "proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause would apply to enactments pursuant to the Property Clause. The text of the Necessary and Proper

20011

PROPERTY CLAUSE

83

The most serious limitation intrinsic to the Property
Clause questions whether the act qualifies as a rule or regulation "respecting" the property of the United States. This requirement means that the federal government must demonstrate a nexus between the rule or regulation and the federal
property being protected. That case could easily be made for
the Forest Gaming Act. Such an act clearly dictates what can
and cannot occur on federal lands. If Congress establishes casino gambling on federal lands, that statute is one "respecting"
federal property in two ways: It regulates the use of federal
land per se, and it represents a decision by Congress of how to
use its property to generate revenue for the public fisc.

381

Even

an act of extraterritorial application such as the Gun-Free Fed-

Clause also makes it difficult to take seriously the argument that the Property
Clause is not an enumerated power or is somehow a lesser enumerated power
because it is in Article IV and not Article I. Contra Brodie, supra note 28, at
720-21; Landever, supra note 28, at 577-78. The clause itself refers to the
powers granted in Article I and all other powers granted to the federal government.
For his part, Professor Engdahl makes little of the placement of the Property Clause in Article IV. He nevertheless has argued that the Property
Clause "is itself an enumerated power, but according to classic property clause
doctrine it was unique among the enumerated powers in that it was inherently
subordinate to state law." Engdahl, supra note 28, at 371. Part I provides a
refutation to Engdahl's argument that the Property Clause is unique among
the enumerated powers: Neither the text of the clause, nor the history of the
drafting of the clause, nor the historical context in which it arose, nor the early
judicial interpretation, nor the early commentary supports his argument.
Given this lack of support, it is hard to see what theoretical or practical advantage Engdahl's postulation of a federal power "inherently subordinate to
state law" provides.
Some of Professor Engdahl's subsequent scholarship shows that he may
no longer adhere to the notion that the Property Clause is unique among the
enumerated powers as being inherently subordinate to state law. Engdahl attributes the federal government's spending power to the Property Clause, not
to the Taxing Clause, as most courts and commentators do. See David E.
Engdahl, The Basis of the Spending Power, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 215 (1995)
[hereinafter Engdahl, Basis of the Spending Power]; David E. Engdahl, The
Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 50 (1994) [hereinafter Engdahl, The Spending Power]. Although Engdahl disputes that federal expenditures by their
own force override otherwise applicable state regulations, see Engdahl, The
Spending Power, supra, at 62-78, he does not argue that state law can otherwise govern federal expenditures. In other words, Engdahl does not argue
that a state could veto federal expenditures, although he earlier argued that
the federal government had only the power of an ordinary proprietor over its
lands. Thus, if the spending power comes from the Property Clause, Engdahl
may have revised his earlier views to account for his reading of the spending
power cases.
381. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 330-40 (1936).
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eral Building Zones Act would fall squarely into old Supreme
Court case law such as Camfield v. United States38 2 and United
States v. Alford 38 3 because it regulates activity that takes place
sufficiently near and can realistically damage federal property.38 4 Finally, although the National Parks Clean Air Act
does not regulate activities that take place on or even necessarily near federal land, such an act should pass constitutional
muster. It regulates activities that, in the aggregate, harm
federal lands in a demonstrable way, despite the fact that the
act exceeds the level of regulation that the common law of nuisance would produce.
The limits just discussed allow Congress more authority
than the limits previously suggested by advocates of the broad
view. These advocates argue that the Property Clause is limited by a geographic nexus or a limitation like that found in the
common law of nuisance. Professor Joseph Sax has urged that
the Property Clause should incorporate zoning-like regulations
for the national parks, but cautioned against broad expansion
of this principle. 38 5 Limiting the federal government to regulating nuisance and nuisance-like activities unintentionally re-

382. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
383. 274 U.S. 264 (1927).
384. For the same reasons that the hypothetical Gun-Free Federal Building Zones Act is constitutional, the present criminal prohibition on firearms in
federal buildings, 18 U.S.C. § 930 (1994), is constitutional as an exercise of the
federal government's Property Clause power. To be sure, Alford involved activity that had a more obvious connection to harming federal property, i.e.,
building a fire near federal lands. But the Court did not require the nearby
activity to cause actual harm to the federal lands for Congress to reach it
through legislation, only that it could pose a threat to federal lands. Likewise,
the Court in Camfield did not require that the federal government show actual
harm to its lands through the extraterritorial conduct; it could reach the conduct if it reasonably interfered with the federal government's use. The federal
government's interest in protecting its own buildings would extend to banning
firearms within 1000 feet of a federal building. Naturally, courts would have
to draw possible boundaries on this power if Congress acted too broadly. Congress could not ban possession of all firearms within the boundaries of the
United States simply to create a super buffer zone around federal buildings.
Such legislation might fail as not being "needful" even if Congress declared in
the legislation how it was "respecting" the property of the United States.
385. See Sax, supra note 27, at 253-55. Sax's article was concerned with
how the Park Service could achieve better protection for the national parks,
and therefore did not analyze the Property Clause limitations as closely as the
works of other scholars. In a footnote, Sax suggested that a "self-limiting rationale for the use of the property clause to regulate peripheral private uses
could be drawn from an analogy to the Court's evolution of a federal common
law of nuisance in cases involving interstate pollution." Id. at 254 n.77.
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stricts the government in its regulatory reach. Although Sax
suggested that the boundaries of federal regulation could exceed traditional nuisance law prohibitions, 386 nuisance and the
sorts of activities it usually addressed-air and water pollution,
noise, or imminent threats of harm to property-remained the
baseline of regulation. Such a limited scope of federal regulation would doom an act such as the hypothetical Gun-Free Federal Building Zones Act. After the bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, threats to Forest
Service and Bureau of Land Management personnel in the
West, and the incidences of postal workers shooting coworkers
or former coworkers, Congress could easily conclude that a rational policy to protect federal buildings would include banning
all firearms and other weapons within 1000 feet of a federal
building.3 87 Because carrying a firearm alone does not usually
rise to the level of a nuisance, Sax's theory would appear insuf388
ficient to authorize this sort of legislation.
Subsequently, Professor Eugene Gaetke made a two-fold
argument concerning the reach of the Property Clause. Gaetke
argued that congressional regulation or disposal of its own
lands or "[tihe use of the dispositional power to promote congressional policy on nonfederal lands.., is appropriately regarded as being without limitations."389 When Congress used
federal regulatory power over nonfederal lands, however,
Gaetke expressed concern about the Court's treatment of this
power as "without limitation" for two reasons. First, the use of
386. See id. at 253.
387. This section deals only with limitations intrinsic to the Property
Clause power. The question of whether such a regulation would run afoul of
the Second Amendment is irrelevant to this discussion. See U.S. CONST.
amend. II; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937-39 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Second Amendment may bar congressional efforts to require reporting of firearm transactions). As stated below,
see infra note 466 and accompanying text, the provisions of the Bill of Rights
can forbid exercises of the Property Clause power.
388. Such legislation would also appear to lie beyond the federal government's authority under the Commerce Clause. A court may conclude that the
effects of guns near federal buildings has the same relationship to commerce
as the guns near schools did in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
One distinction between the hypothetical legislation and the legislation invalidated in Lopez is that federal workers are actually engaged in the work of
the federal government which includes, among other things, regulating the
channels and instrumentalities of commerce. A court may nevertheless hold
this connection too attenuated to commerce to justify it. The Property Clause
justification would still be superior.
389. Gaetke, CongressionalDiscretion,supra note 27, at 394.
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such authority "constitutes nonconsensual 'governmental' regulation of conduct beyond the boundaries of federal land."390
Gaetke's second objection-that extraterritorial application of
the Property Clause "encroaches upon the state's traditional
regulatory role" 391-appears to have its basis in principles of
federalism, a subject treated below as a possible extrinsic
limitation on the Property Clause power.3 92
390. Id. By placing the word "governmental" in quotation marks, Gaetke
seeks to distinguish it "from the voluntary 'proprietary' regulation resulting
from the exercise of the dispositional powers of Congress under the property
clause through conditional transfers of interests in federal lands." Id. at 394
n.71. The paradigmatic case for this latter exercise of power would be United
States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940), where Congress conditioned the conveyance of public lands to be used for electrical generation on
the condition that the electricity be sold directly to city residents and not to a
private utility. See Gaetke, CongressionalDiscretion, supra note 27, at 385,
394 n.71. Here and elsewhere, see infra note 468, Gaetke makes too much of
the distinction between the federal government as an owner that makes proprietary regulations, and the federal government as a sovereign that makes
governmental regulations. Federal regulation such as that involved in United
States v. City of San Francisco is unquestionably governmental, even when it
involves the federal government as proprietor. Such regulations are enacted
by Congress, presented to the President, and are public laws.
Moreover, Gaetke's conclusion that the regulation of nonfederal lands by
the federal government is nonconsensual deserves two criticisms. First, many
forms of land use controls are nonconsensual, regardless of the regulating authority, and the Court has repeatedly upheld them. See, e.g., Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding a local zoning ordinance
as constitutional against the landowner's consent). The lack of consent in
these contexts is just as real as in the federal regulatory context. Second,
Gaetke's characterization of federal decisions as nonconsensual goes too far.
The decisional nexus for federal decisionmaking may be further removed than
that for state or local decisionmaking, but that does not make the decisionmaking less consensual. On the federal level, the fact that representatives
from Georgia may have a say about land management in Montana, for example, does not render the decision nonconsensual, just as representatives from
Montana will have a say in decisions that affect Georgia. In some regards, Joseph Story refuted Gaetke's concern in his Commentaries. See 3 STORY, supra
note 147, § 1321, at 197.
391. Gaetke, CongressionalDiscretion,supra note 27, at 394.
392. In his article, Gaetke expressly disclaimed relying on other constitutional principles in constructing limits for the Property Clause. See id. at 383
n.9 ("This Article addresses only limitations on the property clause power imposed by the terms of the clause itself, not by other constitutional provisions."). Federalism principles lie outside of the grants of power to Congress
and are therefore better considered an extrinsic limitation to the Property
Clause power, not a limitation "imposed by the terms of the clause itself." To
be fair to Gaetke, the Supreme Court has used the question of federalism concerns to determine the intrinsic limitations on other powers in the Constitution. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-57 (1992) (discussing how federalism principles may inform the intrinsic reach of the
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To overcome these problems, Gaetke suggested that courts
should use a rough calculus like that used in nuisance cases to
assess the constitutionality of federal regulation of extraterritorial activities. Under his proposed test,
the value of the challenged regulation to the public lands should be
compared to the degree of imposition on the owners of nonfederal
property. Should the balance indicate that the regulation interferes
with the ownership of nonfederal property more than is warranted by
is
Congress's stated policy, a court justifiably could conclude
393 that it
not a "needful" regulation "respecting the federal lands."

Gaetke meant only that a court should use the same balancing
process that it would in a nuisance case. Unlike Sax's theory,
common law nuisance itself would not form the basis or extent
of the federal government's Property Clause power. Gaetke derived this theory from his understanding of the definition of
"nuisance" as used in Camfield. "Under Camfield," Gaetke argued, "Congress may transform an otherwise lawful use of nonfederal property into an enjoinable nuisance by legislating for a
particular use of the public lands."394 Thus, Congress could, by
legislative fiat, determine certain uses for designated public
lands, and the courts would weigh the proposed regulation to
determine whether it "interferes with the ownership of nonfederal property more than is warranted by Congress' stated pol395
icy."
Under his proposed test, Gaetke suggested that the prohibition against fencing upheld in Camfield396 and the prohibition
against setting fire near federal lands upheld in Alford 397 would
easily pass muster, as would federal regulation of motorboats
in wilderness areas. 398 Fences interfere with free access to and
settlement of federal lands, fires near forests interfere with the
Commerce Clause). Nevertheless, this Article will address federalism concerns in the context of extrinsic limitations to the Property Clause. See infra
notes 472-522 and accompanying text.
393. Gaetke, Congressional Discretion, supra note 27, at 398. Professor
Gaetke did not draw a hard distinction between whether an unconstitutional
act would be unconstitutional because it was not a "needful" rule or regulation
or because it was not "respecting" the property of the United States. The distinction appears unimportant for his analysis. Given the discussion of the
term "needful" in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), I believe that the term "respecting" is the crucial one in this context, not the term
"needful."
394. Gaetke, CongressionalDiscretion,supra note 27, at 396.
395. Id. at 398.
396. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
397. United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927).
398. Gaetke, CongressionalDiscretion,supra note 27, at 398-99 & n.96.
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congressional policy of maintaining forests, and motorboats interfere with the congressional policy of preserving wilderness
free from motorized uses. 399 Gaetke expressed doubt about the
constitutionality of the provisions of the Wild Free Roaming
Horses and Burros Act 4°° that protect these animals on private
property. 40 ' Although Gaetke believed that Congress could
lawfully prohibit taking wild horses and burros near federal
property because such takings would "frustrate the policy of
providing sanctuary" to these animals on federal lands, the
"prohibition of such taking on all nonfederal lands... is unnecessarily broad, for it reaches conduct other than that which interferes with the congressional policy for the use of the federal
402
lands."
Both Sax's and Gaetke's theories have flaws. Sax's theory
incorporates the inherent weaknesses of substantive nuisance
law and fails to define the outer boundary of congressional authority under the Property Clause. Gaetke's more considered
balancing approach transfers authority over the ultimate wisdom of policy decisions concerning federal property from Congress to the judiciary. Although the judiciary can ultimately
review congressional action undertaken pursuant to the Property Clause, the Court's approach in analogous situations suggests that it will defer to Congress. 40 3 In contrast, Gaetke's ap399. On the last restriction, see 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1994) (prohibiting all
mechanical transportation within wilderness areas). The exception for motorboat use within wilderness areas that the Forest Service oversees points to a
potential flaw in Gaetke's theory. Congress allows the Forest Service to permit motorboat use within a wilderness area where the use is established before Congress declares the area to be wilderness. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1)
(1994). Congress has, however, banned other motorized and mechanized
transport within a wilderness area. This means that the Forest Service can
maintain motorboats but must ban sailboats as mechanized transportation.
See 36 C.F.R. § 293.6(a). A court invited to weigh the wisdom or utility of the
federal government's policy might find this to be irrational. I believe that this
sort of regulation, while somewhat absurd in result, is entirely constitutional.
400. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994).
401. See Gaetke, Congressional Discretion, supra note 27, at 399-401.
Gaetke conceded, however, that these provisions would easily pass muster if
the animals were considered federal property. Id. at 400 nn.102, 105.
402. Id. at 401.
403. At some points, Gaetke's primary concern appeared to be that courts
will take statements such as "[tihe power over the public land thus entrusted
to Congress is without limitations," United States v. City of San Francisco,
310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940), to mean that congressional action will escape judicial
review altogether. See Gaetke, CongressionalDiscretion,supra note 27, at 395
("[J]udicial review of... property clause legislation [regulating conduct on
private lands] is useful and necessary."); id. at 402 n.110 (legislation should
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proach expressly invites the judiciary to second-guess the policy
judgments of Congress and to weigh the "value of the challenged regulation to the public lands... [against]4 °4the degree of
imposition on the owners of nonfederal property."
Two of Gaetke's own examples show the potential for mischief arising from his test. First, in determining whether the
extraterritorial application of the Wild Free Roaming Horses
and Burros Act is constitutional, Gaetke concluded that the
federal interest of "providing a sanctuary for the remaining
wild horses and burros .... is a commendable public objective
for the use of the federal lands."40 5 Moreover, the extraterritorial bans on harming the animals rationally further this congressional policy. 40 6 Gaetke ultimately concluded, however,
that protecting the wild horses and burros wherever found did
not sufficiently advance the congressional policy and interfered
too much with private interests. Others would strenuously disagree with all of these assertions. 40 7 Second, Gaetke suggested
not escape "probing judicial review... that the property clause power is 'without limitations.'"). I agree with Gaetke that courts can review congressional
enactments pursuant to the Property Clause. The more germane question is
the purpose and limits ofjudicial review.
404. Gaetke, Congressional Discretion, supra note 27, at 398; see also id.
(inviting courts 'to weigh the utility of the congressional policy for the use of
federal lands and the effectiveness of the particular regulation in accomplishing that policy against the utility of the regulated conduct and the likelihood of
its interference with the congressional policy"). To be sure, Gaetke predicts
that courts will likely defer to the judgment of Congress under his proposed
test. Id. at 401-02 ("A judicial conclusion that such legislation is not 'needful'
regulation 'respecting the federal lands' presumably will be quite unusual
even under the... [proposed] balancing approach.").
405. Id. at 400.
406. See id.
407. The controversy surrounding wild horses in the West is longstanding
and legendary. Some believe that the wild horses should be protected wherever found. This group would likely have included Velma Johnston, otherwise
known as "Wild Horse Annie," who championed the protection of the wild
horses and burros and lobbied for legislative protection for them. See
RICHARD SYiANsKI, WILD HORSES AND SACRED Cows 4-11 (1985). Others are
extremely critical of the cost and effectiveness of the present wild horse program. See, e.g., Range Issues and Problems with the Wild Horse and BurroAct
and Its Implementation:Field HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Nat'l Parks &
Pub. Lands, House Comm. on Res., 105th Cong. 13-16 (1998) (statements of
Dean Rhoads, Chairman of the Senate Natural Resources Committee, Nevada
Legislature, and John Carpenter, Nevada Assemblyman). For criticism of the
tactics of some environmental lawyers and wild horse advocates over this issue, see Richard Symanski, Dances with Horses: Lessons from the Environmental Fringe, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 708 (1996). Recent scientific research has detailed the effects that wild horses have on the range, including
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that banning motorboats on nonfederal waters within federal
wilderness areas would be constitutional, because "although
motorboat usage generally is a legitimate use of waterways, its
enjoyment on every lake is not essential."40 8 Again, others
would strenuously disagree. 40 9 The question is not whether
Gaetke correctly assessed the wisdom or utility of congressional
policy; the question is whether a court should engage in the
balancing of utility that Gaetke suggests and revisit the rationale underlying Congress's decision. Gaetke's approach invites
federal courts to place congressional judgments over the public
lands literally on trial to compare "the value of the challenged
regulation to the public lands" to "the
degree of imposition on
4 10
the owners of nonfederal property."
In determining whether congressional legislation is "respecting" federal property, however, Professor Gaetke made a
valuable contribution. Gaetke correctly suggested that courts
should distinctly review regulations that control the disposition
of federal property and activities that take place on federal
lands, on the one hand, and extraterritorial applications of the
Property Clause, on the other. Gaetke incorrectly concluded,
however, that exercises of the former power should escape any
judicial review, while exercises of the latter should lead to nuisance-like balancing. Instead, two analogous provisions of the
decreased diversity in species of plants and animals. See Erik A. Beever & Peter F.Brussard, Examining Ecological Consequences of Feral Horse Grazing
Using Exclosures, 60 W.N. AM. NATURALIST 236 (2000). For his part, Gaetke
concluded that, although horse preservation is a worthwhile objective, the extraterritorial prohibition on killing wild horses and burros "is unnecessarily
broad, for it reaches conduct other than that which interferes with the congressional policy for the use of the federal lands." Gaetke, CongressionalDiscretion, supra note 27, at 401. The Tenth Circuit upheld the extraterritorial
application of the prohibition on killing wild horses, but primarily against the
challenge that the statute constituted an uncompensated taking of private
property. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423, 1430-31
(10th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
408. Gaetke, CongressionalDiscretion, supra note 27, at 399 n.96; see also
Gaetke, Boundary Waters, supra note 27, at 175-82 (justifying a ban on motorboats within portions of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness).
409. For example, a motorboat regulation on one lake that lies in one wilderness area in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan has spawned a series of lawsuits. See, e.g., Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 226 F.3d 467 (6th Cir. 2000); Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 988 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Stupak-Thrall
v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich. 1994), affd, 70 F.3d 881 (6th
Cir. 1995), vacated, 81 F.3d 651 (6th Cir.), affd by an equally divided court, 89
F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc). I participated as counsel for the United
States in some of this litigation.
410. Gaetke, CongressionalDiscretion,supra note 27, at 398.
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Constitution present useful guides for interpreting the reach of
the Property Clause in these two instances. For regulation of
activities that take place directly on federal land or involve the
use or disposal of federal property to further congressional policy on nonfederal lands, a court might analogize such enactments to actions taken pursuant to the spending power. 411 For
regulation of extraterritorial activities that affect federal lands,
to actions taken pura court might analogize such enactments
4 12
suant to the Commerce Clause.
Congressional actions under the Property Clause to manage or to control the direct disposition of federal property
should receive the same deferential review given to exercises of
the spending power. In both instances, a reviewing court would
find itself in the awkward position of telling a coequal branch
how best to manage its resources-money, in the case of the
spending power, and real or personal property, in the case of
the Property Clause power. The Court itself has linked the two
powers in the context of evaluating conditions that the federal
411. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Professor Engdahl has claimed that
this constitutional text, which gives Congress the power to "lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States," does not actually
create the spending power. See supra note 380 (discussing Engdahl's position). Instead, Engdahl argued that the spending power stems from the Property Clause. See Engdahl, Basis of the Spending Power, supra note 380, at
243-58. I accept for purposes of this Article the common understanding that
the spending power stems from Article I and not Article IV.
412. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The approach I suggest is similar but not
identical to Amar's theory of intratextualism. Amar argued that in interpreting one word or phrase in the Constitution, courts should look at similar terms
and words in the text and how they have been interpreted. Amar, supra note
130, at 748-49 (describing the theory briefly). This interpretive method would
mirror the rule of statutory construction that statutes should be interpreted in
pari materia, with the same word being read with the same meaning in each

place. See

NORATAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §

51.01 (5th ed. 1992); see also Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules,
Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730,
730 (2000) (describing Amar's theory with reference to rule of statutory construction). Using Amar's method, one might compare the term "regulation" in
the Property Clause to the term "regulate" in the Commerce Clause or the
term "needful" in the Property Clause to the term "necessary" in the Necessary and Proper Clause. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
422 (1819); see also Amar, supra note 130, at 757-58 (discussing this use of intratextualism). My approach to the Property Clause, by contrast, looks at possibly analogous clauses that may provide guidance in finding the reach of the
Property Clause. The clause that best suggests itself for this purpose is the
Commerce Clause, because it implicates many of the same concerns as extraterritorial uses of the Property Clause.
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government sought to impose on a federally funded irrigation
project using federal lands. 4 13 With regard to the spending
power, Congress may spend public money to further the general welfare to accomplish almost any end, not just those specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. 4 14 The decisions
of Congress on how to spend public moneys do not escape judicial review, but the review that they receive is extremely deferential. 4 15 Applying these limitations to the hypothetical Forest
Gaming Act-which regulates activities occurring directly on
federal lands-a reviewing court should find the act constitutional unless forbidden by some external limitation of the Constitution. The act constitutes a use of federal power to advance
a simple aim: raising money for the federal treasury.
The Court has developed more scrutinizing rules to review
congressional spending in the context of conditional grants to
the states-i.e., grants that require states to take or refrain
from action in order to receive federal funds-but these
boundaries do not greatly limit congressional discretion. First,
Congress must clearly state the conditions on the receipt of federal funds. 4 16 Second, the Court requires that the condition be
related "to the federal interest in particular national projects
or programs."' 417 Third, "other constitutional provisions may
provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal

413. See Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-95
(1958).
414. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (reaffirming that
"'the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public
purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the
Constitution" (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936)).
415. See id. ("In considering whether a particular expenditure is intended
to serve general public purposes, courts should defer substantially to the
judgment of Congress.").
416. See id.
417. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)
(plurality opinion)). In the quoted case, the Court upheld the application of a
nondiscriminatory federal user fee imposed on state aircraft. It is unclear
from the opinion, however, what force the plurality put on this language, because it cites United States v. City of San Francisco,310 U.S. 16 (1940), as
support for the statement, and that case involved a limitation in a grant that
did not advance a specific enumerated power of the federal government but a
general policy in favor of public distribution of electricity.
Professor Lynn Baker has argued that the Court should revisit its jurisprudence on conditional grants because the ability of Congress to use as a
"back door" its spending power threatens to undermine the positive limits on
congressional authority that the Court has created. Lynn A. Baker, Conditional FederalSpendingAfter Lopez, 95 COLTJM. L. REV. 1911, 1919 (1995).
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funds."418 Finally, the Court has "recognized that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress
might be so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure
turns into compulsion."' 4 19 Thus, with regard to actions undertaken pursuant to the spending power, the regulation of individuals will withstand scrutiny so long as it does not violate an
express limitation in the Constitution. If a state receives federal funds, Congress must speak clearly and advance a national
interest through the use of the conditional grant.
These rules should also apply in the case of conditional
grants of lands to the states. Clearly, Congress can impose
conditions on grants of its property to private parties or municipalities. 420 Congress has also imposed conditions on grants
of lands to the states, and the courts have properly upheld
them as exercises of the Property Clause power. For example,
in Branson School DistrictRE-82 v. Romer,421 the Tenth Circuit
considered whether Congress could impose a trust condition on
federal lands granted to the State of Colorado in the act admit418. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. For example, Congress could
not use conditional grants to establish a church.
419. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590
(1937)). In the quoted case, the Court upheld the unemployment insurance
portions of the Social Security Act of 1935 against the challenge that these
provisions coerced the states "in contravention of the Tenth Amendment or of
restrictions implicit in our federal form of government." Steward Mach. Co.,
301 U.S. at 585. The challenged statute required states to enact specific provisions in their unemployment schemes to receive federal funds. The Court
held the requirements constitutional. "Nothing in the case," wrote Justice
Cardozo, "suggests the exertion of a power akin to undue influence, if we assume that such a concept can ever be applied with fitness to the relations between state and nation." Id. at 590. Thus, the principal authority that the
Court cited in South Dakota v. Dole for the rule that there might be a point
beyond which a conditional grant becomes coercive expresses doubt on the
point. Nevertheless, the dissenting opinion in a recent Eighth Circuit case argued that requiring states to waive their sovereign immunity upon pain of losing educational funds constituted an unconstitutionally coercive conditional
grant. Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1082-83 (8th Cir. 2000) (Bowman, J., dissenting).
420. See, e.g., United States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 28-30
(1940) (upholding a condition in a grant to a municipality that hydroelectric
power be distributed only by the municipality and not by a private company);
Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 104, 107 (1918) (upholding a condition on a grant of
lands to a private party that the lands could not be used to satisfy debt incurred prior to patenting the land); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States,
243 U.S. 389, 404-05 (1917) (upholding a condition that a private party obtain
a permit prior to the use of federal land); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523,
536-37 (1911) (upholding a similar condition).
421. 161 F.3d 619 (10th Cir. 1998).
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ting Colorado to the Union.422 The court properly held that
Congress could impose such a condition on lands granted to the
state after statehood, and that creating the condition in the act
of admission posed no constitutional problem. 423 Similarly, the
conditions imposed on lands granted to Hawaii, requiring the
state to hold the land for the benefit of native Hawaiians,
would not run afoul of the Property Clause.424 Although the ultimate means of establishing government for those lands may
run afoul of other constitutional provisions, 425 the Property
Clause itself does not limit the creation of trust conditions on a
state when the United States transfers property to the state
upon admission to the Union. The United States can impose
trust conditions on lands granted after statehood, and nothing
about the event of admission disables the United States from
imposing such conditions on lands transferred at statehood.
Indeed, the lands transferred at statehood by virtue of the
equal footing doctrine come with a form of trust impressed
42 6
upon them as a matter of law.
For extraterritorial applications of the Property Clause,
the spending power does not provide such a clear analogy.
Unlike the spending cases-in which Congress bestows bounty
on those who wish to avail themselves of it-extraterritorial
regulation under the Property Clause necessarily involves another sovereign that normally would have authority over the
affected area even if Congress speaks. In cases such as the hypothetical Gun-Free Federal Building Zones Act or National
Parks Clean Air Act, the jurisprudence arising under the
Commerce Clause provides an analogous federal power.427 The
422. Colorado Enabling Act, ch. 139, §§ 7, 14, 18 Stat. 474, 474-75 (1875).
423. Branson Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d at 635-36.
424. See Act of March 18, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, §§ 4, 5(b)-(d), 73 Stat. 4, 5.
425. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (holding unconstitutional a
limitation in voter qualification for elections to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs,
which manages Hawaiian homelands).
426. See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1894) (holding that
states may control land below the high-water mark bordering on land granted
to individuals by Congress prior to statehood); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (holding that states may control lands under tidal
waters, but that regulations are subject to the obligation of states to uphold
the public interest).
427. Blake Shepard also suggests the analogy of the Property Clause to the
Commerce Clause. Shepard, supra note 27, at 533-37. Shepard argues that
the analogy should apply to activities on federal lands, as well as to actions
with the potential to damage federal property that take place on non-federal
lands. See id. at 535. Although the basic idea is sound, as I will argue in the
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text, Shepard's account has two flaws. First, in some ways Shepard misses
the fullness of the Commerce Clause analogy by emphasizing that, under this
analogy, "Congress admittedly would enjoy broad authority to regulate activity on federal property." Id. Conceivably, one could argue that if the Property
Clause were compared solely to the Commerce Clause, then federal regulation
of activities on federal land would be like those cases that unquestionably involve interstate commerce and are subject to congressional regulation. Cf.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824) ("[The Commerce Clause]
power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed in the constitution."). Such a rule might escape judicial review.
The second problem with Shepard's argument is that he states that his Commerce Clause analogy would yield a rule that "[olnly if it is irrationalfor Congress to conclude that the legislation in question constitutes a 'needful' rule or
regulation 'respecting' federal property should a federal statute be struck
down as exceeding the scope of the Property Clause." Shepard, supra note 27,
at 535. This conclusion probably resulted in part from the state of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence at the time that Shepard wrote; his article notes that
"[w]ith one exception, a federal regulation enacted under the Commerce
Clause has not been struck down by the judicial branch in over forty years."
Id. at 534. Shepard provides no idea of the kind of nexus between the regulated activity and the federal lands that would satisfy the Property Clause.
Looking to the spending power cases to review regulations of disposals of federal lands or of activities on federal lands has two advantages. First, the
spending power better resembles this area of the property power; in both instances, Congress is charged with managing a federal resource, be it money or
property. Second, the spending power cases provide a window, albeit small,
for a court to ensure against instances of outright federal coercion of states,
which conceivably the federal government may try to do through conditional
grants under the property power.
For his part, Professor Sax devotes insufficient attention to using the
Commerce Clause for guidance in interpreting the reach of the Property
Clause and the protection it might provide for the national parks. See Sax,
supra note 27, at 255. Sax argues that it would be "anomalous to apply
sharply divergent theories of federal-state relations in interpreting the two
constitutional provisions." Id. Sax also argues that the Commerce Clause "itself is a potential source of federal authority for the regulation of private activity that intrudes upon management of the national parks." Id. Although
Sax's second argument may be true-and the scope of Congress's Commerce
Clause authority to protect federal property lies beyond the scope of this Article-his first argument rings hollow. In interpreting the line between federal
and state authority, a holistic approach that looks at all of the federal government's powers is preferable to a disjointed one that separates the powers into
different pigeonholes. Although the nature of federal-state relations will
doubtlessly change depending on which power Congress exercises-Congress
will have more leeway in exercising its war powers or the power over immigration than, say, in exercising its Commerce Clause power in attempting to ban
purely local, noneconomic crime-the overall relationship between the federal
government and the state governments has its roots in the underlying understanding of the division between federal and state powers. Sax himself recognizes this conclusion, because he refers to "many cases more sharply intrusive
upon traditional state power than anything one might anticipate in the area of
Park Service regulation" to bolster his case for more aggressive Park Service
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Supreme Court recognizes plenary congressional authority
where the Commerce Clause definitely applies, but much of its
jurisprudence consists of determining whether the federal government has authority over the targeted activity in its efforts to
428
regulate commerce.
The Court has described the power of Congress under the
429
Commerce Clause as extending to "three broad categories."
The first two broad categories-which include the channels and
instrumentalities of commerce 43 0-have no readily apparent
analogous application in the Property Clause context. 43 1 The
third area of federal authority, however, provides a proper
analogy to explore the potential reach of the Property Clause.
Under this rubric, "Congress' commerce authority includes the
power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation
to interstate commerce, i.e. those activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce," even if they occur wholly within
one state. 432 Thus, Congress can aggregate intrastate economic
activities to show an effect on commerce.
Simply asserting that the aggregation principle should apply to extraterritorial regulations enacted under the Property
Clause does not clearly identify which activities Congress can
aggregate to show a substantial effect on federal lands. Take
the hypothetical National Parks Clean Air Act. Congress could
easily regulate a stationary source of SO2 in an area right next
regulation under the Property Clause. Id. Harmonizing the reach of the
Commerce Clause and the Property Clause would address what Sax called the
anomaly of "apply[ing] sharply divergent theories of federal-state relations in
interpreting the two constitutional provisions." Id.
428. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding public accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the regulation of consuming agricultural
products grown at home); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act).
429. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
430. Id.
431. As suggested above, however, one might analogize these areas of federal authority to the Property Clause power. See supra note 427. One might
analogize the first area of congressional power, regulating the use of the channels of interstate commerce, to federal control of activities that take place on
federal lands, and the second, regulating the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce or persons or things in interstate commerce, to the federal government using the disposition of federal property to effectuate other ends. Nevertheless, I believe the spending power cases provide a cleaner analogy for these
exercises of federal power.
432. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
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to a national park, even under a nuisance theory.433 A more
difficult question is whether Congress could regulate stationary
sources of air pollution located several states away if it could
reasonably conclude that these sources damaged federal property. An even more difficult question is whether Congress
could directly regulate all sources of S02 or NO. across the

country because they collectively contribute to a problem that
affects federal property. Such regulation could extend to all
sources of these air pollutants from large factories to automo434
biles and trucks.
Applying the Court's present Commerce Clause jurisprudence analogously to the Property Clause, even this farreaching version of the National Parks Clean Air Act should
survive constitutional challenge. When the Court has determined that Congress could rationally conclude that the aggregation of regulated activities substantially affects interstate
commerce, it substantially defers to the judgment of Congress. 435 For example, the Court has permitted congressional
433. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (allowing
sovereign to sue smelter that produced sulfur dioxide on nuisance theory).
434. Of course, the federal government does directly create emission standards for automobiles and trucks in the Clean Air Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 75217544 (1994). These provisions have their basis in the Commerce Clause, and
one might wonder about the advantage of creating an elaborate Property
Clause justification for such regulation. After all, the justification for such
standards under the Commerce Clause is relatively straightforward: Automobiles move or are capable of moving in interstate commerce, and Congress can
create standards of general applicability for merchandise that moves or is capable of moving in interstate commerce. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941) (upholding congressional prohibition of the interstate sale of goods
manufactured in violation of federal law). I offer the Property Clause justification for two reasons. First, it helps determine the farthest reaches of the
Property Clause. The hypothetical Gun-Free Federal Buildings Zone Act is an
easy regulation to justify under the Property Clause and difficult if not impossible to justify under the Commerce Clause (at least after Lopez). Likewise, a
broadly drafted National Parks Clean Air Act may have provisions that are
difficult-although I do not think impossible-to justify under the Property
Clause but that are relatively easy to justify under the Commerce Clause.
Second, as the Court adjusts limits of the Commerce Clause, the limits of the
Property Clause may take on new importance, and figuring out the outer limits of the Property Clause may prove useful in environmental regulation.
Unlike the Commerce Clause, where the Court had a history of limiting the
reach of federal power until the 1930's, the Court has routinely interpreted the
Property Clause broadly, with the notable exception of Dred Scott.
435. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981); see also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975) ("Even activity
that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the
activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects com-
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regulation of an individual farmer's consumption of homegrown
wheat where the aggregate impacts on the wheat market affect
interstate commerce. 436 Similarly, seemingly local activity like
the air emissions of a factory can, when aggregated, affect federal property and warrant congressional legislation under the
Property Clause.
If the foregoing characterization of the Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence applies analogously to the Property
Clause, then both of the hypothetical extraterritorial exercises
of Property Clause power introduced above-the Gun-Free
Federal Building Zones Act and the National Parks Clean Air
Act-should pass constitutional muster. As suggested earlier,
Congress could rationally conclude in a Gun-Free Federal
Building Zones Act that wise policy dictates a ban on firearms
within 1000 feet of any federal building. Firearms within 1000
feet of a federal building can cause death and serious injury,
limit worker productivity, and create increased security costs
for the federal government to protect its property. For the National Parks Clean Air Act, Congress could rationally conclude
that increased emissions of SO2 and NO. in the Midwest harm
national parks and forests in the East in the form of blighted
trees, acidified lakes, and diminished wildlife. 437 Congress
could also reasonably conclude that state regulation of these
sources of air pollution insufficiently protected the federal in438
terest.
The Court's two most recent Commerce Clause decisionsUnited States v. Lopez439 and United States v. Morrison40 -do
not change this analysis. These cases did not concentrate on
the question most appropriate for application to the Property
Clause Context, namely the circumstances under which Congress can aggregate intrastate activity as a basis for federal
regulation of interstate commerce. The Court continued to recognize in Lopez that Congress could regulate under the Commerce Clause activities that, in the aggregate, substantially affected interstate commerce even if the individual activity
merce among the States or with foreign nations.").
436. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
437.

See supra note 373.

438. Such a finding would not necessarily form a component of the exercise
of federal authority, but it would certainly bolster the case supporting such an
enactment.
439. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
440.

529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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regulated had an insubstantial effect. The limitation announced in Lopez merely required Congress to target activities
of an economic nature. 44 1 The regulation of guns in school
zones simply did not meet this standard. 442 Congress did not
provide an adequate factual basis for federal regulation, and its
proffered justifications-that violent crime hampered interstate
commerce, and that the presence of guns at school hampered
the educational process thus hampering national productivitywere too attenuated from commerce and economic activity.
Further, because the states historically regulated areas such as
family law, criminal law, and education, these areas should not
become subject to congressional control under the Commerce
Clause." 3 This holding reinforced the accepted notion that the
Constitution does not grant to "Congress a plenary police
power."444
In United States v. Morrison, the Court's most recent case
striking down a congressional exercise of Commerce Clause
authority, the Court further refined its test for considering
whether an activity substantially affects interstate commerce. 445 That case involved a challenge to the Violence
Against Women Act, which created a private right of action in
federal court against perpetrators of violent crimes motivated
by gender. The Court reviewed this act to determine whether
the underlying problem addressed-violent crime against
women based on gender-had a substantial relationship to interstate commerce. Despite extensive congressional hearings
and findings made within the legislation," 6 the Court concluded that Congress lacked the power to regulate these activities. Although the Court declined to "adopt a categorical rule
against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity," it
carefully reasoned that all previous regulations withstanding
Commerce Clause scrutiny involved economic activity.447 The
Court also expressed grave doubt about the application of the
aggregation principle to any noneconomic activity. After all,
441. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60.
442. See id. at 567 ("The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no
sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.").

443. See id. at 564.
444. Id. at 566.
445. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
446. See id. at 614; id. at 628-36 (Souter, J., dissenting) (cataloguing findings from congressional hearings).
447. Id. at 610-11.
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"the but-for causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent
crime... to every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce,"
if accepted as a basis for congressional regulation, "would allow
Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption."" 8 The potential far-reaching extension of federal power greatly concerned
the Court because it would subsume many areas traditionally
regulated by the states."49 The Court also reiterated its concern
from Lopez that such a broad reading of the Commerce Clause
would vest in the federal government a general police power,
"which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States."450
Attempting to summarize the present state of the Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence after the decisions in Lopez
and Morrison may prove risky. The Court has demonstrated
its willingness to rethink what many regarded as the settled
law. Moreover, Justice Thomas has, in concurring opinions,
urged the Court to further limit application of the Commerce
Clause solely to interstate activities, such that even intrastate
activities of an economic nature would lie beyond the reach of
congressional authority.45 1 Despite the current period of flux,
however, some basic principles appear settled in the Court's jurisprudence. First, Congress has broad authority over economic activity, even if that activity occurs solely intrastate.
The statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison failed primarily
because they aggregated noneconomic intrastate activity in an
effort to show interstate economic effect.452 Second, where
Congress regulates economic activity, it appears that the Court
will defer to Congress's determination that the activity involved
453
substantially affects interstate commerce.
448. Id. at 615.
449. See id. at 615-16 (identifying "family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and
childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant").
450. Id. at 618.
451. See id. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 937 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Commerce
Clause "does not extend to the regulation of wholly intrastate,point-of-sale
transactions").
452. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560, 567.
453. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981). Because the opinions in
Morrison and Lopez focus on whether the activity regulated was economic or
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Assuming that these principles continue to guide the Court
in determining whether Congress may reach intrastate activities under its Commerce Clause authority, the analogy to extraterritorial applications of the Property Clause then comes
into focus. Under the Commerce Clause, courts limit intrastate
federal regulation to those activities of an economic nature.
Analogously, under the Property Clause, courts should permit
federal regulation of extraterritorial activities only when substantially related to federal property. In both areas of jurisprudence, courts should uphold a congressional determination
that an activity substantially affects interstate commerce or
federal property if Congress could rationally make that conclusion. Unlike in the Commerce Clause context, however, courts
should not fear the exercise of police powers under the Property
Clause. The Court long ago held that "[tihe general Government doubtless has a power over its own property analogous to
the police power of the several States."454 Although the Court
expressed the concern in both Morrison and Lopez that extensive regulation of local activity under the Commerce Clause
would unduly supplant state authority, in the Property Clause
context, the opposite concern prevails. Prohibiting the exercise
of federal police power to protect its lands within a state "would
place the public domain of the United States completely at the
mercy of state legislation. 455 This prohibition would upset the
balance between federal and state authority, giving too much
authority to the states.456 Congress may lack a general police
power, but it fully possesses a police power over its own lands.
Another possible limit on federal authority may affect the
suggested analogy of the Property Clause to the Commerce
Clause. The Court enunciated in Lopez, 457 repeated in Morrison,458 and more recently hinted at in Solid Waste Agency v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers its concern that connot, they do not address the standard that the Court will use to review congressional determinations that a particular intrastate economic activity will
substantially affect commerce.
454. Camiield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525 (1897).
455. Id. at 526.
456. See id. at 525-26.
457. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (expressing concern about the federal regulation of "criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have
been sovereign").
458. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (expressing concern about federal regulation of "family law and other areas of traditional
state regulation").
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gressional regulation of matters long controlled by the states
might run afoul of the Commerce Clause. 459 This concern dovetails with the discussion below of the Court's federalism
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the lack of federal regulation in
an area does not mean that the power does not exist, but only
that the federal government has not pursued it. Thus, with
regard to the hypothetical Forest Gaming Act, although states
have historically regulated casino gambling, the federal
government has addressed the general question of gambling
from early times. 460 Further, the federal government has
historicially determined how best to use federal property to
enhance the overall revenue to the public fisc. 46 1 The
hypothetical Gun-Free Federal Building Zones Act would
regulate firearm possession, a subject of federal regulation from
early times, and it would seek to protect federal property from
outside harm, just like the statute upheld in Camfield.46 2
Finally, the hypothetical National Parks Clean Air Act would
offer protection for national parks, which have existed since the
founding of Yellowstone National Park in 1872.463 Moreover,
the protection of federal lands from external threats dates from
the earliest times. 46 4 Therefore, all three of the hypothetical
acts should fall within the intrinsic limitations of the Property
465
Clause.
459. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S.Ct.
675, 683-84 (2001) (rejecting the administrative construction of the statute in
part because it "would result in a significant impingement of the State's traditional and primary power over land and water use"). The Solid Waste Agency
case did not involve the constitutionality of a statute, but the Court invoked
constitutional concerns to strike an administrative interpretation of a statute.
See id. at 683-84.
460. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
461. See United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840).
462. See Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1897).
463. See Act of March 1, 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 21 (1994)). The traditional date that most scholars use for the establishment of the first national park is 1872, although Hot Springs National
Park in Arkansas was reserved for its natural wonders in the 1830's. See
RONALD A. FORESTA, AMERIcA'S NATIONAL PARKs AND THEIR KEEPERS 12, tbl.
2-1 (1984); BOB R. O'BRIEN, OUR NATIONAL PARKS AND THE SEARCH FOR
SUSTAINABiLITY 20-21 (1999).
464. The Supreme Court recognized by 1851 that common law protection
existed for damage to public lands. Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.)
229, 231 (1850).
465. The provision that Congress must draft the legislation clearly avoids
the clear statement rules of Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 121 S.Ct. 675, 683-84 (2001), and Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
460-61 (1991). If the hypothetical acts I describe had to stand or fall on their
constitutional merits, I believe that they would constitutionally stand.
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B. EXTRINSIC LIMITATIONS
As stated in the introduction to this section, many extrinsic
limitations on the federal government's general powers should
also apply to the Property Clause power. The exercise of the
Property Clause power would not excuse Congress from otherwise applicable requirements, such as the provisions of the Bill
of Rights.466 After the Supreme Court's decision in INS v.
Undoubtedly, one may wonder what sort of enactment would fall outside
the intrinsic limitations on congressional authority under the Property Clause
under the proposed reading. Congress could broadly conceive of its property
rights, just as private landowners sometimes do. This potential flaw does not
plague my argument alone. Even those theories that find limits to the Property Clause power in the law of nuisance-whether it be Gaetke's theory
which borrows the balancing analysis, Gaetke, CongressionalDiscretion,supra
note 27, at 397 (comparing limits on Property Clause to balancing court will
perform in nuisance cases), or Sax's theory, which relies on the substantive
law of nuisance, Sax, supra note 27, at 254 n.77 (suggesting that common law
of nuisance for interstate cases might provide "self-limiting rationale for the
use of the property clause to regulate peripheral private uses")-could run into
difficulties finding such a limit. The term nuisance "has meant all things to
all people, and has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 86, at 616 (W. Page Keeton ed.,
5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted); see also Wilson v. Parent, 365 P.2d 72, 77-78
(Or. 1961) (holding defendant, who was son-in-law of plaintiff, liable for nuisance by making lewd and obscene gestures to plaintiff). Although Gaetke
and Sax would likely disclaim these broad readings of nuisance law as part of
Congress's authority under the Property Clause, this ignores the possibility
that nuisance law can be as limitless as other areas. Nevertheless, one can
devise an example that all would agree is beyond the authority of Congress to
regulate under the Property Clause because of an insufficient nexus to federal
property. Congress could not, under its Property Clause power, ban all violent
crime that took place within a thousand miles of every piece of federal property. That sort of regulation goes far beyond the need of the federal government to protect its property. Nevertheless, Congress could ban such crime if it
found that such crime affected the use and enjoyment of federal land, even
under the nuisance theory. Congress could also use its Property Clause powers to criminalize acts that take place off federal lands that intentionally interfere with or attempt to interfere with the use and enjoyment of public lands,
especially if Congress made the intent to interfere with the use and enjoyment
of public lands a jurisdictional element of the crime. See McKelvey v. United
States, 260 U.S. 353, 359 (1922) (upholding criminal statute that prohibited
attempts to interfere with use and enjoyment of public lands); see also United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (suggesting that the presence of jurisdictional element may help in sustaining legislation as legitimate exercise
of Commerce Clause power).
466. As suggested above, congressional action undertaken pursuant to the
Property Clause is subject to the Bill of Rights. See supra note 387. The question of whether the Bill of Rights applied to the territories-whether, as some
put it, the Constitution follows the flag-occupied the Court for a considerable
time in the post-Dred Scott era of the territorial aspects of the Property
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Chadha, in which the Court held the legislative veto unconstitutional, 467 several authors argued that the decision should not
apply to public lands.468 Nevertheless, the Court has strongly
Clause. See supra notes 250-256 and accompanying text. I accept that the
provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to congressional exercises of the Property
Clause power within the states. There are some suggestions to the contrary in
the Court's jurisprudence, at least on the question of whether individuals can
obtain standing to challenge actions that allegedly establish religion if the federal government undertakes the challenged action under the Property Clause.
See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ares. United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 480 (1982) (rejecting plaintiffs' Establishment Clause
challenge to a transfer of property from the United States to a religious school
for lack of standing).
One limitation in the Bill of Rights that some might think of as limiting
congressional authority is the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See
U.S. CONST. amend. V. As with enactments undertaken pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, the Takings Clause would not limit congressional actions
undertaken pursuant to the Property Clause provided that Congress provided
a means for the affected people to recover just compensation. See Preseault v.
ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 11-17 (1990) (holding that a just compensation remedy is
available against the federal government unless Congress clearly states the
contrary).
467. 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
468. See, e.g., Eugene R. Gaetke, Separation of Powers, Legislative Vetoes,
and the Public Lands, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 559 (1985) [hereinafter Gaetke,
Separation of Powers]; Roger M. Sullivan, The Power of Congress Under the
Property Clause: A Potential Check on the Effect of the Chadha Decision on
Public Land Legislation, 6 PuB. LAND L. REV. 65 (1985); Timothy R. Baker,
Comment, Chadha and the Public Lands: Is FLPMA Affected?, 5 PUB. LAND L.
REV. 55 (1984). Many public land statutes used the legislative veto as part of
the management scheme. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c), (e). The defenders of
the legislative veto over public land decisions based their argument on two basic theories. First, the long history of congressional accommodation of presidential authority in the area somehow authorized the legislative veto in this
context. Second, the proprietary nature of the government's relationship with
its property allowed for a different legislative structure over federal lands. See
Gaetke, Separation of Powers, supra, at 564-74. I disagree with these conclusions, and not simply as a capitulation to subsequent authority. See Metro.
Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501
U.S. 252 (1991). Professor Glicksman has also reviewed this question, concluding cautiously that legislative vetoes are likely unconstitutional in the
public lands context. See Robert L. Glicksman, Severability and the Realignment of the Balance of Power over Public Lands: The FederalLand Policy and
ManagementAct of 1976 After the Legislative Veto Decisions, 36 HASTINGS L.J.
1, 51-65 (1984). I have reached my conclusion for two reasons. First, the long
history of the President exercising power over public lands without the express
authority of Congress says nothing about the way that Congress itself must
exercise its authority under the Property Clause when it chooses to do so;
rather, that history of congressional acquiescence to executive action goes, if
anything, to the nondelegation doctrine. Also, if the Property Clause is an
enumerated power-and I believe that Professor Gaetke and I agree that it
is-then there are few persuasive reasons to treat it differently from other
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suggested that if Congress wishes to enact legislation for federal property, it must proceed through the constitutionally established procedures of bicameralism and presentment using
constitutionally composed boards. 469 Similarly, the nondelegation doctrine applies to the exercise of the Property Clause
power, 470 although the Supreme Court has applied that docenumerated powers. The Chadhadecision itself arose in the immigration context, where the Court has proven quite acquiescent to the will of Congress othervise. Dicta from the Supreme Court supports the view that if Congress intends to dispose of lands, it must do so through bicameralism and
presentment. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 28 (1947) (holding
that a congressional joint resolution vetoed by the President "does not represent an exercise of the constitutional power of Congress to dispose of public
property under [the Property Clause]").
The second theory makes too much of the proprietary aspects of the federal government's ownership of its lands. For example, Gaetke emphasizes
that exercises of the Property Clause power are legislative and proprietary in
nature and that the President acts as the agent of Congress when he acts concerning the public lands. See Gaetke, Separation of Powers, supra, at 570-71.
He argues that the legislative veto might be constitutional for proprietary decisions but not for regulatory decisions. Id. at 579. Just as Professor Engdahl
errs in concluding that, under what he termed the "classic Property Clause
doctrine," the United States had the power of a mere proprietor over its lands
(with limited exceptions), see supra note 46 (explaining Engdahl's argument),
Gaetke makes too much of the proprietary nature of the federal government's
relationship with its lands when he concludes that the proprietary nature provides an exception to the usual way that the government must exercise its authority. Although the federal government is proprietor of the lands, it is also a
sovereign, as Gaetke would agree. Just as that sovereignty gives the United
States the power to enact legislation and take other measures to protect its
lands that a private proprietor could not, the United States must exercise that
authority through the means established by the Constitution. See C. Peter
Goplerud, III, FederalCoal Leasing and PartisanPolitics:Alternativesand the
Shadow of Chadha, 86 W. VA. L. REV. 773, 793 (1984) ("[Tihe legislative/proprietary dichotomy is stated to indicate the expanse of the Property
Clause powers, not the use or nonuse of article I procedures to implement it.");
see also Brodie, supra note 28, at 711 (lamenting that "[t]he difference between
the United States as 'sovereign' and 'proprietor' has been whittled away to the
point where it is now a distinction without substance"). In other contexts, the
Supreme Court has questioned the validity of the distinction between a government as sovereign and a government as proprietor or market participant.
See Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 679-87 (1999); see also Michael Wells & Walter Hellerstein, The Governmental-ProprietaryDistinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073
(1980).
469. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1991) (holding that management of
airports formerly owned by the federal government could not use an unconstitutionally composed board).
470. The Eighth Circuit held unconstitutional certain provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act that authorized the Secretary of the Interior to take
land into trust for Indians, but the Supreme Court vacated the decision. See
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trine less rigorously to federal actions involving public lands
because of a tradition of inter-branch accommodation and con47 1
gressional acquiescence to exercise of executive authority.
These extrinsic limitations affect only which branch may exercise the Property Clause power and how that branch may exercise it; they do not affect the reach of the power itself.
Given the suggested Commerce Clause analogy, the most
important extrinsic limitation on federal authority over its own
property that lies within a state is the Tenth Amendment and
the associated principles of federalism. Dividing sovereign authority between the federal government and state governments
vindicates several important objectives. The Supreme Court
set forth several of these goals in Gregory v. Ashcroft.472 There,
the Court argued that the division of power between the states
and the federal government
assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the
diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it increases opportunity for
citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes government
by putting the States in competition for a mobile citimore responsive
47 3
zenry.

The division of power between the states and the federal
government

also protects individual liberty by creating "a

healthy balance of power [that] will reduce the risk of tyranny
and abuse from either front."47 4 Nevertheless, the Supremacy
Clause deals the federal government the ultimate trump card
South Dakota v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 69 F.3d 878, 883-85 (8th
Cir. 1995), vacated, 519 U.S. 919 (1996).
471. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 469-73 (1915) (citing the extensive history of congressional acquiescence to presidential withdrawals of public land in upholding such a reservation); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 521 (1911) (upholding regulation banning grazing on
public lands to nondelegation challenge). Professor Gaetke argued that this
history of looser rules for nondelegation in the public lands area reflects the
notion that rules for public lands are not like other laws. See supra note 468.
To be sure, Gaetke has case support for this argument. See Midwest Oil, 236
U.S. at 474 (holding that public land laws "are not of a legislative character in
the highest sense of the term... 'but savor somewhat of mere rules prescribed
by an owner of property for its disposal'" (quoting Butte City Water Co. v.
Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 126 (1905)). Nevertheless, I believe that Midwest Oil
and its progeny are best viewed not as commentary on the Property Clause
power so much as reflecting a tendency of the Court to recognize executive
power if it has been repeatedly exercised and acquiesced in by Congress. See,
e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-22 (1936).
472. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
473. Id. at 458.
474. Id.
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in this relationship.
As with the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has recently proven quite active in the area of federalism, in no small
part because of the relationship between the Commerce Clause
and the Tenth Amendment. 4 6 Although the Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence might now need clarification, that case
law provides a model of clarity as compared to the Court's
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. Translating the general
principles behind federalism announced in cases such as Gregory v. Ashcroft into judicially enforceable rules has proven
nearly impossible. 477 The Court's decision in National League
of Cities v. Usery 78-its first modern attempt to devise a judicially enforceable principle of federalism to limit the reach of
the federal government-proved unworkable, and the Court
overruled it within a decade. 479 Gregory v. Ashcroft itself did
not yield a rule of constitutional limitation, but instead a rule
of statutory construction: The Court will read particularly instate governments
vasive congressional enactments to apply 4to
80
only if Congress clearly stated this intent.
More recently, the Court held unconstitutional two acts of
Congress because they over-regulated the states and thus in481
fringed on state sovereignty. In New York v. United States,
the Court struck down a requirement that states take title to
radioactive waste generated within their borders. In the
475. Id. at 460 ("As long as it is acting within the powers granted it under
the Constitution, Congress may impose its will on the States.").
476. As the Court has stated, in cases
involving the division of authority between federal and state governments, the two inquiries are mirror images of each other. If a power
is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment
expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a
power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).
477. See H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Searchfor a JudiciallyEnforceable Federalism,83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 864-68 (1999).
478. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
479. Garcia,469 U.S. at 529.
480. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 460-61 (describing a clear statement rule for determining when congressional enactments regulate states); see
also Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct.
675, 683-84 (2001) (reading the reach of the Clean Water Act narrowly to
avoid a potential federalism problem).
481. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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Court's view, this required the state government to enact legislation against its will. In Printz v. United States, 4 82 the Court
held that certain provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence
Protection Act-which required the local chief law enforcement
officer to perform a background check on anyone who wished to
purchase a handgun-unconstitutionally ordered state officials
to administer a federal program in derogation of the Tenth
Amendment. 4 3 Both of these cases made clear that congressional legislation should properly target private parties; Congress cannot commandeer the state legislative or executive
branch to implement federal policy thereby interfering with the
relationship between the citizens of the state and their state
484
government.
Nevertheless, the Court recently allowed Congress to limit
the activities of state officials if the federal regime treated the
state officers like private individuals and did not single out
states as the target of regulation. 485 The Court has also upheld
federal statutes giving states the choice between having state
regulation of individual conduct according to federal standards
or having direct federal regulation of the individual conduct
that would altogether bypass state law.4 86 Older cases, sometimes grouped with the equal footing cases, hold that Congress
487
cannot dictate the internal affairs of state government.
Thus, the Court's modern federalism jurisprudence draws a few
clear boundaries for federal action: Congress must speak
clearly if it intends to regulate the states; it cannot dictate legislation that a state legislature must pass; it cannot commandeer state officials; and it cannot deprive a state of the ability
to control the central attributes of its government. The Supreme Court continues to recognize, however, that the federal
482. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
483.

Id. at 918-22, 925-33.

484. See id. at 925-28; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 168-69.
485. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (upholding provisions of the
Driver Privacy Protection Act, which makes unlawful the release of information from state drivers license records); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at
160 (acknowledging that the Court's jurisprudence on the question of Congress's power to subject states to generally applicable laws "has traveled an
unsteady path").
486. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining
& Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
487. See, e.g., Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 574 (1911) (holding that
Congress may not dictate the location of the state capital in an act admitting
a state to the Union).
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government has a broad role in the governance of national life.
Under these principles, the three hypothetical acts introduced above would pass muster under the Court's current federalism jurisprudence. None of the hypothetical acts commands a state to enact legislation or to enforce federal
legislation, and none limits a core function of state government. 488 Nevertheless, larger concerns about the proper role
between the states and the federal government motivate many
opponents to a broadly construed Property Clause. It has not
escaped attention, for example, that the Court decided National
League of Cities v. Usery48 9 only a week after it decided Kleppe
v. New Mexico.490 Now that the Supreme Court has overruled
National League of Cities, however, it is unclear exactly how
the principles of federalism limit the Property Clause power.
Most advocates of the narrow view of the Property Clause
do not analyze the federalism limitations based on the Court's
most recent jurisprudence; rather, their concerns reflect the
general principles articulated in Gregory v. Ashcroft. These
critics argue that allowing the federal government to own and
manage land in the states (apart from those small tracts described in the Enclave Clause) undermines the very notion of a
state government free from federal interference. 49 1 Such a
488. The federal government could not, however, require a state to police
its lands. Thus, if the hypothetical Forest Gaming Act required states to provide police and security for federal casinos, that provision would fail under
Printz.
489. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
490. 426 U.S. 529 (1976); see also Landever, supra note 28, at 600; Touton,
supra note 28, at 828. This coincidence in the Court's calendar signifies little
about the role that federalism principles actually play in the Property Clause
context for two reasons. First, the Court overruled National League of Cities.
Second, the opinion in National League of Cities makes clear that the federalism limitations it found limited congressional action under the Commerce
Clause, not other powers of the United States. Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S.
at 852 n.17, 854 n.18 (leaving open the question of whether the principle it
announced would affect congressional regulation of integral state fimctions
under the war power, the spending power, or the power to protect civil rights).
The Court later made clear that its federalism limitations did not apply to
congressional acts made under the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980). Arguably, then, the federalism limitations
of National League of Cities did not apply to congressional enactments authorized by the Property Clause even when that case had vigor. See Minnesota ex
rel. Alexander v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1251 n.26 (8th Cir. 1981) (leaving open
the question of whether National League of Cities applies to exercises of Congress's Property Clause power).
491. See Brodie, supra note 28, at 724-25; Landever, supra note 28, at 638;
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state would be, in words that the critics borrow from Laurence
Tribe, a "gutted shell" incapable of providing the services that
its citizens have come to expect.492 In its strongest statement,
the argument opposes any federal authority over lands located
within a state, using reasoning that either echoes or comes directly from the equal footing doctrine. These critics urge that
the federal government should not subject certain states to an
immense federal presence by virtue of large federal landholdings in those states. In weaker versions, proponents of the narrow view raise the concern that federal decisions would prevail
even when contrary to state policy and economic interests. "For
example," wrote one critic, "the citizens of Utah undoubtedly
expect the state to protect them from the evils of gambling, and
federal frustration of that state's ability to prohibit gambling
may so discredit the state as to deprive it of the support of its
citizens." 493 Similarly, Nevada should be able to charge sales
tax on federal lands within its borders to raise needed revenues. 494 Other critics urge that management of federal lands
will improve with cooperative participation between the states
and the federal government, and allowing state authority sim495
ply provides a good check on federal authority.
These arguments, however, do not withstand scrutiny, as
courts have properly rejected the equal footing notion that
states with large federal landholdings are somehow lesser than
other states because of an increased federal presence. 496 Many
states have an increased federal regulatory presence within
their borders because of activities undertaken in those states.
Touton, supra note 28, at 825.
492.

See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-20, at

381 (2d ed. 1988), quoted in Landever, supra note 28, at 638; LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-20, at 302 (1978), quoted in Tou-

ton, supra note 28, at 832.
493. Touton, supra note 28, at 832. By "depriv[ing the state] of the support
of its citizens," id., the author does not mean that civil war would break out in
Salt Lake City if the federal government permitted gambling on federal lands
in Utah. Rather, the author raises a common refutation to the argument that
the political structure of the federal government adequately protects the state
interest in being free from federal interference, namely that overarching federal authority might weaken the bonds that state citizens feel toward their
state government. See id. at 828-33.
494. See id. at 825.
495. See Landever, supra note 28, at 612-36.
496. See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314, 1319 (9th Cir.
1997) (explaining that the purpose of the Equal Footing Doctrine is not to establish equality of economic or physical characteristics among the states;
rather, it pertains to political rights and sovereignty).
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No one questions the power of the federal government to regulate a national market in securities or commodities. Despite
concerns about federalism, no one questions the fact that federal securities laws have greater bite in New York and Illinois
because the major stock exchanges and commodities markets
are in New York City and Chicago. No one questions the plenary authority that Congress wields over immigration. As a
result of that power, Florida, Texas, and other border states
have greater federal presence within their borders. Similarly, a
state like Nevada or Utah might experience increased federal
regulation because of the presence of federal land.497 Furthermore, although increased state participation in federal decisionmaking might, as a policy matter, lead to substantively
better outcomes, 498 that possibility does not negate the federal
government's constitutional authority over its property and
over extraterritorial activities that affect its lands.
The scholarship of Professor Deborah Jones Merritt, 499
whose work the Court has cited, 50° provides a thoughtful model
for approaching modern federalism problems that recognizes
both the increased role of the federal government and the role
that the Constitution established for the states. Merritt has
argued that the current model used by the Supreme Court protects the autonomy of state governments against incursion by
the federal government.5 0 1 Merritt contrasted this model with
the territorial model-under which the federal government and
the states each control some sphere or subject matter-and the
federal process model-under which the courts rely on the political process to protect the states. 50 2 In Merritt's view, so long
as the actions of the federal government do not interfere with
497.
498.
ism on
(1982).
499.

See Touton, supra note 28, at 825.
See Milner S. Ball, Good Old American Permits:MadisonianFederalthe TerritorialSea and Continental Shelf, 12 ENVTL. L. 623, 654-63
See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State

Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988) [here-

inafter Merritt, Guarantee Clause]; Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of
Federalism:Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563 (1994)

[hereinafter Merritt, Three Faces].
500. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997) (citing Merritt,
Three Faces, supra note 499); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157
(1992) (citing Merritt, Guarantee Clause, supra note 499).
501. See Merritt, Three Faces, supra note 499, at 1570-73.
502. See id. at 1564-70; see also Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards
of Federalism:The R6le of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546 (1954).
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state autonomy-meaning in this context "tamper[ing] with the
independent relationship between a state government and its
voters"5 03-then the federal government may generally regulate
the activity.
Assuming that the Supreme Court now embraces an
autonomy model and has dealt "fatal blows to both the territorial and federal process models," 5°4 then the suggested reach for
the Property Clause should not run afoul of any principle of
federalism. In the hypothetical acts examined thus far, the
federal government directly regulates individuals, not states.
Moreover, the prospect of using federal lands as a haven from
state regulation-such as the hypothetical Forest Gaming
Act-does not interfere with the relationship between citizens
and their states. Any interference resulting from federal authorization of activities occurring on federal lands that would
otherwise be banned by the relevant state should be no greater
than the federalism concerns raised by Indian reservation
gambling.50 5 Despite the presence of federal operations, these
activities do not force state governments "to respond to the
commands of Congress rather than to the dictates of their vot-

503. Merritt, Three Faces, supra note 499, at 1571.
504. Id. at 1572.
505. In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 20407 (1987), the Court held that states that permitted some forms of gambling
could not prohibit bingo played on Indian reservations because Congress had
not consented to the application of state regulatory law in that instance. Following this decision, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Under § 2710(d) of that Act, Indian tribes seeking to host certain types of gambling must enter into a cooperative agreement with the state in which the gambling will take place. The
Supreme Court reviewed provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida,517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996), and held unconstitutional
the provisions that waived the sovereign immunity of the states to lawsuits
brought by tribes. The states also raised an argument based on federalism,
namely that requiring a state to enter into a cooperative agreement constituted forcing them to enact legislation in violation of the Court's federalism
jurisprudence. See id. at 61 n.10. The Court did not consider this argument
because it had not been raised below. Id. Whatever the merits of this argument, the states did not contend in Seminole Tribe that the mere presence of
gaming on Indian reservations within their states violated the Constitution,
and the Court's jurisprudence suggests that the presence of Indian reservations within a state does not raise federalism concerns, even though these reservations are generally free from state regulation. See Blatchford v. Native
Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 791 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Despite
the States' undeniable interest in regulating activities within its borders, and
despite traditional principles of federalism, the States' authority has been
largely displaced in matters pertaining to Native Americans.").
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ers."506
Present case law makes it more difficult to justify extraterritorial regulations that attempt to control state use of state
land in order to protect federal property. Some cases, however,
have already upheld federal regulation of private use of state
lands where that use affects federal property.50 7 These cases
find support under the Court's present jurisprudence, which
concludes that direct federal regulation of private-party conduct does not implicate federalism principles. 508 To the extent
that any of the hypothetical statutes might involve regulation
of individuals on state-owned property-such as the National
Parks Clean Air Act-the Court's federalism jurisprudence
should not affect that regulation.
The existing case law provides no instances in which the
federal government instructs the states themselves on how to
manage their own lands. The Supreme Court has described a
state's relationship with its lands-especially submerged lands,
which pass to the state under the equal footing doctrine--as
"an essential attribute of sovereignty." 50 9 The Court, however,
did not clearly define this statement. It has also recognized
that, prior to admitting a state, the United States can convey
submerged lands to others or retain them and defeat title from
passing to the state under the equal footing doctrine. 5 10 If Con506. Merritt, Three Faces, supra note 499, at 1571. By contrast, if Congress required state officials to provide police or fire protection for casinos on
federal property, that requirement would probably run afoul of the Court's
anti-commandeering jurisprudence. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
933 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
507. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 186 F.3d 1055, 1061 (8th Cir.
1999) (upholding a federal ban on operating a business on a lake in a national
park without a permit where the state ceded jurisdiction over the waters to
the federal government), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1018, and cert. denied, 529 U.S.
1033 (2000); Minnesota ex rel. Alexander v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1251-53 (8th
Cir. 1981) (upholding a federal ban on the use of motorboats and snowmobiles
on state-owned waters); United States v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1979)
(per curiam) (upholding a federal ban on camping and building fires without a
permit within a national recreation area when the activities took place on
state property, namely the bed and banks of the river); United States v.
Brown, 552 F.2d 817, 820-21 (8th Cir. 1977) (upholding a hunting ban in Voyageurs National Park when the activity took place on state waters).
508. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) ("In providing for a stronger central
government... the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon
Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.")
509. Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195 (1987).
510. See Idaho v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2135, 2142 (2001); United
States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 61 (1997); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48
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gress can by clear legislation enacted prior to statehood deprive
a state of these lands, they must not represent "an essential attribute of sovereignty" in the same way that other attributes
are essential. For example, Congress could not enact legislation before admitting a state to the Union to deprive that state
of fair representation in the House of Representatives. 511 Congress also could not dictate to a state the location of its state
capital without interfering with an essential attribute of state
sovereignty. 512 Thus, although the principle that passes submerged land to the states upon admission has constitutional
force, its application in this context is uncertain. Similarly, a
state's relationship with its lands generally does not prevent
the federal government from exercising its authorized power to
acquire them by condemnation. 5 13 Although states have a special relationship with their lands, that relationship does not
create a complete barrier to federal regulation.
For that reason, courts should hold many applications of
Congress's power under the Property Clause constitutional
even if the United States regulates state use of state lands. In
this context, the role of the federal government as proprietor as
well as sovereign makes a difference. In the context of the
Commerce Clause-where the Court has held that Congress
can regulate the conduct of state governments provided that it
legislates clearly without targeting the states 5 14-the relationship of Congress to the subject regulated is more amorphous
and theoretical. By contrast, in the context of federal property,
(1894). The Court decided United States v. Alaska four days before it decided
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), in which the Court held
that the Eleventh Amendment barred a suit brought by Indians against a
state where the Indians sought to establish title to submerged lands. The
Court noted that such lands have "a unique status in the law and [are] infused
with a public trust the State itself is bound to respect." Id. at 283. More recently, the Court held in Idaho v. United States that Idaho did not in fact own
the lands at issue in Coeurd'Alene Tribe. 121 S. Ct. at 2146-47.
511. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 2. Similarly, the Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from amending equal representation in the Senate
or from depriving a state of two senators without its consent. U.S. CONST. art.
V. Congress could not admit a state on the condition that it receive only half
of its otherwise allowed representation in the House because that would interfere with an inherent attribute of sovereignty.
512. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579-80 (1911) (holding unconstitutional the requirement that Oklahoma maintain its capital in Guthrie).
513. See Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508,
534 (1941) ("The fact that land is owned by a state is no barrier to its condemnation by the United States.").
514. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150-51 (2000).
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a tangible relationship exists between the regulated activity
and the federal interest. If the federal government regulates
state activity on state land to protect federal land, the Supremacy Clause dictates that the federal regulation must prevail.
Moreover, in most instances, Congress will regulate private
parties rather than the state.
A comparison of several factual settings helps clarify the
reach of this principle. Suppose that federal law prohibits setting a fire in a national forest. The law of a given state does
not bar lighting campfires. If a visitor to a national forest
within this state lights a campfire on federally owned lands, no
one argues that the federal government cannot reach this conduct. Indeed, many of those who read the Property Clause narrowly would concur, arguing that as a proprietor the federal
government can make more stringent rules than a state
could. 5 15 Just as a private owner of a campsite could forbid
lighting fires, so can the federal government. Suppose however
that the Forest Service wishes to prosecute an individual who
camped within the external boundaries of the national forest
but on land that belonged to the state and lit a campfire. The
courts have held that the federal government may regulate the
camper's conduct. 516 Finally, the federal government can
criminally prosecute an individual who lights a fire outside of
the boundaries of national forests if the fire threatens to injure
5 17
a national forest, even if the fire is lit on state lands.
515. See Engdahl, supra note 28, at 316-17.
516. See, e.g., United States v. Arbo, 691 F.2d 862, 865-66 (9th Cir. 1982)
(explaining that federal officers can inspect private activities on state land to
protect adjacent federal land); United States v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir.
1979) (per curiam) (upholding a conviction for camping and building a fire
without a permit when the activity occurred on state land adjacent to a national forest).
517. United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (1927). Although the opinion is not altogether clear, Alford apparently involved privately owned lands.
See id. ("Congress may prohibit the doing of acts upon privately owned lands
that imperil the publicly owned forests." (emphasis added)). The principle
should apply even if a state is igniting fires on state land. For example, suppose that a state decided to use controlled burning as a management technique for a state forest that lies next to a national forest in which the Forest
Service has decided to suppress all fires. If the state lit a fire near the national forest, the United States could, in my view, sue to enjoin this conduct on
the principle announced inAlford. The federal government can reach the conduct and its prohibition on fires set near the boundaries of a national forest
would be of general applicability, rather than one that targets states exclusively. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 149, 150-51 (2000); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985). If the United States could
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By contrast, instead of suppressing extraterritorial activity, federal legislation might actively implement a program off
of federal property to protect federal lands. Such a program
might raise different concerns. Suppose that the federal government determines that it needs to cull a herd of deer because
of overbrowsing in a national forest. Suppose further that the
otherwise applicable state law forbids hunting deer out of season, and that a private proprietor facing a similar threat could
not generally hunt deer that threatened his or her trees. Supreme Court precedent holds that the federal government could
direct federal employees to kill the deer on federal lands even if
that would violate state game laws. 5 18 Suppose that a Forest
Service employee shoots a deer off federal property in an effort
to reduce the deer population but in compliance with a clear
federal legislative or regulatory mandate. Again, the Supreme
Court case law would suggest that this activity is within the
5 19
constitutional reach of the federal government.
Suppose, further, that rather than relying on federal employees, the Forest Service allows private hunters to hunt for
deer on its land. The hunt falls outside of the established state
game season, and the Forest Service requires the private hunters to obtain a federal special use permit rather than a state
hunting license. Again, this situation poses no difficulty under
federalism principles. The federal government can regulate the
taking of game on federal lands. Moreover, the special hunting
rules for federal lands do not interfere with the autonomy of
the state. The state can regulate hunting everywhere else in
the state, and the citizens of the state have the opportunity to
maintain their relationship with their state government.
Suppose finally that one of these private hunters spots a
deer on neighboring state lands and shoots it in a federally authorized effort to protect federal lands. This case poses the
most difficulty from the federalism perspective, because the
state's citizens may have a strong view against hunting as expressed in legislation. Supreme Court precedent would nevertheless suggest that the private hunter should obtain immunity

prohibit Weyerhauser or Georgia-Pacific from using controlled burning as a
management technique on their lands, similarly the United States should,
without violating any principle of federalism, have the power to prohibit a
state from using this technique under similar circumstances.
518. Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928).
519. See Alford, 274 U.S. at 267; Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518,
528 (1897).
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from state regulation because he or she acted pursuant to a
520
federal program.
These hypothetical situations spell out the application of
the judicially enforceable principles of federalism in the Property Clause context. The fact that these situations remain hypothetical supports the belief that the federal government's exercise of its Property Clause power will not trample the
legitimate interests of the states. Herbert Wechsler and others
have argued that the values of federalism should be protected
primarily through the political processes, 52 1 and the Supreme
Court embraced this view in Garcia.522 Although the Court has
since retreated from this position, the claim that procedural
protections will safeguard federalism has force in the evidence
provided by Congress's use of its Property Clause power. Until
now, Congress has not tried to directly regulate state conduct
off of federal lands in any significant way. Furthermore, while
the states containing the most federally owned lands often have
smaller populations, they maintain political clout in the Senate
and often obtain representation on congressional committees
that oversee public lands and natural resources. Although the
process might not in all cases provide adequate protections for
the interests of states, it has in the context of the Property
Clause.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF A BROADLY READ
PROPERTY CLAUSE
The first two Parts of this Article demonstrate that the
Court has, at almost every opportunity, correctly interpreted
the Property Clause broadly. Further, the proper analogue to
guide the jurisprudence for extraterritorial applications of the
Property Clause power is the jurisprudence arising under the
Commerce Clause to determine when Congress may regulate
intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. If this analysis is correct, it remains to be determined
how such a reading of the Property Clause would affect the dis520. See Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S.
256, 269-70 (1985) (barring a state from regulating how local government
must use money received from the federal government).
521. See Wechsler, supra note 502, at 558-60.
522. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552
(1985) ("State sovereign interests.., are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power.").
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position of cases involving the environment. Environmental issues seem the most appropriate area for looking at possible expansions or affirmations of federal power in light of the nature
of the Clause. If Congress lacked the constitutional authority
to enact the Violence Against Women Act under the Commerce
Clause, the Property Clause will not provide supplemental authorization for that act. Nevertheless, as courts have begun to
turn a searching eye to congressional authority over environmental issues,523 shoring up the potential Property Clause justification for such acts may well serve the cause of federal regulation of environmental problems.
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT
The options available to federal land managers will expand
under the proposed reading of the Property Clause. Presently,
federal land management agencies-notably the United States
Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the National Park Service-exercise jurisdiction over millions of acres
of federally owned lands. They also have become more assertive about regulating their neighbors in an effort to protect the
resources under their command. 524 These agencies have, however, historically shied away from broader regulation. Their reluctance to reach out further may reflect, in part, a belief that
they lack the constitutional or statutory authority to promul5
gate extraterritorial regulations to protect their resources. 2
The historical reluctance of these federal agencies to reach
beyond federal land boundaries also probably reflects wise politics. A tenuous relationship has always existed between the local representatives of federal agencies and local landowners,
but recent incidences such as the Sagebrush Rebellion and the

523. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
121 S. Ct. 675 (2001); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1081 (2001); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d
1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
524. See, e.g., Michael Janofsky, PrivateAcres in Public ParksFuel Battles
on Development, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1999, at Al; Stephen Steubner, Wilderness vs. Houses In the Idaho Mountains, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1996, at A25.

525. See Sax, supra note 27, at 241 ("While intrusive private activities have
increased all around them, park managers have stood by nervously, sensing
that they were caring for helpless giants."). To be sure, Sax's account is
somewhat dated, and more recent evidence suggests that the National Park
Service especially has proven less shy about extraterritorial regulation, at
least where a specific act has directed it to consider the possibility. See supra
note 524.
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more recent County Supremacy movement have made federal
land management personnel scared for their lives and safety.
One of the most notorious examples of this threat comes from
the forced opening of a Forest Service road in Nye County, Nevada. On July 4, 1994, Richard Carver, a Nye County commissioner, mounted a bulldozer and "repaired" a Forest Service
road lying wholly upon national forest land despite a direct order from a forest service officer to stop. 526 Forest Service and
BLM workers have received threats and bombs have detonated
in their offices. 527 In this hostile environment, where the federal government's authority to control even its own lands remains controversial, strict federal regulation of extraterritorial
activities could lead to disaster.
Nevertheless, wise politics does not necessarily dictate the
legal range of actions that an agency could possibly take.
These federal agencies should at least contemplate regulating
extraterritorial activities when making decisions on how best to
protect the lands under their control. The procedures established by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)528 and
its implementing regulations 529 provide one important opportunity for federal land management agencies to consider the
scope of their regulatory jurisdiction under the Property
Clause. NEPA requires federal agencies to take a hard look at
the environmental impacts of actions that they undertake, authorize, or approve. 530 In evaluating alternatives for action, the
regulations require agencies to consider not only alternatives
within their jurisdiction but also "reasonable alternatives not
within the jurisdiction of the lead agency."53 1 An expanded
view of a federal agency's jurisdiction will broaden the number
of alternatives that agencies will consider when conducting the
review required under NEPA. Although this expanded review
526. See Keith Schneider, County's Move on Land Use Draws Suit by Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1995, at A12.
527. See Jeff DeBonis, Buffaloed by the Land-Use Bullies, N.Y. TIMES, July
7, 1995, at A25 (quoting an Idaho rancher about Forest Service ranger Don
Oman, who enforced grazing regulations: If I get Oman alone... I'll slit his
throat.'"); Timothy Egan, FederalUniforms Become Target Of Wave of Threats

and Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1995, at Al; see also Robert L. Glicksman,
Fear and Loathing on the Federal Lands, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 647, 647-49

(1997) (detailing similar episodes).
528. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
529. 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500-1508 (2000).
530. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350
(1989); KIeppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409-10 (1976).
531. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(c) (2000).

120

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

will not necessarily translate into substantive results, it may
encourage more far-reaching action.
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVES

If the federal government extensively exercised its Property Clause power, many other areas in addition to land management could experience dramatic changes. At least three areas of congressional legislation lend themselves to reanalysis
through the lens of the Property Clause: air pollution control,
species preservation, and wetlands conservation.
As the hypothetical National Parks Clean Air Act suggests,
Congress could potentially use the Property Clause to directly
control emissions from air pollution sources. The present provisions of the Clean Air Act rely heavily on the states to achieve
clean air in the parks, and even then make special provisions
only for visibility protection for certain federal lands, namely
those designated in the Act as Class I lands. 532 Thus, many
federal lands go unprotected under the Act, and the remaining
lands receive only visibility protections that fail to prevent the
larger problems created by air pollution. Moreover, the Clean
Air Act, as it stands, places primary responsibility on the states
to achieve its substantive provisions. 533 Because air pollution
532. As part of the overall statutory scheme to prevent significant deterioration in areas that meet the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS), the Clean Air Act designates the following lands as Class I lands:
"(1) international parks, (2) national wilderness areas which exceed 5,000
acres in size, (3) national memorial parks which exceed 5,000 acres in size,
and (4) national parks which exceed six thousand acres in size," that were in
existence by August 7, 1977. 42 U.S.C. § 7472(a) (1994). Other federal lands
and other nonfederal areas that meet the NAAQS are initially designated
Class II lands, but the state has the discretion to designate some lands as
Class III lands. Some, but not all, federal lands can be designated only Class I
or Class II. 42 U.S.C. § 7474(a) (1994) (providing that "an area which exceeds
ten thousand acres in size and is a national monument, a national primitive
area, a national preserve, a national recreation area, a national wild and scenic river, a national wildlife refuge, a national lakeshore or seashore," or "a
national park or national wilderness area established after August 7, 1977,
which exceeds ten thousand acres in size" may be designated only Class I or
Class II). The Clean Air Act then requires states to establish a baseline of pollution in these areas and to make sure in their plans to implement the Clean
Air Act that pollution in lands does not increase over certain levels. Class I
lands have the most stringent limitations, and Class III lands the least restrictive. 42 U.S.C. § 7473(b) (1994). Despite these provisions, no standard is
set for national forests or the public domain. The Clean Air Act also makes
special provisions to protect visibility in federal lands that must be designated
Class I. 42 U.S.C. § 7491 (1994).
533. See Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975)

2001]

PROPERTY CLAUSE

can lead to detrimental interstate effects without harming the
lands in the state where the pollution is generated, federal
lands may not receive the protection they need. Under these
circumstances, the states with the sources producing the pollution have little or no incentive to regulate those sources if they
otherwise attain the nationally required levels of air cleanliness. As the Court predicted in Camfield, entrusting protection
of the public lands to the states in this context will leave them
at the mercy of unsympathetic state legislatures. 534 Direct federal regulation of pollution sources that harm federal lands
may help achieve clean air nationwide without the535delays encountered in relying exclusively on state regulation.
Second, some applications of the Endangered Species Act
(ESA)536 might survive judicial scrutiny as being applications of
the Property Clause. That act prohibits, among other things,
the "taking" of an endangered or threatened species, with taking including every action from actually killing a member of the
species to making modifications to a species' habitat that
harms the species. 537 The present protection afforded to endangered and threatened species is grounded in the Commerce
Clause and, to some extent, the Treaty Clause, but not the
Property Clause. 538 Nevertheless, if the logic of Kleppe v. New
Mexico 539 applies-in which the Court upheld congressional use

(noting that, although Congress reacted to slow progress on air pollution by
"taking a stick to the States" in the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, the act
places "primary responsibility" on states to implement national standards).
534. See Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 526 (1897) (upholding
extraterritorial federal regulation because to do otherwise would "place the
public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation").
535. For suggestions on how to improve present air pollution protection for
federal lands, see Glicksman, supra note 20, at 38-39, 54-59. Professor
Glicksman does not, however, suggest that the federal government directly
regulate sources of air pollution.
536. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
537. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515
U.S. 687, 704-08 (1995) (upholding regulatory definition of "take" and "harm"
as applying to habitat modification).
538. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1), (3), (4) (1994) (finding that endangered and
threatened species have become so "as a consequence of economic growth and
development," that these species "are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people," and
that the United States has pledged itself to the preservation of endangered
and threatened species through various international treaties and conventions).
539. 426 U.S. 529, 535-41 (1976).
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of the Property Clause to protect animals Congress believed
were an "integral part of the natural system of the public
lands"54 0 -then the federal government has a legitimate interest in maintaining endangered and threatened species on its
property.541 More importantly, because the government did not
542
assert ownership over the wild horses protected in Kleppe,
the case implies that Congress's ability to protect these animals
is independent of ownership. Therefore, Congress could prohibit individuals from harming endangered and threatened
species off federal property if members of those species sometimes occupy federal lands and if Congress reasonably concludes that extraterritorial preservation of such species pre543
serves the overall value of federal lands.

Finally, certain types of wetlands protections and other
watershed protections may survive scrutiny as applications of
the Property Clause rather than applications of other federal

540. 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
541. See Holly Doremus, Comment, Patchingthe Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 292 (1991) (arguing that
the reasoning of Kleppe "could justify federal protection of virtually any biological resource").
542. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 537 n.8 (1976) (noting that
the United States made no ownership claim over the protected animals); cf
Villareal, supra note 14, at 1150-53 (suggesting that the Property Clause justification for endangered species protection would become problematic if the federal government sought protection by claiming ownership in species).
543. See Kieppe, 426 U.S. at 546. Villareal, supra note 14, at 1151-53, argues that such protection of endangered and threatened species on private
lands would likely result in an uncompensated taking of that private property.
Villareal's conclusion founders on two grounds. First, Villareal assumes that,
in order for the federal government to invoke its Property Clause power, it
would have to assume ownership over the species involved, thus interfering
with some ownership claim others might make. See id. at 1150. As just demonstrated, the United States need not assert that it owns a species to protect it
under the Property Clause, provided it demonstrates how the protected species enhances the value of the federal property. Second, Villareal's conclusion
that protecting endangered and listed species would result in an uncompensated taking of private property says nothing about the federal government's
Property Clause power. The literature that Villareal cites discussing whether
endangered species protection constitutes a taking of private property, see id.
at 1151 n.201, does not discuss this possibility only if the federal government
is exercising its Property Clause power. Presumably, if the protections of the
ESA result in a taking of private property-and I need not express an opinion
on whether they do-then the government's duty to compensate arises regardless of the constitutional authorization for the ESA, be it the Commerce
Clause, the Treaty Clause, or the Property Clause. See also supra note 466
(arguing that Fifth Amendment protection against takings only guarantees
compensation in most cases, not invalidation of federal legislation).
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powers. The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters, which the act defines as "waters of
the United States, including the territorial seas."54 The Army
Corps of Engineers has defined this term to include certain
types of wetlands. 545 The Supreme Court has upheld these
regulations as they apply to wetlands adjacent to waters used
or potentially used for navigation, 546 but recently invalidated
the regulations to the extent that they applied to ponds and
other wetlands "that are not adjacent to open water."547 Although the Court rested its conclusion on an interpretation of
the statutory text, it also resolved this issue against the agency
in part because of the "significant constitutional questions" implicated by the agency's broader reading of the statute. 54 8 This
recent decision does not vitiate the Commerce Clause potential
for reaching isolated wetlands-Congress could, after all, respond to the Court's decision by enacting clear federal legislation reaching the previously regulated conduct-but the Court
has nonetheless indicated its doubts that the federal government can reach these waters under the Commerce Clause.
A Property Clause justification for wetlands protection
would not necessarily protect all wetlands reached by the regulation but would protect some. Clearly, the federal government
could apply this regulation to isolated wetlands on its own
property. Moreover, like the Property Clause justification for
the ESA, Congress could in clear legislation indicate that migratory birds constitute an essential attribute of the beauty and
value of public lands; that migratory birds rely on isolated wetlands for their habitat and breeding; and that filling such wetlands would damage the property of the United States. This
would provide justification for the broad reach of federal authority against challenges to the federal government's power
under the Commerce Clause.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS

Expanding the federal government's role within the states,
as a broadly read Property Clause would, necessarily entails
544. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994).
545. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1999).
546. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,

129-31 (1985).
547. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct.
675, 680 (2001).
548. Id. at 683-84.
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contemplation of the relationship between the federal government and the governments of the affected states. It also raises
the possibility that the Property Clause, standing alone, may
preempt state regulation of federal lands in certain instances.
1.

Federalism Concerns

The previous section addressed the federalism implications
of a broadly read Property Clause. This next section will discuss how federalism principles may affect not just the hypothetical statutes considered in Part II, but also the last hypothetical statute introduced at the beginning of this Article and
until now set aside. In that hypothetical statute, Congress enacts a clear statute that dictates land-use planning within a
certain radius around a national park. The Park Service directly regulates everything from the presence of fast food restaurants and trinket shops to the color and style of buildings in
order to protect the visual corridor leading to a national park.
This Article reserved consideration of this hypothetical
statute until now for three reasons. First, the earlier-discussed
hypothetical statutes provided more straightforward constitutional applications to explain the Article's proposed Property
Clause theory. Second, in the context of this hypothetical act,
the various strains of the Court's jurisprudence governing the
relationship between the federal government and the states
come together. Although Professor Merritt has argued that the
Court's federalism jurisprudence primarily preserves state
autonomy, 549 the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence still
echoes of the territorial model of federalism, i.e. the belief that
certain subject matters belong to the federal government and
others to the states. 550 Finally, unlike the earlier-discussed hypothetical acts, some evidence exists that Congress has attempted to extend the reach of its Property Clause power to
551
this extent.
549. See Merritt, Three Faces, supra note 499, at 1572.
550. See Solid Waste Agency, 121 S. Ct. at 684 (noting constitutional difficulties in extending federal regulation in a manner that "would result in a
significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over
land and water use"); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000)
("[W]e can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders
denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims."); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (expressing concern about extending the reach of federal regulation to family law and education).
551. In the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
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Provided that Congress speaks clearly and makes the general parameters of the regulations known, such legislation
should pass muster under the Property Clause. The Commerce
Clause may not provide authorization for this kind of local zoning regulation around a specific park. After all, the hypothetical act regulates wholly intrastate conduct that falls within the
ambit of activities traditionally regulated by states and local
governments. Nevertheless, the tangible presence of federal
property-rather than the abstract concern that Congress may
have with interstate commerce-provides a sufficient nexus between the federal concern and the activity regulated. Although
the outer limits of this regulatory authority remain uncertain,
act should fall within the Property
this specific hypothetical
552
Clause's reach.
2. The Dormant Property Clause?
In further extending the analogy between the Commerce
Clause and the Property Clause, one might even conclude that
the very existence of the Property Clause preempts certain
state actions. In other words, just as the Court has developed
the notion of the dormant Commerce Clause-an area of federal authority that the states may not enter, at least not without express federal permission 553 -the Property Clause might
544-544p (1994), Congress decided to protect the scenic vistas of the Columbia
River Gorge. The Gorge consists of the river itself and public, state, and private lands on either side of the river. Congress established a commission to
create a land use plan for the area. The Ninth Circuit upheld the Act as a
valid exercise of the Commerce Clause power, noting, but not deciding, that
Congress might have the authority to enact the legislation under the Property
Clause. See Columbia River Gorge United-Protecting People & Property v.
Yeutter, 960 F.2d 110, 113-14 (9th Cir. 1992).
552. As suggested earlier, Congress could not directly require the states to
enact legislation to protect the national parks in the manner described in the
text, nor could Congress require state officials to enforce federal requirements.
Such means of enforcing federal law would run afoul of the Court's decisions in
New York v. United States and Printz. Nevertheless, Congress could induce
the states into enacting such protections using its spending power. For example, Congress could withhold payments in lieu of taxes on federal lands if
states did not create regulations that minimized visual impacts on national
parks. This restriction would be germane to the federal interest and would
not likely be too coercive in effect.
553. The dormant Commerce Clause limits state actions that discriminate
against or unduly burden interstate commerce on the theory that such discrimination or burdens would interfere with the plenary authority of Congress
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. See Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Fla.
Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) ("In cases involving the... dormant
Commerce Clause, both interstate and foreign, the Federal Government has
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contain a dormant Property Clause. At first blush, such a suggestion may appear contrary to received precedent. After all,
even in the Kieppe v. New Mexico decision, which involved the
federal government regulating its own land, the Court appeared to hold that the Property Clause standing alone would
not preempt otherwise applicable state law absent explicit federal legislation. 554 The Court has also recognized in other cases
that states can regulate federal property through otherwise applicable state law.555 Moreover, the existence of a dormant
Property Clause power would appear to empower the federal
government with exclusive authority over federal property.
This would conflate the terms of the Enclave Clause (which
supplies an express means through which the federal government can achieve exclusive authority to make legislation for an
area) and the Property Clause (which is silent on the matter).
Nevertheless, support does exist for the proposition that
the Property Clause has dormant emanations that limit state
action. Perhaps the clearest suggestion of this possibility came
in a largely overlooked decision, United States v. Little Lake
Misere Land Co. 556 Although the decision does not even cite the
Property Clause, two aspects of its reasoning present evidence
for the existence of a dormant Property Clause. Little Lake
Misere involved a private claim to minerals that underlay a migratory bird refuge in Louisiana. Louisiana law provided that
whenever the United States acquired land in Louisiana, mineral rights retained in the land were not subject to extinguishment but would persevere; mineral rights lying under private
lands would ordinarily lapse after the passage of time. 557 The
Court's decision holding the Louisiana law inapplicable to federal lands took several steps. First, the Court held that, as a
general rule, federal common law, not state law, governed the
acquisition and vindication of federal property rights. 558 The
Court then asked whether local law could supply the federal
not affirmatively acted, and it is the responsibility of the judiciary to determine whether action taken by state or local authorities unduly threatens the
values the Commerce Clause was intended to serve.").
554. See Kieppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976); see also
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918).
555. See, e.g., Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228, 231 (1925); Omaechevarria,
246 U.S. at 346 ("The police power of the State extends over the federal public
domain, at least when there is no legislation by Congress on the subject.").
556. 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
557. See id. at 582 n.2, 584 (describing Louisiana law).
558. Id. at 590-94.
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rule of decision. In answering this question no, the Court held
that Louisiana law was unsuitable to apply in this instance because, among other things, it discriminated against the federal
55 9
government.
Undoubtedly, some would dismiss the Little Lake Misere
decision as simply reflecting the more general rules concerning
federal lands. These rules provide that federal lands must pass
through express grant; that courts will construe grants in favor
of the United States and against the grantee; and that the doctrines of adverse possession, easements by prescription, easements by implication, and easements by necessity do not apply
to the public lands of the United States. These doctrines,
which apply specifically to federal lands, displace otherwise applicable state law, and advocates of the narrow view might concede their viability because the United States can set the rules
for the disposition of its land.
These assertions, however, do not fully explain the decision
in Little Lake Misere. An ordinary landowner cannot refuse to
participate in otherwise-applicable state law of adverse possession and the like. Moreover, this possible explanation by those
advocating the narrow view overlooks the justification that the
courts have given for these rules: Different rules apply to the
sovereign in its ownership of land than to private parties.
Whatever one might feel about the validity of these particular
rules, they nevertheless stem not from the federal government's
role as proprietor of these lands alone; they have their roots in
the fact that the federal government is a sovereign and has
sovereign powers over its lands. These doctrines, along with
the equal-treatment doctrine enunciated in Little Lake Misere,
suggest that the property power of the United States as embodied in the Property Clause may have dormant emanations, areas that the states cannot touch even through positive legislation.
CONCLUSION
Legal commentators have largely ignored the Property
Clause to the detriment of both constitutional scholarship and
the Clause itself. This oversight stems from three interrelated
factors. First, one can easily relegate study of the federal government's relationship with its property into the specialized,
abstruse, rarified, and sometimes-boring field of public lands
559. See id. at 594-604.
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law. Scholars of constitutional law should not have to distract
themselves with this more specialized area, for the same reason
that they should not have to ponder the federal government's
power to establish a uniform rule for bankruptcies, for example, 560 or the power of Congress to grant letters of marque and
reprisal. Second, the natural tendency of lawyers and legal
scholars to plough already well-ploughed fields has contributed
to ignoring the Property Clause. It is more useful-or, perhaps,
more publishable-to contribute to the ongoing debate about
the extent of congressional power under the Commerce Clause,
the reach of the dormant Commerce Clause, and how these issues interact with federalism concerns, than to ponder the fate
and management of nearly one-third of the real property in the
United States. 561 Third, because Congress and federal agencies
have not pushed the limits of the federal government's authority under the Property Clause, interesting and hard cases have
not arisen to challenge scholars of constitutional law. Instead,
these scholars ponder the extent of the federal government's
power where Congress has attempted to flex its muscle.
Thus, the debate about the reach of the Property Clause
has limited itself to the margins. The debate has taken place
only between those who adopt an unsupportable, narrow interpretation of the Clause, and those who superficially adopt a
broader interpretation without appreciating the full extent of
560. I have picked the example deliberately, for Professor Tribe's most recent treatise has lumped the Property Clause into the same section discussing
the federal power over bankruptcies. See TRIBE, supra note 21, § 5-8.
561. In a recent article, Professor Eric Freyfogle has observed that successful environmental law scholarship-successful, that is, as measured by placement in prestigious law reviews-has skirted important bedrock principles relating to principles of environmental protection and has tended to focus on
peripheral issues such as environmental federalism. See Eric T. Freyfogle,
Five Paths of EnvironmentalScholarship, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 115, 132-34. If
Freyfogle is correct, then my efforts here could be seen as falling into the same
pattern. Nevertheless, I believe that successful environmental legal scholarship still has much to offer in linking environmental and natural resources
law to other areas of law, such as constitutional law. In the introduction, I
showed that the Property Clause escapes the thinking of most scholars of constitutional law. My hope in writing this Article is that scholars of constitutional law will start thinking about this power and its implications seriously.
Professor Richard Lazarus has argued that some justices on the Supreme
Court do not view environmental law as a distinct area of law, but as merely a
factual context for the raising of more important issues. Richard J. Lazarus,
Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme
Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 706 (2000). Making the Property Clause more a
part of the standard introduction to and thought about constitutional law generally may help with the phenomenon that Lazarus documented.
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the Property Clause power. The advocates of the narrow interpretation assert either that the United States cannot legally
own any property within the admitted states, or that, if it does,
it has only the powers of an ordinary proprietor. The advocates
of the broader interpretation fail to grasp the potentially rich
authority that the Clause vests in the federal government.
Those scholars who have examined the potential limits of the
Property Clause turn not to the Constitution for possible guidance, but to the common law of nuisance, either for substance
or for a balancing mechanism to evaluate the extent of the federal government's authority. Use of this analogy, albeit a start,
overlooks the potential richness of this federal power and reflects a silent agreement with those who read the Property
Clause narrowly that this Clause is not fully a part of the
Constitution.
The overlooking of the Property Clause in constitutional
scholarship is inexcusable in the end. In a time when the relative powers of the federal and state governments have received
thorough analysis and examination and reanalysis and reexamination, one would think that the federal government's
ownership of land within every state-and prominent ownership in some states-would attract attention. If the effect that
intrastate wheat consumption has on interstate commerce or
the limitations on state authority to regulate the interstate
traffic in garbage can occupy the attention of legal scholars,
surely the federal regulation of a few million acres within a
state should as well.
The Property Clause should also occupy the attention of legal scholars because of the rich history and broad authority associated with the Clause. The Clause's history spans some of
the most momentous constitutional events of the country's history, including the debates over the Articles of Confederation,
the debates over ratifying the Constitution, the decision in
Dred Scott, and the more recent constitutional tension between
federal and state power. Remarkably, the scope of a power that
the Supreme Court has repeatedly described as limitless has
received little analysis. Looking at analogous provisions of the
Constitution, this Article concludes that the federal government's power to dispose of and to govern activities on its property most resembles the spending power. Therefore, courts
should rarely, if ever, hold such acts unconstitutional. Similarly, the federal government's regulation of extraterritorial activities to protect federal lands most resembles its efforts to
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regulate intrastate commerce under its Commerce Clause authority. Therefore, Congress can regulate extraterritorial activities under the Property Clause when substantially related
to federal property. If this analogy holds, some state regulation, standing alone, may also unconstitutionally tread on the
dormant emanations of the Property Clause.
This Article attempts to raise the Property Clause as a
topic worthy of discussion among scholars of constitutional law,
but also as one worthy of continued and more thorough discussion among scholars in the fields of environmental, natural resources, and public lands law. This Clause has always formed
a bedrock principle for federal protection of federal natural resources and may emerge as an important constitutional basis
for environmental regulation generally. At a time when the
Court has begun to restrict Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause, advocates of greater environmental protections should explore the Property Clause as an alternative
source of congressional authority.

